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Abstract 
This study is an analysis of how public policy changes 
in China influenced the development of rural enterprises 
from 1978 to 1992. Starting in 1978, China's leadership 
implemented a series of economic reforms aimed at rebuilding 
domestic legitimacy by catching up with the industrialized 
nations of the West and the new industrial powers of Asia. 
These reforms in combination created a political and 
economic environment that proved conducive to the 
development of rural enterprises. 
Despite the undoubted progress of the 1980s, changes in 
public policy have been inadequate, and ideological and 
political problems continue to prevent rural enterprises 
from making even greater developments. However, mounting 
social and economic problems, such as rural unemployment, 
and the economic strength of rural enterprises will push 
against these constraints. These conditions may force the 
leadership to take further changes in public policy which 
will allow rural enterprises to play increasingly important 
roles in the Chinese economy. 
The thesis consists of nine chapters. Chapter One is a 
general introduction to the research area. Chapter Two deals 
with the evolution of rural enterprises policy both before 
and after 1978. Chapter Three examines regional policy 
variations for rural enterprises. Chapter Four focuses on 
the implications of market reform and market expansion for 
viii 
rural enterprises. Chapter Five assesses the impacts of 
rural employment and regional development strategies for 
rural enterprises. Chapter Six examines financial and 
taxation policies towards rural enterprises. Chapter Seven 
and Chapter Eight deal with policies to improve the 
management and technology of rural enterprises. Chapter Nine 
draws conclusions and evaluates likely future development of 
rural enterprises. 
Ix 
Note On Transliteration 
This thesis uses the pinyin system of transliteration 
for all names, including those that are commonly known in 
their wade-giles transliteration in English. For example, I 
use Beijing instead of Peking, Zhejiang instead of Chekiang, 
and so on. However, when directly quoting an author or when 
citing book and article titles, the author's original 
transliteration is used. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 The Significance of the Study 
For many third world nations, the axiom that "big is 
best" seems to have been at the heart of economic 
development strategies. The establishment of large 
industrial complexes (most notably iron and steel furnaces) 
has been seen as the key to laying the foundations for 
further economic development and the creation of a vibrant 
domestic economy. But the evidence of recent years is that 
the expected economic growth and increased employment that 
large-scale industrialization was supposed to generate has, 
at best, been slow in appearing. As a result, many 
development economists have increasingly turned their 
attention to the potential impact of emphasizing the 
development of small-scale enterprises. 
This shift in emphasis has been reflected by the 
actions of both important international institutions and 
national governments. For example, the World Bank has been 
steering more of its loans towards small-scale enterprises 
at the expense of large industrial complexes. Some 
developing countries have intensified their measures to 
support and protect such enterprises. In contrast to the 
traditional large-scale complexes, small-scale enterprises 
are thought to have made significant contributions to both 
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employment generation and the diffusion of skills and 
technology. These developments have been reflected by the 
growth in academic literature analyzing promotional policies 
adopted in developing countries for the development of small 
and medium-scale industries. ' 
Although large-scale state owned complexes continue to 
play an important role in the Chinese economy, rural 
enterprises have developed rapidly, and have become a major 
prop of the rural economy and an important part of the 
national economy since 1978. The following data clearly 
indicate rural enterprises' important role in China's 
national economy. In 1989, there were more than 18 million 
rural enterprises nationwide. They turned out 840.3 billion 
yuan in output value, an amount equal to the nation's entire 
1979 gross product. The total industrial output value of 
rural enterprises from 1981 to 1989 increased at an annual 
rate of 28.6 percent, thus playing an increasingly important 
role in national economic development and social life. 2 
The development of rural enterprises has changed the 
old economic structure which was largely dependent on 
farmland and become a means by which the total output value 
of rural enterprises, as a proportion of that for rural 
society, increased from 31.4 percent in 1978 to 58 percent 
in 1989. From 1979 to 1989, rural enterprises ploughed more 
than 80 billion yuan from their profits back into rural 
undertakings. 3 Without the contribution from rural 
enterprises, the financial situation for education, health 
3 
care and welfare facilities in many rural areas would be 
worse since local governments have faced fiscal restraints. 
Rural enterprises have also become an outlet for the 
surplus rural labour force. In 1989, some 93.67 million 
people worked in rural enterprises, accounting for 23 
percent of the total rural labour force, or 62 percent of 
the increased labour force from 1978 to 1989, or half of the 
current total labour surplus. 4 
Between 1979 and 1989, rural enterprises, direct 
subsidy of agricultural production was about one-third of 
the state investment in forestry, water conservancy and 
meteorology during the same period, thus considerably 
promoting agricultural production. 
5 In these 11 years, 
farmers across the country gained one-fourth of their net 
income from rural enterprises, and during 1986 to 1990, the 
proportion rose to 50 percent. 
6 Since 1985, the net increase 
in taxes from rural enterprises has accounted for 50-06 of 
that in the state's financial revenue. In some areas, where 
rural enterprises are highly developed, local financial 
revenue is mainly from rural enterprises. 
7 From 1984 to 
1989, the total export value of rural enterprises reached 
US$ 35.5 billion, as much as US$ 10.5 billion in 1989 alone, 
representing about one-fifth of the country's total export 
value. 8 
The data such as the above show that developing rural 
enterprises has been a distinguishing characteristic of the 
rural development strategy in China since 1978. The 
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development of rural enterprises has contributed immensely 
to the phenomenal growth of the rural economy and improved 
living standards in China's rural areas since 1978. The 
development of rural enterprises has also helped to boost 
agricultural production itself, while changing the 
traditional rural economic structure from one dominated by 
farming to a far more diversified economy. Furthermore, 
rural enterprises have played a very important role in 
providing rural employment, increasing financial revenue and 
earning foreign exchange. 
Chinese government policy makers are also well aware 
of the importance of rural enterprises. For example, a 1984 
joint State Council and Central Committee communique9 listed 
an impressive array of the beneficial consequences of 
allowing rural enterprises to flourish. The communique 
indicated that village and town enterprises are recognized 
as an important component of a diversified economy, an 
important pillar of agricultural production, an important 
way for the masses of peasants to achieve common prosperity, 
and an important source of state revenue. The development of 
village and town enterprises was further described as an 
important force in the national economy. 
Given this laudative "mid-term report", it is not 
surprising that some Western economists have subscribed to 
the view that rural enterprises are well on the way to 
changing the entire nature of Chinese society. For example, 
a report in The Economist suggested that: "China's economy 
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has produced a nice twist on Mao Zedong's theory of 
revolutionary war. The private enterprises of the 
countryside are surrounding, and threaten eventually to 
swamp, the state-owned industries of the cities". 
10 
The year 1978 marks a watershed in the study of the 
importance of rural enterprises for the Chinese economy. 
Before this date, the dominance of 'leftist' ideology and, 
equally as important, the disbanding of economic research 
institutes meant that no research on rural enterprises was 
undertaken within China. Outside China, some western 
economists, however, did undertake research on China's rural 
enterprises. The main focus of those works was rural 
industry, the main part of rural enterprises in China before 
1978. The most important contributions to this field of 
study are Rural industrialization in China by Jon 
Sigurdson", and Rural Small-Scale Industry In The People's 
Republic of China by the American Rural Small-Scale Industry 
Delegation12. ion Sigurdson focused his analysis on county- 
run enterprises. He examined rural industrialization within 
counties, giving the rationale for the various programs, an 
analysis of two model counties, and some estimate of how 
well the programs have worked. The crucial flaw in the 
American Rural Small-Scale Industry Delegation's work was 
that they interpreted what they were told, and failed to 
question the validity of the raw data they were given to 
work with. 
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In addition to these two books, two important articles 
are worthy of comment, namely "Small Industry and the 
Chinese Model of Development", 
13 and "China's Rural 
Industries: 'Self-reliant Systems or Independent Kingdoms'', 
both by Carl Riskin. 14 The first article, published in 
1971, examined the evolution and implementation of China's 
policy towards small and medium industry. In this article, 
the first four sections were concerned with the period of 
the First Five-Year Plan (1953-57), while the latter four 
dealt with the dramatic activities of the Great Leap Forward 
(1958-60) and the attempts to rationalize the small-industry 
programme in the 1960s. Riskin's second article published 
in 1978 mainly dealt with the roots of these events in the 
development of China's rural industries from the 1960s. It 
evaluated the impact of the Cultural Revolution on rural 
industrialization, and sought to place the polemics over the 
socio-political implications of this form of development 
into the context of changing objective conditions. It is 
necessary to mention that the scope of all these works 
included county-level state owned enterprises. Although 
this was a valid approach at the time, the definition of 
rural enterprises used in this study does not include 
county-run enterprises (see section 1.2). As a result, these 
earlier works have only a limited application to this study. 
Since 1978, there has been an explosion of articles on 
rural enterprises within China. Some Chinese scholars have 
undertaken research on the position and characteristics of 
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rural enterprises, and indeed disclosed much useful 
statistical information. But inevitably this research was 
deficient in that it lacked political analysis of the 
development of rural enterprises because of domestic 
political obstacles. 
What is surprising is that although Chinese rural 
enterprises have developed dramatically since 1978, few 
articles and books have been published in western countries. 
In the early 1980s, the only articles of note were the 
following: "Rural Enterprise in China, 1977-7911 by Jack 
Gray; 15 "Commune- and Brigade-Run Enterprises in Rural 
China: an overview" by Keith and Kimberley Griffin; 16 and 
"Commune- and Brigade-Run Industries in Rural China: Some 
Recent Observations" by J. L. Enos. 17 Enos and Griffin and 
Griffin indicated a few of the characteristics, sizes of the 
commune- and brigade-run enterprises sec, -or, and briefly 
discussed some of the recent changes in policy affecting 
this sector. Gray described the growth, the regime and some 
changes of purpose in relation to rural enterprises, and 
discussed changes in the control of rural enterprises 
between 1977 and 1979. However, although these authors 
undoubtedly made some contribution to the literature on 
rural enterprises in China, their publications suffered from 
the following limitations. 
First, Gray did not draw a clear line between rural 
enterprises and local industry. Secondly, none has paid any 
attention to the private sector of rural enterprises. It 
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could be possible that their primary stumbling block is lack 
of detailed information because debate and information 
concerning these sectors was not published in the Chinese 
press until the late 1980s. 
In the late 1980s, more noteworthy articles were 
published. Two articles are especially worthy of comment: 
"The Development of Town and Township Enterprises in 
Mainland China Since 197911 by Chen Tesheng18 and "Policy, 
19 Practice and The Private Sector in China" by Suan Young 
The first article briefly discussed the theoretical basis 
for promoting town and township enterprises, the evolution 
and characteristics of these enterprises, the reasons and 
measures for their development, as well as their advantages 
and disadvantages. The second article examined the growth of 
the private sector in China since 1978, including the 
original goals of its promotion and development, and the 
impact of this growth on Chinese assessmen7-s of the role of 
private business in the Chinese economy. Without doubt, 
their articles have represented valuable research into rural 
enterprises and the private sector. However, the 
implications of other policy changes, such as rural 
employment and regional development policies, were not 
discussed. Policy analysis has also been inadequate. 
The most important book on this subject is China's 
Rural Industry: Structure, Development, and Reform. 20 This 
six-part, nineteen-chapter volume is the result of a joint 
project by the World Bank and the Economics Institute of the 
9 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. In 1986 and 1987, the 
joint world Bank and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
research team conducted surveys and extensive interviews on 
China's township, village, and private enterprise (TV. D) 
sector, involving 1,174 workers, over 100 enterprises and 
their directors, and sixty-seven township officials. It is 
the first comprehensive study of China's TVP sector based on 
systematic empirical evidence. The survey data collected as 
part of the project is comprehensive and basically reliable. 
The topics covered in the book, such as ownership, labour, 
efficiency, the role of governments, and comparative 
perspectives, are both theoretically and practically 
important and relevant. However, this research is not 
without its limitations. First, the research has been 
overtaken by the pace of change within China. As this 
research was completed before 1987, important changes that 
occurred after 1986 are not included. Secondly, there is the 
limitation of the analysis of public policy, with no 
detailed analysis comparing policy before and after 1978. 
Therefore, as far as the literature reviewed above is 
concerned, research has tended to neglect the study of the 
impact of public policy on the development of rural 
enterprises. However, public policy has been extremely 
important in China since it has determined not only the 
extent to which rural enterprises have been developed (and 
what prospects rural enterprises will have in the future), 
but also whether rural enterprises should be allowed to be 
10 
developed at all! Therefore, an analysis of changes of 
public policy since 1978 must be a crucial component of any 
analysis of the development of rural enterprises. 
1.2 The Definition of Rural Enterprises 
One of the problems entailed in studying rural 
enterprises in China is that of defining what constitutes a 
"rural enterprise". There has been no united definition of 
rural enterprises, a problem exacerbated by the economic 
changes enacted after 1978. Before this date, the definition 
of rural enterprises was much broader than that used in the 
era of reform. 
Carl Riskin gave the following definition: "rural 
industries refer to those industries run by the rural 
communes and their production brigades and state industries 
at sub-provincial level, chiefly those operated by the hsien 
(county). 1114 Jon Sigurdson's definition of "rural 
industries" was similar to Carl Riskin's. He stated that: 
"rural industry is, in this monograph, not 
defined on the basis of size but as any local 
industrial unit run by county, commune, or 
brigade. The enterprises may be collectively 
owned, jointly financed by the state and 
collective units, or wholly owned by the state but 
local management. Rural industry also includes 
11 
units attached to middle schools, hospitals, and 
health clinics. 1121 
Jack Gray also used the term "local industry" 
interchangeably with "rural industry". However, within China 
itself, the terms "local industry" and "rural industry" 
have distinctive and different meanings. "Local industry" 
comprised all industrial enterprises under the jurisdiction 
of government organs at the provincial level and below. 
Hence, rural industry is a part of, and does not equal, 
local industry. 
In sum, the definition of rural industry that most 
western economists used before 1978 equates to industrial 
units run by counties, communes, or brigades. It therefore 
includes not only collectively owned enterprises, but even 
those units wholly owned by the state. 
Since 1978, there has been considerable confusion 
within the Chinese press as to what terms to use to describe 
rural enterprises. The terms commune and brigade 
enterprises, township and village enterprises, rural 
enterprises have all been used at various times in various 
Chinese journals, newspapers and official documents. 
Officially, the name of "commune and brigade enterprises" 
was changed to "village and town enterprises" in 1984. 
"In view of the fact that communes and production 
brigades will become town and village co-operative 
economic organizations, many enterprises of a 
cooperative nature jointly run by some households 
12 
or by households in different areas as well as 
many jointly operated and individual enterprises 
have emerged in recent years. Such enterprises 
will tend gradually to congregate in small market 
towns. Therefore, the term "commune and brigade 
enterprises" used in the past can no longer 
reflect the newly developing situation of the 
enterprises of this category. It is suggested that 
such enterprises be called "village and town 
enterprises.,, 22 
In fact, rural enterprises should include private rural 
enterprises although private enterprises were not legalized 
until 1988. For example, rural industry in China's Rural 
Industry: Structure, Development, and Reform, edited by 
William A. Byrd and Lin Qingsong, included private rural 
enterprises. 
Even in the Chinese press, there is confusion over 
what constitutes a rural enterprise with the term "township 
and town enterprises" often used interchangeably with "rural 
enterprises". For example, the English language journal, 
Beijing Review, gives the following definition: "Township 
enterprises include industries which have been run by 
communes, production brigades and teams since the 
establishment of communes. They also include associations of 
enterprises set up by peasants in recent years, enterprises 
jointly run by various rural economic sectors and individual 
23 
enterprises". However, in the same journal, another 
13 
article gave the following definition of rural enterprises: 
"Rural enterprises are run by townships or towns (The 
people's communes before 1983), by the villages (previously 
production teams), by teams (previously production teams), 
24 by several households together or individual households". 
Thus, in essence, rural enterprises and township and town 
enterprises are the same entities under different names. 
For the convenience of this research the author 
follows the definition of rural enterprises adopted in the 
Chinese press. Rural enterprises or village and town 
enterprises include all factories and companies in industry, 
construction, transport, agriculture, and husbandry, 
commerce and catering which are operated by towns 
(townships), villages and individuals. It is important to 
note that government policy towards rural enterprises is 
different in terms of ownership structures of rural 
enterprises. Therefore, in my research, rural enterprises 
are divided into the following two categories according to 
the ownership structures of rural enterprises. 
The first category is those enterprises originally 
belonging to communes or large production teams, which now 
belong to agricultural cooperatives or integrated economic 
organizations. In some cases, they call themselves 
"companies", and are generally administered by rural small 
town governments. In rural and small town government 
enterprises, there is often no clear line drawn between 
14 
government and enterprises. They all bear the clear mark of 
collective ownership status. 
The second category comprises the private sector of 
rural enterprises. These enterprises can themselves be 
subdivided into two broad areas; private enterprises and 
individual enterprises. The term "private enterprises" 
refers to those whose means of production are privately 
owned and with eight or more employees, 25 as compared with 
the category of "individual enterprises" meaning a business 
started with private funds with seven or less employees. 
Private enterprises are officially classified into the 
following three types: (1) Individual investor; (2) 
Partnership; (3) Limited liability company. Individual 
investor refers to enterprises managed by a single person. 
Partnership refers to two or more people who invest as an 
association, sharing joint management. Limited liability 
company refers to investors who are responsible to the 
company for a specific amount, and the company may use the 
entire amount of its capital to assume the responsibility of 
the debt of the enterprise. 
In addition, most private enterprises are located in 
rural areas. The information in 1988 indicated that about 83 
percent of the capital funds and labour of private 
enterprises were located in rural areas. Over 80 per cent of 
private enterprises were based in the countryside. 26 
Furthermore, the government has provided the same policy 
treatment towards individual and private enterprises 
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irrespective of whether they exist in rural or urban areas. 
Therefore, I will analyze general policy towards individual 
and private enterprises instead of towards rural private and 
individual enterprises. 
1.3 Research Hypotheses 
This thesis aims to demonstrate that the main stimulus 
for the extraordinary growth of rural enterprises in post- 
Mao China has been the removal of restrictions to their 
operations. Although the introduction of special programmes 
and incentives have played a beneficial role, they have only 
reinforced the natural proliferation of rural enterprises 
resulting from the removal of obstacles to their 
functioning. As such the main contribution of the reform era 
has been the creation of a political and economic 
environment conducive to the expansion of the number, type, 
and functions of rural enterprises. 
After the death of Mao Zedong and the arrest of the 
radical "Gang of Four" in 1976, Chinese politics entered a 
new age. Although Mao had an intense desire to turn China 
into a modern industrial country, this desire coexisted with 
an even stronger desire to ensure that the social and 
cultural revolution should occur alongside (and indeed, 
could help facilitate) the industrial revolution. For Mao, 
economic development should not be seen as an end in itself, 
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but as a means to the more important end of the transition 
to a communist society. 
After 1976, or more correctly, after Deng Xiaoping took 
de facto control from the quasi-Maoist Hua Guofeng in 1978, 
the ideological basis of decision making began to change. At 
the risk of over simplification, the ascendancy to power of 
Deng Xiaoping marked a shift from "politics in command" to 
"economics in command". In an attempt to "catch up" with the 
industrialized nations of the West and the new industrial 
powers of Asia (Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, 
Taiwan, and Hong Kong), the social and cultural revolutions 
were essentially postponed. 
As China was still a backward nation in the early 
stages of development, it was argued that the development of 
a modern industrial society must occur before the transition 
to communism could take place. Expanding the productive 
forces therefore increasingly became the base-line for any 
change in society. Whatever helped in economic development, 
including private and even foreign ownership of the means of 
production, should not only be tolerated, but actively 
encouraged. As this thesis will show, this change in the 
basic ideological orientation of Chinese decision making had 
a profound impact on the expansion of rural enterprises, 
although, as shall be seen, developments have been far from 
trouble free. 
Rural reform was the entry point of the reform program. 
In an effort to increase rural production, the household 
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production responsibility system was introduced, rural 
markets were reopened, procurement prices were raised to 
improve incentives, and agricultural taxes were reduced. 
Without these reforms, the increased agricultural output, 
rural savings, and surplus labour that were a precondition 
for the development of rural enterprises would not have 
existed. 
Although the removal of restrictions on the role and 
scope of rural enterprises has been the principal source of 
their expansion and develpment, the goverment has also 
implemented a number of specific policies aimed at 
facilitating further developments. These special programmes 
have been primarily targetted at the development of the 
collective sector of rural enterprise, and have greatly 
contributed to growth in this area. However, the key element 
in the considerable growth of the private sector remains the 
simple tolerance of their existence by a government which 
previously prohibited their existence. 
In addition to policies directly concerned with the 
expansion of rural enterprises, reforms in other areas of 
the political-economic system have also influenced the scope 
and nature of developments. Of particular note are the 
extension of decision-making power to local governments, 
individuals and enterprises; the partial adoption of market 
mechanisms; a new rural employment strategy; and a regional 
development strategy based on exploiting regional 
comparative advantage. In fundamentally altering the 
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underlying political and economic system in China - not 
least in promoting the acceptance of the legitimate role of 
market forces and non-state ownership - these policy changes 
have significantly aided the development of rural 
enterprises. Indeed, the specific policy changes relating to 
rural enterprises could not have been implemented without 
such a reform of the basic structure of the Chinese 
political-economic system. 
The overall impact of these changes has been the 
creation of a more relaxed environment and more favourable 
conditions for the development of rural enterprises. As a 
result, since 1978, rural enterprises have developed 
rapidly. As I have indicated in section one of this chapter, 
rural enterprises have become a major prop of the rural 
economy and an important part of the national economy. 
However, despite this phenomenal progress, the change 
of public policy has been inadequate, and many 
restrictions to the effective functioning of rural 
enterprises in China remain in place. The old economic 
structure has been only partially dismantled, and rural 
enterprises still face considerable discrimination (whether 
they are collective-run or private-run enterprises) in the 
economic system. This is most clearly evident in official 
policy regarding access to raw materials and credits, where 
state-run enterprises receive preferential treatment. Rural 
enterprises have not enjoyed the same competitive position 
as state-enterprises in many other areas such as product 
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transport, retailing and export, and the supply of key 
production elements. Rural enterprises cannot fulfil their 
true potential within the Chinese economy until these 
anomalies and restraints on operation are removed. 
In addition, some of the special policies designed to 
facilitate the growth of rural enterprises have been 
inadequate. Perhaps the best example here is the 
preferential treatment accorded to rural enterprises in 
credit procurement and taxation policy, which have been 
gradually, and prematurely, reduced. 
Arguably the greatest challenge to the future 
development of rural enterprises in China is the fact that 
despite the dramatic and radical changes in the ideological 
basis of Chinese decision making in the 1980's, some 
ideological and political problems still remain. 
Essentially, not everybody in the Chinese political system 
shares the belief that rural enterprises are a good thing. 
on a practical level, some critics have complained, not 
without justification, that the development of rural 
enterprises has affected agricultural production, and the 
development of rural enterprises has polluted the 
environment. But even the fundamental ideological question 
of the acceptability of rural enterprises has not been 
solved once and for all. Some conservative leaders have 
expressed concern that the existence and development of 
private enterprise might lead to private entrepreneurs 
becoming a distinct class infiltrating the government 
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sector, and could finally result in the restoration of 
capitalism, which would change the face of socialism and the 
nature of society in China. Some critics have also warned 
against the over rapid development of these enterprises, 
seeing them as a threat to state owned enterprises that will 
result in a widening disparity between the rich and the 
poor and between different regions. This suspicion of rural 
enterprises has been fuelled by accusations that rural 
enterprises, and especially private enterprises, have been 
the source of much corruption. These ideological and 
political problems have been an obstacle restraining rural 
enterprises, ability to make an even greater development. 
Notwithstanding these problems, it should be recognized 
that both ideological and public policy changes have 
facilitated a dramatic and rapid expansion in the scope and 
importance of rural enterprises since 1978. Despite the 
obstacles that remain to their further expansion, I believe 
that growing social and economic problems, such as rural 
unemployment, and the economic strength of rural enterprises 
will push against these constraints, and force the 
leadership to further reform its public policy, and allow 
rural enterprises to play an even greater role in the 
Chinese economy. 
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1.4 Research Method and Research Plan 
My study is primarily concerned with public policy 
analysis. There are many different definitions of public 
policy. For example, Eugene J. Kolb defined public policy as 
follows: "Public policies constitute the expression of a 
political system's goals and the means with which it pursues 
them.. 27 Thomas R. Dye defines public policy as "whatever 
governments choose to do or not to do.,, 28 However, one thing 
is common in that if a policy is regarded as "Public 
policy" it must to some degree have been generated or at 
least processed within the framework of governmental 
procedures, influences and organizations. 29 Rod Hague, 
Martin Harrop and Shaun Breslin3o divide the policy process 
into the following stages: (1) initiation; (2) formulation; 
(3) implementation; (3) evaluation. Although the decision- 
making process towards rural enterprises is a very 
interesting issue, the primary purpose of my study is to 
examine how public policy influenced the development of 
rural enterprises as the title of my study has clearly 
showed. Therefore, my study will mainly deal with policy 
evaluation. Thomas R. Rye thought that "Policy evaluation is 
learning about the consequences of public policy.,, 
31 Peter 
Jones considered that the evaluation of public policy is 
concerned to assess the effectiveness and propriety of 
policy. The narrower approach is concerned to judge a policy 
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only by standards internal' to the policy itself, this is, 
to deal with whether a policy succeeds in achieving its own 
aims, while the more comprehensive approach would invoke 
criteria 'external, to the policy, in other words, whether 
the aims to which a policy is committed are the right 
ones. 32 
In my study, I will take a comprehensive approach to 
analyze China's government policy towards rural enterprises. 
First, I will make an empirical examination of the policies 
themselves -- the general and specific content of policies. 
Second, I will examine actual or potential consequences of 
policies, and their immediate and long-range impact on the 
development of rural enterprises as well as politics and 
society. 
The analysis in this thesis is primarily concerned with 
the different central government policies towards rural 
enterprises. However, in the post-Mao era provincial and 
lower level authorities have been allowed flexibility in the 
implementation of central policy. At certain times in 
certain policy areas, lower level authorities have taken on 
the function of actually making policy. Therefore, I will 
also analyze why regional policy variations have occurred. 
My study mainly makes use of information and documents 
from the Chinese and English press. Party and state 
leadership speeches, documents and communiques are also 
important, requiring careful analysis for indications of 
past and future policy direction. Since 1949, the quality of 
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information in China has gone through three stages: (1) 
1949-1958, (2) 1958-1978, (3) 1978-present. 
During 1949-1958, the 
relatively sufficient, and 
information in China was 
as a consequence, some 
researchers have concentrated on this period for research 
purposes. For example, A Price control, and Rationing of Key 
Agri cul tural Goods in China by Johnson, Todd Milo 
(August, 1984), and Rural Income in the People's Republic of 
China, 1952-1957, With Special Reference to Guangdong 
Province by Peter Nolan. However, there was a distinct drop 
off in the quantity and quality of information contained in 
the Chinese press during and after "the Great Leap Forward". 
News reports and statistics were reduced, and replaced by an 
increase in rhetoric. This situation continued until the 
late 1970s. The period since 1978 has seen an improvement in 
information for both outsiders and insiders. During this 
period, China established more than twenty universities and 
colleges of finance and economics as well as economic 
institutes at both the national and provincial level. Many 
journals and books in social science were published in 
China, while detailed texts of government policies, and 
mass reaction to some policies, as well as debates over 
economic questions were more frequently published in 
national and local periodicals. 
Moreover, at the end of April 1980, the PRC was 
accepted as a member of the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank. As a result, some statistical information 
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has been brought up to internationally acceptable standards. 
However, China is a developing and socialist country, and 
some data and information are still lacking. Moreover, some 
data is misleading. For example, some private rural 
enterprises registered their business as affiliated with 
collectively owned ones in order to gain the same 
advantages, while fearing policy changes and discrimination. 
The recorded amount of private enterprises was thereby 
reduced. 
The author will undertake the following plan of 
research. In Chapter Two, the author will discuss the 
evolution of China's rural enterprise policy. This chapter 
will mainly concentrate on China's rural enterprises policy 
since 1978. However, in order to analyze the change of 
policy towards rural enterprises, a brief review of pre-1978 
policy will be given. Rural enterprises include both rural 
enterprises of the collective and the private sectors. Since 
China's policy towards the two sectors has been quite 
different since 1978, the policy analysis after 1978 will be 
divided into two parts: the collective sector and private 
sector of rural enterprises. Therefore, in the first 
section, I will first provide a brief review of China's 
policy towards collective rural enterprises before 1978; 1 
will then discuss China's government policy towards 
collective rural enterprises after 1978. In the second 
section, I will first give a brief review of China's policy 
towards individual and private enterprises before 1978. 
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Secondly, I will deal with government policy towards 
individual enterprises since 1978. Thirdly I will discuss 
government policy towards private enterprises since 1978. 
One of the most striking features of China's economic 
(and to a lesser extent, political) development in the post- 
Mao era has been the degree to which provincial and lower 
level authorities have been allowed flexibility in the 
implementation of central policy. Since 1978 there have been 
relatively wide discrepancies between what the centre 
officially decrees, and what actually happens on the ground. 
Therefore, in Chapter Three, I will address the issue 
of the divergence between central policy and local actions 
in relation to the development of rural enterprises. Having 
briefly analyzed the wider question of centre -local 
relations in the post-Mao era, I will proceed to assess the 
importance of five key factors in the evolution of differing 
local policies towards rural enterprises. These are the 
implications of the changes of the centre-local relations, 
the conflicting approaches of rival central leaders, 
variations in the desire of local leaders to adhere to 
central policy, the economic legacy in determining an area 
level of economic development, and the importance of unique 
geographical and historical factors of different areas. 
Although examples of divergent policy will be used from 
across China, debate within China itself has centred on the 
different approaches adopted in Wenzhou and in Southern 
Jiangsu. As a result, issues relating to the evolution of 
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local policies in these two areas will be given a relatively 
high profile in this chapter. 
Since 1978, the Chinese economy has been divided into a 
planned and a non-planned sector. China's rural enterprises 
are highly dependent on the market. The reform of the market 
has played a very important role in the development of rural 
enterprises. Therefore, in Chapter Four, I will discuss the 
influence of the market on rural enterprises. First I will 
discuss reform measures of the market and their implications 
for rural enterprises. Then I will examine the effects of 
market expansion on the development of rural enterprises. 
Thirdly I will explain some characteristics of the market's 
use of rural enterprises. Finally I will analyze the likely 
effects of further reform of the market on the development 
of rural enterprises. 
In Chapter Five, I will concentrate mainly on 
analyzing the implications of the changes of rural 
employment and regional development strategies on the 
development of rural enterprises. In the first section, I 
will discuss the implications of rural employment strategies 
on the development of rural enterprises. In this section, 
first, I will assess unemployment in rural areas. Next, I 
will discuss the strategies attempted for solving rural 
underemployment. Then I will examine the employment 
generated by rural enterprises. In the second section, I 
will examine the implications of regional development 
strategies on the development of rural enterprises. In this 
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section, first, I will analyze regional development 
imbalances of rural enterprises since 1978. Then I will 
analyze the impacts of regional development strategies on 
the development of rural enterprises. In the third section, 
I will analyze the future prospect of employment in rural 
enterprises and future regional development of rural 
enterprises. 
Financial and taxation policies have also influenced 
the development of rural enterprises. Thus, in Chapter Six, 
I will analyze China's governmental financial and taxation 
policies in rural enterprises. First I will examine the 
state's credit policy towards rural enterprises and its 
implications. Second I will analyze China's tax policy 
towards rural enterprises. Third I will consider the sources 
of capital in rural enterprises. Fourth I will examine the 
fundraising process in rural enterprises. Finally I will 
analyze the prospects of finance in rural enterprises. 
The government has adopted some policies to improve 
management in rural enterprises. Therefore, in Chapter 
Seven, I will examine how these measures have affected the 
management in rural enterprises. In doing so, first, I will 
discuss the reform of the administrative management system. 
Second, I will consider some of the government's measures to 
improve the income distribution of rural enterprises, which 
will include the reform of the wage system and the reform of 
the profit distribution system in rural enterprises. Third, 
will examine government Policy to promote the quality of 
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production in rural enterprises. Chapter Eight is used to 
examine China's government measures to promote technology in 
rural enterprises. In so doing, I will first explain the 
level of technology in rural enterprises, then I will 
analyze the government's technological strategy before and 
after 1978. Next I will examine the progress of technology 
in rural enterprises. This includes the following aspects: 
the Spark Plan towards rural enterprises; technological 
personnel in rural enterprises; cooperation in technology 
between state enterprises and rural enterprises and between 
research institutes and universities and rural enterprises. 
Finally I will discuss the future prospects for 
technological progress in rural enterprises. Chapter Nine 
draws conclusions, and estimates the likely development of 
rural enterprises in the near future. 
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Chapter 2 The Evolution of China's Rural Enterprise 
Policy 
In this chapter, I will explain the evolution of 
government policy for the development of rural enterprises. 
I am mainly concerned with the development of rural 
enterprises since 1978. But in order to explain the change 
in government policy for rural enterprises, a brief review 
of its pre-1978 policy will be given. Rural enterprises 
include rural enterprises of both the collective and 
private sectors. China's policy towards the two sectors is 
quite different. Thus, the policy analysis is divided into 
two parts: the collective sector of rural enterprises and 
the private sector of rural enterprises. 
2.1.1 A Brief Review of China's Policy towards 
Collective Rural Enterprises Before 1978 
As early as the 1950s, shortly after the founding of 
the People's Republic of China, the attitude of China's 
leadership towards small scale enterprises was either to 
overlook them, in the haste to build heavy industry, or to 
focus more on the problem of freeing them from the control 
of petty capitalists-' At that time, rural enterprises were 
underdeveloped. The "five kinds of artisans" (the carpenter, 
bricklayer, blacksmith, mason and bamboo stripknitter) and 
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the "four kinds of mills" (the power mill, bean-noodle mill, 
oil mill and bean -curd mill) were only predominant in the 
rural area. 2 Due to the negative attitude of the leadership 
towards small scale enterprises and to the state monopoly 
over the purchasing and marketing of grain, cotton and oil, 
many handicrafts mills were merged, and the "four kinds of 
mills" were forced to cease operation. 3 
China began to enunciate a small-scale industry 
development policy after the people's communes were set up 
throughout the country in 1958. In addition, 
decentralization of industrial administration and control 
functions took place in 1957 and 1958. Small industrial 
activities throughout the countryside developed very 
rapidly. By the end of 1958, the labour force in commune-run 
enterprises reached 18 million and the gross output value of 
these enterprises was over 6,000 million yuan. 4 
However, during this period, in order to develop 
commune-run enterprises, the property of the agricultural 
producers, cooperatives and their members was requisitioned 
without compensation. 
5 The government also mistakenly 
promoted many technological processes for which there were 
no existing small-scale options. Large quantities of 
resources were wasted. 
6 This kind of "left" activity caused 
an agricultural crisis. As Carl Riskin wrote: "With overall 
production down and supplies of both food and basic 
household consumer goods becoming scarce, it no longer 
seemed possible to devote so many resources to investment 
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and non-essential production., '7 In order to correct the 
mistake of depriving the peasants of their property, a 
policy of "going bankrupt for repaying debts" was promoted. 
8 
Therefore, many commune- run enterprises were closed. By 
1961, the gross output value of commune- run industry 
throughout the country had been reduced to 1,980 million 
yuan. 9 
In 1962, the state stipulated that commune and 
production brigades were not to set up enterprises. As a 
result, by 1963, the gross output value of commune run 
industry had further reduced to 410 million yuan. 10 
In the late 1960s, the "five small industries" (iron 
and steel, cement, chemical fertilizer, machinery and power) 
developed very rapidly although these enterprises were run 
at the level of the county. " Meanwhile, the leaders had 
considered that it was necessary for the communes to run 
some small factories. Therefore, Commune- and brigade- run 
industries began to develop again. 
During the Cultural Revolution, China had adopted the 
Dazhai Production Brigade in Xiyang County, Shanxi Province 
as a model to develop agriculture. Some practices of ultra- 
leftism prevailed. Private plots and domestic sideline 
occupations of the commune members were all eliminated as 
"tails of capitalism". Commune- and brigade run industries 
and sideline occupations were restricted and diversified 
undertakings strangled. Village fairs were banned. Economic 
exchange between town and country was stopped. 
12 These 
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ultra-left practices associated with the Dazhai Model were 
promoted across the country, causing great damage to China's 
agriculture as well as the development of rural enterprises. 
However, as Qi Zong indicated: .... these enterprises had a 
strong appeal and inspired a great vitality among the 
people, so they continued to develop despite these 
obstacles.,, 13 In 1976, the gross output value of commune- 
and brigade- run industries reached over 24,300 million 
yuan. 14 
Therefore, it is clear that rural enterprises had 
expanded before 1978, though almost entirely in the 
collective sector of rural industrial enterprises. The 
policy towards rural enterprises before 1978, mainly rural 
industries, justified its contribution to "self-reliance" 
151,16 
and "walking on two legs 
However, Western observers argued that the realities 
for the development of rural small scale industrial 
enterprises were that China's rural economy was too poor to 
overcome the isolation of the countryside from the 
industrial mainstream, but adequate to build small-scale 
industries. In addition, industrial goods were difficult to 
obtain because of poor transportation and the long waiting 
list for industrial items. 17 
In addition, rural small scale industries had 
characteristics that suited the technological and economic 
constraints of rural economy. Small plants could be built 
faster than modern large-scale enterprises, and transform 
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locally available raw materials into useful products. 
18 
Small-scale factories were located close to their markets. 
By designing goods for local conditions, rural enterprises 
were able to compensate somewhat for the low quality of the 
available materials-19 They had other advantages that partly 
offset their inefficiency relative to large-scale firms. 
They required less infrastructure and expenditures on 
housing and public utilities. 20 They could also offer 
significant social benefits, including the improvement of 
the mechanical aptitude and industrial discipline of the 
peasantry, and the narrowing of the gap between rural and 
urban incomes and living standards. 21 
Jack Gray summarized that the main economic and 
ideological arguments to support the development of rural 
enterprises before 1978 in China were as follows: 
Rural enterprises could make use of scattered raw 
materials, and could make use of surplus labour in rural 
areas and diminish unemployment. Rural enterprises could 
mobilize rural savings, and could provide a local flow of 
consumer goods. The flow of consumer goods could maintain 
incentives among the peasants. The profit of rural 
enterprises could be invested for further growth of rural 
economy. There was a growing need for small factories for 
short-run production of spare parts, accessories, and goods 
22 
suitable for local conditions. 
As far as ideological factors were concerned, Mao 
thought that rural industry could provide the quickest route 
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to socialism and the creation of new socialist man by 
maximizing participation in co-operative enterprises. The 
industrialization of the rural areas could gradually 
eliminate the distinctions between industry and agriculture, 
mental and manual labour, and city and countryside. The 
development of local communities via self-reliant 
industrialization, and the transformation of agriculture 
would both minimize the need for bureaucracy and at the 
23 same time create a countervailing power. Mao was also 
concerned with national defence. He wanted to ensure that 
production of dispersed small industries could continue even 
after the perceived treat of military attack from abroad 
receded. 24 
However, there were the following limitations of 
policy towards the development of rural enterprise before 
1978. 
First the attitude of China's leadership towards 
rural enterprises was to overlook them and to stress their 
role as the complementarity of agriculture and urban 
industry. This included two different aspects. On the one 
hand, rural industry only served as a complement to the 
modern industrial sector, but on the other hand, rural 
enterprises also served as a complement to agriculture. 
Second the market was underdeveloped. It was almost 
impossible for rural enterprises to buy raw materials in the 
market. ion Sigurdson has estimated that, because of 
constraints on both market and resource expansion, at least 
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two of the "five small industries" --iron and steel, and 
chemical fertilizers had by 1973 almost exhausted the 
opportunities for further expansion throughout the 
country. 25 Planners were more sophisticated over time. 
During the Great Leap, the government mistakenly promoted 
many technological processes for which there were no 
existing small-scale options. As a result, large quantities 
of resources were wasted before new varieties of small 
plants were designed and produced. 
Third, before 1978 China had very strict constraints 
on farmers engaging in non-agricultural occupations. Under 
the influence of 'leftist' ideology for many years, the 
policy of "grasping grain as the key link" confined a large 
number of peasants to working a small area of arable land. 
It condemned "businessmen" as people "not engaged in honest 
work" or even as people "taking the capitalist road". 
Fourth, China did not then allow the development of 
rural enterprises in the private sector. This will be 
analyzed in the next section. This also limited the 
development of rural enterprises. 
Fifth, before 1978 China had not implemented the open 
door policy. Thus, it was impossible to develop export- 
oriented rural enterprises. 
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2.1.2 Policy Towards Collective Rural Enterprises 
After 1978 
The Maoist version of the centrally planned economy 
had failed to produce efficient economic growth and had 
caused China to fall far behind not only the industrialized 
nations of the West but also the new industrial powers of 
Asia: Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and 
Hong Kong. In the late 1970s, China's citizens did not have 
sufficient food and clothing, adequate housing and service 
sector. Therefore, China's leaders realized that if the 
Party was to retain its position and the country was not to 
slide further behind its competitors in terms of economic 
development, policy changes must take place. 
In the historic Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh 
Central Committee of the CCP in December 1978, the party 
leaders decided to undertake gradual but fundamental 
economic reforms. China's economic reforms can be 
distinguished from other reformers like the former Soviet 
Union and India in two main ways: the open door policy and 
rural reform policy. The open door policy has provided more 
opportunities for rural enterprises in China's coastal 
areas, to gain access to international markets. However, its 
impact for China's rural enterprises is marginal. The most 
significant impacts of policy changes for rural enterprises 
came from rural reform. 
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The first step in reforming the rural sector was the 
introduction of the household production responsibility 
system. Under this system, the cooperative assigned specific 
plots of land to a family to cultivate for up to fifteen 
years. For each piece of land, the cooperatives specified 
the quantity of output that had to be delivered to 
procurement stations. Any surplus was for the household to 
dispose of as it saw fit. Families could consume the surplus 
or sell it on rural markets as they wished. As a result, 
agricultural output increased rapidly, creating a solid base 
for the development of rural enterprises. 
Second, households with insufficient labour were able 
to transfer land contracts to families that were interested 
in cultivation and animal husbandry. Peasants were permitted 
to shift from crop cultivation to commercial, service, 
construction, and industrial activities in rural 
enterprises. The government has removed the constraints 
against farmers engaging in non-agricultural occupations, 
and has allowed a large number of rural people to go into 
non-agricultural occupations. These reforms have facilitated 
the supply of surplus labour for rural enterprises. 
Third, rural markets were reopened. The rural marketing 
system changed substantially. Households with marketable 
surplus had several options: goods could be consumed, sold 
in local markets, or sold to state stations according to 
signed purchase contracts. The government raised procurement 
prices to improve incentives and reduced farmers' 
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agricultural taxes. These rural reforms have generated the 
rural savings necessary to develop rural enterprises. 
Fourth, reform policies also reduced major 
administrative barriers that had limited labour and capital 
from moving beyond commune boundaries. Capital in rural 
areas was permitted to move across administrative 
boundaries, and individuals invested not only in their own 
farm production but also in business ventures outside their 
own villages. In particular, rural enterprises have been 
allowed to be established in small towns. These policy 
changes have provided rural enterprises more chances to be 
concentrated on small towns and to cooperate with state 
enterprises. 
Since 1978, the Chinese government has attached great 
importance to the development of rural enterprises, 
regarding their development not only as an important facet 
of readjusting the rural economic structure and a strategic 
measure to vitalize China's rural economy, but also as the 
road to the integration of urban and rural areas. 26 
In December 1978, the CCP's 11th Central Committee 
emphasized at its third plenary session the need to develop 
commune- and brigade-run enterprises. The Third Plenary 
Session of the lith Central Committee of the Communist Party 
of China pointed out in its "Decisions on Some Questions 
Concerning the Acceleration of Agricultural Development": 
"under the principles of reason and economy, 
all agricultural and sideline products well-suited 
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to being processed in rural areas should be 
increasingly produced by commune- and brigade- run 
enterprises. Factories in the cities should, in a 
planned way, turn over those products or parts 
which can be processed in rural areas for 
processing by the commune- and brigade- run 
enterprises, as well as lend support in equipment 
and guidance in technology. 1127 
Therefore, China's leaders decided that urban 
enterprises could hand over to commune- and brigade-run 
enterprises the production of those commodities where 
processing was suitable in rural areas. As we can see, 
although this policy change facilitated the expansion of the 
operations of existing rural enterprises, the CCP was not 
yet prepared to legitimate the expansion of the non-state 
sector. At this stage, the notion that the communes (and 
brigades) should control affairs remained firm. 
In 1980, the campaign to reorganize rural enterprises 
was launched. Certain enterprises were closed, suspended, 
merged or transferred. Their number was reduced from 
1,480,000 in 1979 to 1,430,000 in 1980, but their total 
income and profits were higher than those of the previous 
year. 28 
After the household production responsibility system 
was successfully implemented in agriculture, China's leaders 
decided to introduce the contracts system into commune-run 
and brigade-run enterprises. In March 1983, a People's Dail_V 
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commentator29 called for local government to introduce the 
contracts system into commune-run and brigade-run 
enterprises after he summarized the experiences of the 
Shangquiao Commune in Xuancheng county, Anhui province. He 
argued that the contracts system had enhanced the 
rationalization of the structure of business management and 
had changed the situation of stagnation in development; 
this system had been described as orientating the direction 
of management toward serving the society and market demand. 
He also thought that this system had systematized enterprise 
management, and combined responsibilities, power and profits 
so that enterprises had power to make management decisions. 
The implementation of the contract system has aroused the 
enthusiasm of the workers in production, has thus improved 
the management of rural enterprises. I will further discuss 
this issue in section 7.1 of Chapter Seven. 
1984 was a very important year for rural enterprises. 
The CCP Central Committee and the State Council issued a 
circular to transmit a "Report on creating a new situation 
in commune and brigade enterprises" by the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, and the leading Party Group 
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of the Ministry in March, 1984. It argued that China 
should use diversification as the strategic principle to 
utilize surplus labour in rural areas so that China could 
change the situation of having 800 million people producing 
food and gradually accumulate the large amounts of funds 
needed to modernize agriculture. In this report, village 
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and town enterprises were considered as an important 
component of a diversified economy, an important pillar of 
agricultural production, an important way for the masses of 
peasants to achieve common prosperity, and an important 
source of state revenue. 
In addition, in this report, the development of village 
and town enterprises was described as being conducive to 
expanding agricultural capital construction, increasing the 
strength of the agricultural co-operative economic 
organization and providing more and better agricultural 
machinery and services for peasants. This report argued that 
the development of village and township enterprises can 
promote the system of contracting specialized jobs and 
suitably expanding their scale of operations. Their 
development can also promote the growth of the market towns, 
accelerate the construction of economic and cultural centres 
in the countryside, and prevent peasants who give up farming 
from leaving the countryside, and deter the massive influx 
of peasants into the cities. Furthermore, in this report, 
village and town enterprises were regarded as an important 
force in the national economy and an important supplement to 
state-owned enterprises. 
This report is the most important official document 
concerning rural enterprises published in the 1980s. It can 
be seen that China's leaders have realized the important 
roles of rural enterprises in the development of 
agriculture, solving rural unemployment and the national 
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economy. This report also regarded individual rural 
enterprises as a part of village and town enterprises, and 
gave a permit for further development. As a result, this has 
provided a base for the development of private enterprises. 
Moreover, this report called for party committees and 
governments at various levels to give village and town 
enterprises "positive guidance" and "necessary support". 
However, in this report, rural enterprises were still asked 
to play a supplementary role to agriculture and state-owned 
enterprises. At this stage, China's leaders did not realize 
that rural enterprises would become a serious challenge for 
state enterprises in the late 1980s. 
The CCP Central Committee also supported the development 
of town and township enterprises in its Document No. 1 and 4 
in 1984. It provided policy guidance concerning credit 
extension and taxation of township and town enterprises in 
its Document No. 1,1985.31 In its Document No. 1,1986, it 
claimed that the development of township and town 
enterprises was of great economic and political significance 
and urged various departments to adopt supportive 
measures. 32 The above discussion provides evidence of the 
gradual introduction of new policies and measures to promote 
the development of rural enterprises. It also shows that the 
central government was aware of the importance of the 
development of rural enterprises given its wider commitment 
to agricultural reform. However, it is important to note 
that at this stage, developing the private sector of rural 
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enterprises was not considered to be a viable option. 
Indeed, the legalisation of private rural enterprises - the 
first step in their development - did not occur until as 
late as 1988. 
Economists in China have also regarded the emergence 
and development of township and town enterprises in rural 
areas as an objective necessity. They believe that to 
practice a planned commodity economy on the basis of public 
ownership and to promote socialist commodity production and 
socialist commodity exchanges, the development of township 
and town enterprises is inevitable. 33 The second stage in 
China's rural reform must continue the policies of 
liberation and invigoration, promote the development of 
rural productive forces, help the countryside transform 
itself from a semi-self-sufficient natural economy to a 
planned commercialized economy, transform traditional 
agriculture into modernized agriculture and gradually reduce 
the gaps between industry and agriculture and between city 
and countryside so that the national economy can develop 
rapidly and in a balanced fashion. The key to the second 
stage in rural reform is the 
township and town enterprises. 
34 
necessity of the development of 
follows: 35 
vigorous development of 
The main arguments for the 
rural enterprise are as 
First, the financial resources of the state are limited 
and it would be unrealistic to expect the state to provide 
more funds to subsidize agricultural modernization. China 
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has to make new breakthroughs in agriculture, it must 
introduce new inputs, maintaining and expanding farmland 
irrigation and drainage systems, promoting greater 
agricultural mechanization, increasing inputs of quality 
chemical fertilizers and pesticides and applying and 
disseminating science and technology, such as developing and 
spreading improved crop strains. These will require a 
tremendous amount of funds. The state proposed a general 
policy, "use industry to subsidize agriculture". This 
"industry" is none other than rural enterprises. With the 
development of rural enterprises, China can use the profits 
generated by these enterprises to provide financial 
assistance to agriculture so as to enable the agricultural 
sector to continue to develop. 
Secondly, the development of rural enterprises can not 
only support the prosperity of the rural economy, change and 
reform rural economic structure, but also, push the 
development, change, and reform of the national economy, and 
influence the future of China's economy. On the side of the 
growth in the economy, rural enterprises can make prominent 
contributions, manifested in the increase of gross output 
value, national financial revenues and foreign exchange 
earnings. The development of rural enterprises can also make 
contributions to both market supply and market expansion and 
promote changes in the economic structure at a comparatively 
fast rate. 
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Thirdly, in order to achieve rural specialization, 
China must change the situation in which the majority of 
people engage in agriculture, and the only way to do this is 
to transfer peasants into non-agricultural employment. It is 
impossible to accomplish this if China depends on state- 
sponsored secondary and tertiary industry to absorb all 
surplus rural labour. Thus the way is to let peasants raise 
their own funds, take full responsibility for their own 
profits and losses, set up various township and town 
enterprise on their own and transform themselves into 
enterprise employees. Furthermore, the development of rural 
enterprises can restructure the irrational mix in China's 
rural output by developing rural secondary and tertiary 
industry. 
Fourthly, in order to commercialize the countryside 
and to develop a commercial economy, China must ensure great 
abundance of various commodities. It is impossible to 
produce commodities if over 800 million peasants continue to 
engage in agriculture. Moreover, China's commercial, 
communications, storage and shipping and service sectors are 
too backward and fall far behind the levels attained in 
China's primary and secondary industries. Thus the 
mobilization and encouragement of rural enterprises to 
engage in commercial, transport, service and other 
industries comprise another important link in the reform of 
the commercial system. 
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Compared with China's government policies towards 
collective rural enterprises before 1978, the government 
took direct measures to promote collective rural 
enterprises. Some reform measures to promote management and 
technology have taken place in the collective sector of 
rural enterprises. The main reform measures are as follows: 
First, the 'production responsibility system, and new 
contractual arrangements were introduced in rural 
enterprises; Secondly, the labour recruitment system has 
been changed; Thirdly, a new income distribution system has 
been introduced; Fourthly, the central government adopted 
some policies to promote product quality in rural 
enterprises; Fifthly, the "Spark Plan" promoting the 
technological level in rural enterprises has been 
implemented; Sixthly the central government adopted a more 
flexible policy to allow technological personnel to work in 
rural enterprises; Seventhly, the central government has 
taken some measures to promote technological cooperation 
between rural enterprises and state enterprises and between 
rural enterprises and research institutes. These government 
policies and measures have had profound impacts on the 
development of rural enterprises, which I will further 
analyze in Chapter Seven and Chapter Eight. 
Furthermore, the state has extended decision making 
powers to local governments, enterprises and individuals. 
Local governments have been allowed to adopt different 
models to develop rural enterprises. I will further deal 
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with this issue in Chapter Three. Since 1978, China has also 
engaged in market reform. There has been a considerable 
development of the market. The reform of the market has made 
a noteworthy contribution to the development of rural 
enterprises since 1978.1 will analyze their implications in 
Chapter Four. In addition, the government has changed rural 
employment and regional development strategies, and has also 
encouraged the development of rural enterprise by providing 
favourable tax and financial policies and offering rural 
enterprises lucrative investment opportunities. I will 
examine these issues in Chapter Five and Six. 
While central government policy encouraged rural 
enterprises to coordinate with state enterprises and promote 
joint ventures during 1980s, it did not encourage activities 
that competed with state enterprises for energy and raw 
materials in short supply. That is, rural enterprises were 
expected to exploit locally available resources and not to 
increase the use of scarce national resources. 
During the early 1980s, rural enterprises played the 
role of making up for the deficiencies of large enterprises 
rather than competing with them. However, in the late 1980s, 
this relation changed, and rural enterprises began to 
compete with state enterprises for the supply of raw 
materials. The state's attitude has been to ensure the 
supply of raw materials to state enterprise, and to allow 
the remaining or newly increased raw materials to be 
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processed by rural enterprises after state procurement 
quotas are met. 
However, rural enterprises have more decision making 
power in production and management. They can choose from a 
variety of flexible management methods according to market 
needs, arrange in a planned manner their own production, 
supply, and marketing activities, and budget funds retained 
for their own use. 36 Rural enterprises have other advantages 
which state-run enterprises lack: they have an ample supply 
of cheap labour, and the problem of enterprises sites is 
comparatively easy to solve. The other is that they have 
full decision making power. Rural enterprises have many more 
rights of autonomous decision making. They are responsible 
for their profits or losses, and are capable of absorbing 
technological results in breadth from units of scientific 
research and institutes of higher education in the form of 
transfer with compensation. Therefore, rural enterprises are 
more competitive than state enterprises. 
In late 1988, overheating of the economy, inflation, 
widening income differential, and corruption took place in 
China. This led to a period of economic austerity. Faced 
with an economic crisis and resistance from the conservative 
forces, rural enterprises became a main target of the 
economic austerity program. From late 1988 to 1991, the 
government emphasized the key function to be played by 
state-run large and medium-sized enterprises and adopted a 
policy where state enterprises were definitely favoured in 
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the acquisition of the capital, energy, and raw materials. 
Rural enterprises faced a serious situation: capital funds 
were scare, energy sources were insufficient, prices for raw 
materials went up, and the scope of market shrunk. 
In addition, some departments in local governments 
used the excuse of improvement and rectification to 
indiscriminately collect fees, and impose fines on 
enterprises, seriously infringing their legitimate rights 
and interests and placing an unbearable burden on them. 37 As 
a result, during this period, rural enterprises faced 
serious difficulties under the austerity programme. Many 
rural enterprises were closed, merged with others or shifted 
to other businesses; many employees in rural enterprises had 
to return to the land. 
Local governments put great pressure on the central 
government. Some economists also made strong protests 
against the central government policy of discriminating 
against rural enterprises. For example, Yu Guoyao and Yi 
Yandong wrote that it would not make sense to force the 
growth rate of the township and town enterprises below that 
of urban industry. 
38 Su Bei also indicated: "We have tc 
make a clear distinction: adjusting is not negating. 
Adjustments want to achieve a steadier advance and a 
healthier development for township enterprises.,, 39 
Moreover, some rural enterprises have already forged 
business links with urban industries. These links have been 
widespread in machine-building and among newly opened 
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enterprises. For example, in 1989, in Zhenjiang city, 
Jiangsu Province, of the 4.7 billion yuan of industrial 
output value, roughly 2 billion yuan came from rural 
enterprises which had varying degree of economic ties with 
urban industries. 30 percent of township and town industries 
had close ties with urban counterparts. 40 Many rural 
enterprises have become workshops of urban industrial 
enterprises. This type of business connection has made rural 
enterprises into an indivisible part of urban industry. 
Attempting to pressure rural enterprises to preserve state 
industries will also affect the growth of the national 
economy. 
In late 1991, the political and economic situation was 
changed again. Some reform measures have taken place. 
"Decision of the CCP Central Committee on Further 
Strengthening Agriculture and the Work in Rural Areas", 
adopted by the eighth plenary session of the 13th CCP 
Central Committee on 29th November 1991, indicated actively 
developing township and town enterprises is a way to develop 
rural economy, to increase peasant's income, and to speed up 
agricultural modernization and national economic 
development. This document called for carrying through the 
principle of giving active support to township and town 
enterprises, making plans for the reasonable development of 
these enterprises, providing correct guidance to them, and 
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strengthening management of them. 
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In addition, important remarks made by Deng Xiaoping 
during a tour to the south of China, and the Fifth Session 
of the Seventh National People's Congress have both 
certainly promoted further economic reform in early 1992. 
Some important policies have been formulated to encourage 
the development of rural enterprises. The State Council also 
issued a package of new policies to prop up rural 
enterprises, particularly in inland areas in early 1992.42 
These measures are summarized as follows: 
First, local governments have been asked to set up 
development funds for rural industries, which usually get 
little investment from the State budget. State run banks 
will increase loans to help successful rural firms with 
technological innovations. Key rural enterprises will be 
given aid in term of credit, taxes, energy, raw materials, 
transportation and the employment of technologists. 
Secondly, the government has taken further measures to 
promote technology in rural enterprises. The government will 
allow successful rural enterprises to increase their 
depreciation rates in order to update facilities; and their 
key projects for improving technology should be listed in 
local economic plans. More college students will be 
encouraged to work in rural enterprises. Thirdly, the 
government has adopted the measures to expand the scope of 
businesses for rural enterprises. Certain rural enterprises 
will be granted rights to deal in foreign trade. The 
government will no longer prevent rural firms from engaging 
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in wholesale and retail enterprises. Service industry will 
open a wide door for rural enterprises. Fourthly, the 
government has undertaken the measures to reduce financial 
burdens on rural enterprises. Rural enterprises will be 
permitted to retain at least 60 percent of after tax 
profits. Poor areas will be given more help to develop rural 
enterprises. 
New policies for rural enterprises showed that the 
government will continue to provide favourable financial, 
technological and management policies to promote the 
development of rural enterprises, and create more business 
opportunities for rural enterprises. In particular, the new 
policies have paid more attention to the development of 
rural enterprises in poor rural areas. 
official statistics show that China's rural industries 
increased production by 36.1 percent in the first quarter of 
1992 compared with the same period of 1991.43 Therefore, the 
development of rural enterprises is expected to speed up 
again. 
In summary, the central government has relaxed 
restrictions on the large-scale expansion of non- 
agricultural activities by rural communities. Furthermore, 
the government has formulated some policies to encourage the 
development of collective rural enterprises since 1978. 
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2.2 Policy towards Individual and Private Enterprises 
Since 1978 there has been a dramatic change in 
policy in the People's Republic of China which has again 
allowed the establishment of individual and private 
enterprises. Previously China had eliminated private 
enterprises in the traditional capitalistic sense, leaving 
only handicrafts as a supplementary sideline. Now both 
"private enterprises" and "individual enterprises" exist. 
The term "private enterprises" refers to those whose means 
of production are privately owned and with eight or more 
employees, 44 as compared with the category of "individual 
enterprises" meaning businesses started with private funds 
employing seven or less. The essential difference between 
the two in the Chinese thinking is that the latter is 
categorized as being owned by the labouring people because 
the owners still thrive mainly on their own work, while the 
former is traditionally considered "capitalist ownership" 
because owners depend mainly on the employment of wage 
earners. Since the majority of individual and private 
enterprises are in rural areas, the government policy 
towards individual and private enterprises have important 
impacts on the development of rural enterprises. Thus., in 
this section, first I will give a brief review of the policy 
towards individual and private enterprises before 1978. Then 
I will examine the government policy towards individual 
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enterprises since 1978. Finally, I will analyze the 
government policy towards private enterprises. 
2.2.1 A Brief Review of China's Policy towards 
Individual and Private Enterprises Before 1978 
The development of the private economy in China can be 
divided into the following periods before 1978.45 
The first stage lasted from 1949 to 1953. During this 
period, the government allowed different sectors of the 
economy to coexist with the state-run sector in the leading 
position. Individual businesses and private capitalist 
businesses were developed along with the recovery of the 
country's economy. There were 7.24 million individual 
industrialists and businessmen in the country's cities and 
towns in 1949. By 1953, the number had increased to 8.38 
46 million. 
The second period was from 1953 to 1956. In 1953, 
China stated to engage in the socialist industrialization 
and socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts, 
and capitalist industry and commerce. By the end of 1956,95 
percent of small trades people joined cooperative shops, 
cooperative groups, or took part in joint public-private and 
state-run enterprises; meanwhile, 96 percent of individual 
industrial and commercial people joined handicraft 
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production cooperatives or cooperative groups. The 
transformation left only about a hundred thousand 
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individuals in industry and commerce who had not joined any 
cooperative. 
The third period was from 1957 to 1965. The policy 
toward the remaining individual industry and commerce in 
this period can be summarized as utilizing, restricting and 
transforming. A 14-grade taxation system based on 
progressive rates was introduced which taxed the individual 
businesses heavily, the highest tax rate being 86.8 
percent. 48 The income of the individual business people was 
strictly held at a level which just maintained a simple 
life. Soon after the transformation of the private sector, 
underground factories came into being in some places. Mao 
admitted that the resurgence of underground factories meant 
there was a social need for them. Therefore husband-wife 
shops and privately-run factories were given permission to 
operate. Chen Yun declared at the Eighth National Party 
Congress that, while the state and collective economy were 
dominant, it was still necessary to have a certain number of 
individual businesses to supplement the state and collective 
sectors. This made it possible for individual enterprises 
in industry and commerce to recover to some extent. However, 
there then came the nationwide campaign of setting up 
people's communes and the so-called socialist transformation 
of individual industry and commerce was again intensified. 
Not only those who had joined cooperatives had to advance to 
ownership by the whole people, but those remaining 
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individual also had to be transformed. The number of 
individual businesses again plummeted. 49 
The ten years of the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 
1976 comprised most of the fourth stage which actually 
lasted until 1978. During the Cultural Revolution, 
individual economy was considered capitalistic and was 
practically eliminated. Most individual industry and 
commerce were banned or merged. In the rural areas small 
plots of land allocated to the commune members for private 
use and household sideline production were also repeatedly 
eliminated as "tails of capitalism". The results were that 
state and collective industry and commerce monopolized 
everything. By 1978, only 140,000 people were in 
individually owned undertakings throughout the vast country 
of China, and they were mostly small retailers and 
repairers. 50 In summary, China's policy towards private 
enterprises during 1949 to 1978 changed from tolerance to 
elimination. 
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2.2.2 Policy towards Individual Enterprises Since 
1978 
In 1979, the state decided to restore and develop 
individual industry and commerce. The authorities thought 
that individual enterprises were different from private 
enterprises, in which the private ownership of the means of 
production is combined with hired labour and the capitalists 
make a profit through exploiting the labourers. Under 
socialism, individual industry and commerce are considered a 
supplement to socialist industry and commerce. In 1980, at 
a national work conference on employment, the central 
authorities pointed out more clearly that it is necessary to 
develop the individual economy to a proper degree. After 
that, the state formulated a series of policies to encourage 
peasants and urban residents to develop tertiary industry. 
Retired workers were allowed to operate individual shops. 
Some small shops were leased or contracted for individual 
operation. 51 
The 1982 Constitution stipulated that: "The individual 
economy of urban and rural working people, operated within 
the limits prescribed by law, is a complement to the 
socialist public economy. The state protects the lawful 
rights and interests of the individual economy". 
52 Thus, 
individual enterprises in China were accorded legal status 
again. This is not only important for the development of 
individual enterprises, but was also conducive to the 
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subsequent development of private enterprises. When 
individual enterprises were allowed to develop, many of them 
employed more than eight employees. In the process, the 
delineation between "individual" and "Private" became 
somewhat blurred - indeed, many of these "individual 
enterprises" formally became "private enterprises" after 
their legalization in 1988. Thus, without formally tackling 
the question of whether private enterprises should be 
allowed to exist and develop, the changes in the 1982 
constitution facilitated the subsequent move towards 
official and legal acceptance of privately owned rural 
enterprises. As such, the new constitution marks an 
important watershed in the removal of the restrictions that 
hindered the development of rural enterprises in post-Mao 
China. 
In February 1984, the State Council issued some 
regulations governing individual industry and commerce in 
rural areas in order to strengthen further the leadership, 
management and supervision over individual industry and 
commerce in rural areas. 
53 The regulations stated that the 
development of individual industry and commerce in rural 
areas would play a positive role in promoting commodity 
production in rural areas, stimulating exchanges of 
materials between urban and rural areas and putting surplus 
rural labour to multiple use. Therefore, the government 
tried to strength its leadership over rural individual 
enterprises, and also expected rural individual enterprises 
61 
to play a greater role in rural economic development and 
solving the problem of rural unemployment. 
In China, individual enterprises mainly involves 
small industries, the handicraft industry, the transport 
industry, the construction and house maintenance industry, 
commerce, the catering trade, and other service trades. The 
number of individual businessmen reached 18 million in 1987, 
but three-fourths of them were in rural areas. 54 
In some areas where policies toward the individual 
economy are carried out more flexibly, the development of 
the individual economy has greatly exceeded the development 
of state-owned and collective enterprises. Individual 
business operators do business with small capital. In order 
to survive, they have to pay attention to their business 
goodwill and service quality. The existence of individual 
businesses is itself a forceful challenge against 
egalitarian practice. 
However, under the influence of "Leftist" ideology and 
policies, a few people in society still hold a prejudice 
against individual business operators because some 
individual businessmen evaded taxes and often practiced 
fraud and did not observe trade ethics there by harming the 
consumer's interests. 
Although the government laid down policies for 
encouraging the development of the individual economy, 
individual business operators still feel that their status 
is low and they are still despised in society and have no 
62 
bright future. Thus, they want only to make big money in a 
short time by making use of the opportunities brought about 
by government policies rather than doing business in an 
honest manner throughout their lives as individual 
operators. 
State policies toward the individual economy have been 
unstable, and this has placed obvious pressure on individual 
business operators. In January 1986 the State Council 
promulgated its Provisional Regulations Regarding the Income 
Tax of Individually Owned Industrial and Commercial 
Establishments in Town and Country, which implemented a ten- 
bracket progressive income tax aimed to bring under control 
the high earning of individual businesses. 55 After paying 
taxes and administrative fees, individual business operators 
often have to pay many kinds of mandatory fees and 
contributions in the names of "sponsoring" or "raising 
funds". Although some problems still remain, the state's 
policies towards individual enterprises have been more 
liberal. 
2.2.3 Policy towards Private Enterprise Since 1978 
The first new private enterprises in China emerged in 
the early 1980s with the beginning of economic and political 
reforms. Most private enterprises were distributed in the 
suburban areas of the smaller cities and large towns. 
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More than 80 per cent of private enterprises were based in 
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the countryside. More than 70 per cent of these private 
enterprises were operating in more developed rural areas 
along the 57 coast. Most people working with the newly 
formed private enterprises were the surplus labour force in 
the wake of reforms in the rural economic structure. 
A private economy used to be regarded as incompatible 
with the socialist system in China. According to Marxist- 
Leninist doctrines, ownership of all means of production in 
socialist countries should be vested in the State. Before 
1988 private economy did not have a definite legal position 
in China. This can be seen in Article 5 of the 1978 
constitution of the People's Republic of China: 
"There are mainly two kinds of ownership of means 
of production in the People's Republic of China at 
the present stage: socialist ownership by the 
whole people and socialist collective ownership by 
the working people.,, 58 
"Ownership by the whole people" denotes means of 
production owned by the State; and "collective ownership by 
the working people" denotes means of production owned by 
worker or farmer cooperatives. 
Public opinion is, accordingly, divided on the 
treatment of private enterprises since they are 
traditionally considered "capitalist". The most common 
complaint against the private economy is that entrepreneurs 
exploit their workers and create forms of labour-capital 
relations which are incompatible with the Chinese socialist 
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system. It is concluded that the private sector of the 
economy has distorted the economy and destroyed the 
national plan since some private enterprises engage in 
speculation, price boosting, illicit purchase of raw 
materials, bribery and corruption involving government 
cadres and use underhand methods to obtain services from 
workers in government departments and state owned 
enterprises. There is also a concern in some areas that the 
development of private enterprises may lead to the 
development of social stratification; the rich becoming 
richer and the poor becoming poorer. Thus, it was suggested 
that the government should adopt a combination of 
administration and economic measures to tighten control over 
the development of private enterprises. 59 
Others who supported the development of the private 
economy held that it differed in nature from that which 
existed in the 1950s except for the private employment of 
workers. The private economy in the 1950s was a 'national 
capitalist, 60 economy and signified the indigenous 
development of capitalism in China. In contrast, the current 
private economy serves as a supplement to the state and 
collectively owned economies. Nowadays the private economy 
is not strong enough to determine the nature of China's 
society. Its supporters stress its positive role in 
promoting the productive forces. They believe that China is 
now in the primary stage of socialism6l which is 
characterized by backward productive forces, reflecting the 
65 
low degree of industrialization and underdevelopment of the 
market economy. In particular, the per capita gross national 
product in China still ranks among the lowest in the world. 
Therefore, China must focus on developing productive 
forces. 62 Since private economy can promote production, it 
should be encouraged. Moreover, it is argued that the policy 
to encourage the development of the private economy does not 
necessarily lead to extremes of wealth. Although it allows 
some people to improve their living standard before others, 
its ultimate objective is to achieve general prosperity more 
quickly. 
Although the Chinese Government officially believes 
that private enterprises inevitably lead to the exploitation 
of labourers, a moderate development of this sector is 
considered positive in promoting production, providing 
employment, making people's life more comfortable and 
increasing state revenues. The authorities have for some 
time adopted ambiguous attitude, while they have not taken 
the strong measures to prohibit the development of private 
enterprises. 
At the 13th Communist Party Congress in October 1987, 
former Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang set an 
authoritative tone on the controversial subject of private 
enterprises. In his report, Zhao explained why it should be 
allowed to develop in China. He stressed that 
"Public ownership should remain predominant in 
the primary stage of socialism. However, other 
66 
sectors of the economy not under the ownership of 
the whole people are far from adequately 
developed. The cooperative, individual, and 
private sectors of the economy in both urban and 
rural areas should be encouraged to expand.,, 63 
Zhao also expected the government to "formulate 
policies and enact laws governing the private sector as soon 
as possible, in order to protect its legitimate interests 
and to provide it with more effective guidance, supervision 
and control.,, 64 It was the first time that the "private 
sector" of the economy formed by private enterprises, had 
been named in an openly-published party document as 
something positive. In adopting an ideological stance that 
formally accepted that private enterprise had a legitimate 
and even progressive role to play within a socialist 
society, Zhao laid the foundations for the legalisation of 
private rural-enterprises the following year. As such, 
Zhao's speech marks a crucial sea-change in the ideological 
orientation of China' s economic affairs - even if it was 
only making de jure what had been the de facto situation 
since the decision was taken to expand "individual,, 
enterprises in the revision of the 1982 constitution. 
Subsequently, at the 7th National People's Congress 
in April 1988, an amendment on the private economy was added 
to Article 11 of the Constitution. 
11 The State permits privately owned economic 
entities to exist and develop within the limits 
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prescribed by the law. The private economy is a 
complement to the socialist public economy. The 
State protects the legitimate rights and interests 
of the private economy while providing the private 
sector with guidance, supervision and 
administrative regulation. 1165 
For the first time, private enterprises were, in 
principle, accorded legal status in China. 
However, until then there had not been any significant 
elaboration of law or regulation for private enterprises. 66 
Lack of laws and regulations had caused problems and 
hampered further development of private enterprises. Some 
entrepreneurs feared that the government would change its 
current policy of encouraging private enterprise. Some 
private firms had been found to engage in unlicensed dealing 
or tax evasion, to lack safety facilities or demand long 
working hours under poor working conditions. For example, an 
investigation by the Beijing Municipal People's Government 
in 1987 revealed that some employers did not have any 
medical insurance, and more than 80 per cent of employees 
did not enjoy any kind of medical welfare. 
67 On the other 
hand, there had also been cases of infringement upon the 
legitimate rights of private enterprises. In many cases, 
private enterprises had been confronted with excessive tax 
demands or had experienced difficulty obtaining permits to 
establish their enterprises. For example, one private 
entrepreneur said he had to treat the person in charge of 
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issuing the business permits to a dinner in a luxury 
restaurant before he got his permit to open a restaurant. 
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Thus, it was in the interest of both the government and 
private enterprises to stipulate clearly the scope of 
regulation on private enterprises. 
Shortly after the 7th National People's Congress in 
June 1988, the State Council issued the "provisional 
regulations on private economy" and the "provisional 
regulations on income tax of private enterprises". They are 
the country's first two regulations on operation, management 
and income taxation for private enterprises. 
Although the State has done much to protect the 
development of private enterprises to date, there is still 
some discrimination against them in access to loans, tax 
relief and supplies of materials in short supply. Shanxi 
provincial government made an investigation of 54 private 
enterprises. It revealed that these enterprises did not 
receive the same treatment from the authorities as the 
collectively owned enterprises. For example, they could not 
get enough raw materials and fuels, which they therefore had 
to buy at higher prices from the free market. The monthly 
interest rates on loans to state-run enterprise were also 
much lower than to private enterprises. 
Since some people in power still tend to believe that 
private institutions deviate from socialist ideals and 
should not be encouraged, some government departments tend 
to "give special treatment to the collectives, slight the 
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cooperatives, and to squeeze out the individual 
businesses. 1169 Many state enterprises are unwilling to 
establish business relations with private entrepreneurs. 
The scope for private enterprises in general is officially 
restricted. For example, the regulations forbid private 
enterprise from engaging in the military industry and 
banking business, and from dealing in specified goods under 
State protection and monopoly such as cultural relics, 
jewellery, automobiles and civilian explosives. 
Even amongst those in the CCP leadership who favour the 
existence of private enterprises, there is a belief that 
private enterprises should not be allowed unrestricted 
expansion even if it differs greatly from capitalism in 
capitalist societies. It has to be subordinated to the 
dominance of public ownership and subject to the guidance 
and restrictions of state policies as well as government 
decrees and regulations on taxation and loans. 
In short, although private enterprises have acquired 
a legal status, they still face many difficulties and 
different forms of discrimination. 
2.3 Conclusion 
It is now clear that distinct policy changes for rural 
enterprises have taken place since 1978. Before 1978, 
China's policy concerning rural enterprises had very much 
emphasized the development of commune- and brigade-run 
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enterprises, in particular, agricultural product processing 
enterprises. China's leaders overlooked them and only 
demanded them to complement agriculture and state 
enterprises. Furthermore, the market was then 
underdeveloped. In particular, the government had tight 
constraints on farmers engaging in non-agricultural 
occupations, and prohibited the development of individual 
and private enterprises. 
Since 1978 the most significant policy changes towards 
rural enterprises appear to be as follows: First, policy 
changes permitted peasants to engage in nonagricultural 
activities. In general, the central government provided a 
policy that encouraged the development of collective rural 
enterprises. Second, the Chinese government has legalized 
both individual and private enterprises. The private sector 
of rural enterprises has been tolerated. These changes of 
policy have done much to promote the development of rural 
enterprises. 
However, it must also be recognized that although 
private enterprises have acquired a legal status, in 
particular, private enterprises still face many difficulties 
and different forms of discrimination. Similarly, there is 
still considerable discrimination against rural enterprises 
whether they are collective-run or private-run enterprises 
such as in the supply of raw materials and credits, compared 
with the policy towards state-run enterprises. Moreover, the 
policy changes have been inadequate. Some political and 
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ideological problems have still remained an obstacle 
restraining rural enterprises to make an even greater 
development. I will discussed these problems in the 
following chapters, especially in Chapter Nine. 
In this chapter, I have discussed the evolution of 
China's central government policies towards rural 
enterprises. Since China is a big country, different 
regions have different economic and geographic conditions. 
Thus, the different regions have adopted the different 
development strategies of rural enterprises. Therefore, in 
the next chapter, I will examine local governments' 
development policies for rural enterprises. Since the focus 
of the research in the next chapter is to exemplify local 
government development policies and approaches of rural 
enterprises, much care is given to the selection of case 
studies. In the next chapter, the Southern Jiangsu Model and 
the Wenzhou Model will be selected for analysis. 
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Chapter 3 Regional Policy Variations for Rural 
Enterprises 
The analysis in this thesis is primarily concerned with 
central government policy towards rural enterprises. As was 
shown in Chapter Two, numerous central directives and 
initiatives were issued and undertaken between 1978 and 1992 
to sponsor the growth of collective rural enterprises. 
However, private rural enterprises did not receive the same 
preferential treatment - indeed their existence was not 
formally or legally accepted until as late as 1988. 
But one of the most striking features of China's 
economic (and to a lesser extent, political) development in 
the post-Mao era has been the degree to which provincial and 
lower level authorities have been allowed flexibility in the 
implementation of central policy. At certain times in 
certain policy areas, lower level authorities have actually 
gone beyond their formal right to exercise flexibility in 
policy implementation, and have taken on the function of 
actually making policy. As such, there have been relatively 
wide discrepancies between what the centre officially 
decrees, and what actually happens on the ground. 
In this chapter, I will address the issue of the 
divergence between central policy and local actions in 
relation to the development of rural enterprises. I will 
show that despite the plethora of national level 
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pronouncements on the "correct" path of development, there 
has been no uniform pattern of policy implementation at a 
grass roots level. Indeed, the process of defining a 
"correct" central policy has in many ways been a reactive 
process - the centre has distilled a national policy through 
synthesizing (and of course rejecting) disparate elements of 
local initiative. 
Having briefly analyzed the wider question of centre- 
local relations in the post-Mao era, I will proceed to 
assess the importance of five key factors in the evolution 
of differing local policies towards rural enterprises. These 
are the implications of the changes of the centre-local 
relations, the conflicting approaches of rival central 
leaders, variations in the desire of local leaders to adhere 
to central policy, the economic legacy in determining an 
area level of economic development, and the importance of 
unique geographical and historical factors of different 
areas. The debate within China itself has centred on the 
different approaches adopted in Wenzhou, Southern Jiangsu, 
and Nanhai. As there are wide variations in the experience 
in these three areas, a comparative analysis of their 
development will provide the case studies for this chapter. 
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3.1 The Implications of the Changes of Centre-local 
Relations for Rural Enterprises Since 1978 
The extent of the change in centre-local relations 
since 1978 is one of the most striking consequences of the 
post-Mao reforms. Virtually no area of spatial policy has 
been left unaffected by reform, and the resolution of the 
resulting conflicts between both centre and the provinces 
and between the provinces themselves will be a crucial 
determinant of the future trajectory of the Chinese reform 
process. The changes of centre-local relations occurred not 
only in politics and economy but also in military and 
ideology. Although these changes have affected all spheres 
of the centre-local relationship, the following discussion 
will be confined to those economic and political shifts 
which impinge on the development of rural enterprises. 
An important component of the CCP's attempt to 
generate economic modernisation was an uneasy mix of partial 
market reform and administrative decentralization. 1 The 
impact of the introduction of partial market reform has been 
very beneficial for rural enterprises in that it has 
expanded access to markets, funds and raw materials. These 
issues will be dealt with in more detail in the following 
chapter. 
But as argued in the introduction, a number of 
restrictions on rural enterprises' activities remain, which 
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is partly a function of the only partial introduction of 
market reforms. Indeed, in some respects, the administrative 
decentralization which has also taken place has made control 
of rural enterprises more intimate. Local governments' 
powers to interfere in the working of the local economy have 
been enhanced. The causes and consequences of this increase 
in local autonomy warrant closer attention, particularly in 
relation to local governments' financial obligations and 
priorities. 
One of the key elements here is the result of the 
combined changes in the fiscal system, and in centre-local 
revenue sharing arrangements. As Ferdinand2 and others3 have 
demonstrated, these changes gave local authorities an 
incentive to maximize their local fiscal base. Since both 
the fiscal responsibilities to the state and the desire to 
find investment capital placed local authorities at all 
levels under severe financial strains, many local 
governments strove to expand their local revenue base, 
irrespective of national economic needs and goals. 4 In 
addition, since the agricultural sector has also faced 
serious financial shortage and needs large funds for 
modernization, it proved impossible for local governments to 
generate sufficient revenue from the agricultural sector. 
So on the positive side, developing rural enterprises 
provided an attractive option for many local governments 
anxious to increase their local revenue base. Initial start- 
up costs were low, and returns on investment were generated 
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relatively quickly. As a result, the expansion of rural 
enterprises in many provinces has developed in a manner and 
at a rate that deviated from central government plans and 
expectations . But on the negative side, many local 
governments exercised an overtight control of their local 
economies. What the local government gave, the local 
government could also take away. As a result, while rural 
enterprises prospered when times were good, they often found 
their access to funds and raw materials quickly reined in 
when the economy took a downward turn. 
Another important change occurred in the structure of 
the rural political-administrative system. 5 There are three 
main components to these reforms. First, the system of city 
leadership over counties has been changed. After the 
cultural revolution, the Chinese countryside was basically 
divided into two - the cities engaged in industry, while 
their peripheries were engaged in agricultural production. 
Now, however, the cities are responsible for local 
agricultural production as well as industry. This change 
has brought about a closer working relationship between town 
and countryside. Secondly, 
administrative system has 
the county (xian) political- 
been changed. The 1982 
Constitution stipulated that a standing committee should be 
formed in the county people's congress, meaning that all 
county revolutionary committees were to be replaced by 
county people's governments. The delegates to the county 
people's congress were to be elected directly by the voters. 
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Thirdly, since the introduction of the new Constitution in 
late 1982, the central government has reformed rural 
political structures by substituting new townships and 
village institutions for the commune, production brigade and 
team and redefined the scope of their authority and 
controls. Township governments and villages' committees have 
to be directly elected by villages. 
These changes have profound implications for the rural 
political system as well as on the development of rural 
enterprises. As the Chinese political economist Wang Huning 
has commented, "If a candidate wants to be elected, he must 
show that he can satisfy local interests.. 6 In rural areas, 
achievement in developing rural enterprises has become an 
important criterion for villagers to judge a candidate for 
villages' committees and township governments. Moreover, as 
will analyze in both section 3.3 of this chapter and in 
Chapter Seven, local leaders can gain numerous more tangible 
benefits from the development of rural enterprises. 
3.2 The Conflicting Approaches of Rival Central Leaders 
Central leaders, attitude to reform comprises an 
important component of its extent and scope and regional 
policy variations. On a wider scale, Hsu argues 
convincingly that economic developments are shaped and 
constrained by the pervading political climate of the time, 
"it is primarily the political leaders and their ideology 
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that determines political practice. 117 Thus, although 
provincial and local leaders do have considerable leeway in 
policy implementation, there are limits to their actions set 
by the goals and priorities of important central leaders. 
For example, as I have shown in Chapter Two, the acceptance 
of an individual and private sector of rural industries was 
dependent on the ideological interpretations of central 
leaders, and in particular, of Zhao Ziyang. 
Despite the extension of local government power in 
the 1980s, central leaders have by no means lost total 
control over the provinces. Although they may be prepared to 
sanction a relatively high degree of provincial 
"flexibility", the extent of central leaders, intervention 
in local affairs has been variable. There are perhaps two 
main elements here. Firstly, if the issue at hand is one 
which has crucial implications for the ideological 
orientation of the state - if it challenges or questions 
basic so-called "socialist principles" - then central 
leaders are likely to pay close attention to local 
initiative. Secondly, if there is conflict between leaders 
at the centre over the direction of the reform process, then 
they will concern themselves with local affairs either to 
promote their ideas, or to rubbish those of opponents. For 
example, central leaders have frequently identified 
themselves with particular successful local strategies to 
prove the wisdom of their view. Deng Xiaoping's support for 
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Zhao Ziyang's agricultural reforms in Sichuan being an 
important case in point here. 
With particular reference to rural enterprises, central 
leaders' attitudes towards the development of private 
enterprises in Wenzhou provides a good and relatively well 
documented example. Wenzhou region in Zhejiang Province was 
the first place where private enterprises came to dominate 
the local economy. Policy implementation and development in 
Wenzhou have a wider significance than just as an example of 
local variation. In fact, central leaders' attitude towards 
the Wenzhou experiment sheds light on the extent that 
central leaders allow the existence of regional policy 
variations towards the development of rural enterprises. 
Therefore, it is worthy of analysis. 
In the late 1970s, Wenzhou was a poor unnoticed region 
of China. However, in the middle of the 1980s, the output of 
private and individual industries rose dramatically. 
Meanwhile, the proportion of state industry in Wenzhou's 
total output decreased. Table 3.1 shows how by 1985, 
private traders' proportion of total social retail sales 
reached parity with the state sector. 
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Table 3.1 Shares of Social Retail Sales of Commodities in 
the Different Sectors in 
------ 
Wenzhou, 1980-1985 
------------------- 
Year 1980 
------ 
------------- 
1981 1982 
--------- 
1983 
------ 
1984 
------- 
1985 
------------------- 
Social retail sales 
------------- --------- ------ ------- 
of commodities 
(100 million Yuan) 8.81 9.57 10.43 11.99 14.60 19.25 
State-owned commerce 
9 .................. 38.6 36.9 35.2 33 31.6 27.5 
Supply and marketing 
CO-OPS ............ 35.4 34.2 31.1 27.5 23.2 18 Collectively owned 
commerce in other 
forms('-. ) ........... 23.9 25.7 26.4 25.4 24.8 27 Individual 
Businessmen (0i) ... 2.1 3.2 7.3 14.1 20.4 27.5 
------------------------- 
Source: Wang Youfen and 
---------------------------- 
Li Ning, "Rural Changes 
------ 
promote 
urban reform", Beijing Review, N0.43, October, 1986. 
According to the traditional Marxist-Leninist doctrine, 
which supposedly provided the bed-rock for all policy at 
this time, public ownership should dominate the economy. 
As a result, the case of Wenzhou's development became an 
issue of national concern and debate. The main question for 
discussion was whether the growing proportion of the private 
economy would affect the leading position of the state 
economy, and ultimately move China away from a socialist 
economy and society. Or from a more cynical viewpoint, 
perhaps we can say that the debate was how to change China's 
ideological stance to facilitate the rapid economic 
development that the private sector in Wenzhou had helped to 
generate. 
In defence of the Wenzhou experiment, Wu Xiang, 
deputy director of the Rural Policy Research Centre under 
the State Council, argued that the overall direction and 
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orientation of China's economy would not be fundamentally 
affected by isolated events in some areas. 8 As long as the 
national economy as a whole was dominated by public 
ownership, then it could easily accommodate some areas where 
the private sector was in command. Furthermore, almost all 
the piece-work products produced by the household industry 
in Wenzhou were small products which could not affect the 
dominant position of the state economy. Most products of the 
household industry were sold in vast rural areas and remote 
mountainous areas, and supplemented rather than displaced 
existing industries. The state would still be able to use 
macroeconomic control methods such as taxes, credit, 
industrial and commercial administration and so on to 
influence the overall economic direction. 
Some people have strongly argued against the 
development of private enterprises in Wenzhou, pointing to 
the prevalence of tax evasion and fraudulent practices, 
since they thought these wrong doings are capitalist 
restoration and should be eliminated along with private 
enterprises. 
The public airing of the Wenzhou debate inevitably 
entailed the participation of central leaders. Indeed, it is 
inconceivable that this debate would have become public 
without the prompting of a central leader or leaders anxious 
to prove a point. It is important to note that at this stage 
(and at many others) further reform of the Chinese economy 
was being obstructed by opposition from powerful 
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conservative minded leaders. An open debate which would 
hopefully show to the Chinese people the benefits of private 
industry would force the hand of the conservative leaders 
and make it difficult for them to halt the momentum for 
reform. On the other hand, conservative leaders would hope 
to highlight the negative impacts in an attempt to influence 
an alternative public opinion. 
The development of private rural enterprises obtained 
support from a group of influential leaders, including Wan 
Li (vice premier), Zhao Ziyang (premier), Tian Jiyun 
(Poliburo member and vice premier), Du Runsheng (Director of 
Rural Policy Research Centre under the Secretariat of the 
Central Committee) . In particular, Zhao Ziyang, the then 
prime minister (and thus, ultimately in charge of economic 
affairs), was Wenzhou's most powerful advocate. His support 
for Wenzhou was developed in a now typical manner9 -a 
personal tour to Wenzhou in December 1985 was followed by 
praise for what he had found at a central cadres' conference 
held in Beijing on 6-9 January 1986. Following this public 
announcement of support from the highest level, Wenzhou was 
approved as an experimental zone for reform in May, and an 
experimental Zone Office under the auspices of the Rural 
Policy Research Centre and the Central Committee Secretariat 
was established. 
10 Wan Li entered the debate by using his 
close contacts with Deng Xiaoping to bring him into the pro- 
Wenzhou "lobby". " 
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Despite this support for the Wenzhou 'model", more 
conservative leaders were not prepared to admit defeat. 
Although it proved difficult to oppose the pro-Wenzhou 
grouping in 1985, they waited until further problems emerged 
in the reform process to renew the attack on the dangerous 
capitalist tendencies in Wenzhou. During the anti-bourgeois 
liberalization campaign in 1987, Wenzhou was used as an 
example of the dangers of capitalist restoration. Similarly, 
after the suppression of the 4th June "democracy movement" 
in 1989, Wang Zhen, a conservative top Chinese leader wrote: 
have long heard that Wenzhou's political power is not in 
the hands of the Communist Party. " The State Council 
Research Office (headed by Yuan Mu) responded by dispatching 
a group to Wenzhou for investigation, which reaffirmed the 
success of the Wenzhou experiment and its socialist 
characteristics. Undeterred, Yuan Mu rejected the findings 
and insisted on revising the conclusion accordingly to 
affirm Wang Zhen's position. 12 This counter-attack was in 
itself countered when Qiao Shi and Li Ruihuan, Central 
Committee Political Bureau Standing Committee members of 
the Chinese Communist Party, separately visited Wenzhou in 
August and September, and both affirmed its achievements in 
reform and opening up. 
13 
The controversy on Wenzhou has cooled down since Deng 
Xiaoping paid a visit to south China in early 1992, and 
called for bolder reforms. Deng redefined "socialism" during 
the southern trip: "To judge whether an economic measure is 
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socialist or capitalist will depend mainly on whether it 
will develop productive forces under socialism, enhance 
national strength and promote the living standards of the 
people.,, 14 From this point of view, the development of 
private rural enterprises in Wenzhou is socialist. It should 
be encouraged. James McGregor wrote: "in essence, that it is 
all right to use capitalism to save socialism. 1115 
What this discussion demonstrates is that the 
acceptance of local initiative and the extent of local power 
is tempered by the attitude and intervention of central 
leaders. But conversely, the success of the policy line of 
particular central leaders is also very much helped (if not 
dependent on) the successful initiatives of local 
authorities. 
3.3 Policy Variations in the Desire of Local Leaders 
to Adhere to Central Policy 
Although central leaders' attitudes are a crucial 
determinant of the existence and scope of regional policy 
variations, local government leaders also play a very 
important role in regional policy variations. Provincial and 
lower level authorities have always been in a position to 
modify and even distort central policies due to their 
control over policy implementation. But after 1978, this 
ability to change the substance of central policy 
initiatives was expanded with the devolution of more 
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decision making powers (as opposed to policy implementation 
powers) to provincial level authorities. 
Township and village leaders are generally very keen on 
developing rural enterprises. As noted in section 3.1 above, 
they have become an important component of township and 
village governments, fiscal considerations. But there are 
also more tangible benefits to local leaders from developing 
rural enterprises. Many have partially transferred their 
political power to economic power by becoming involved in 
running rural enterprises themselves. Their knowledge, 
experience and, perhaps most importantly, contacts have 
ensured that their personal incomes as well as the local 
governmentis income have benefited from the development of 
rural enterprises. 
Indeed, in some rich areas, township and village 
government leaders have been unwilling to accept promotion 
to the next higher level because of the relatively low 
government wage scale and the prohibition against higher 
government cadres' engaging in private business. By 
contrast, in poorer more backward areas, lower-level 
community government leaders actively strove for promotion 
to state cadre status because of the financial advantages 
resulting from the change in household registration status 
from rural to urban residency. 
16 Thus, perhaps not 
surprisingly, one of the determinants of how supportive of 
rural enterprises local leaders are is the benefits that 
they themselves can expect to gain from their development. 
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This is in turn partially dictated by the economic 
conditions of their area, an issue that will be dealt with 
in more detail in sections 3.4 and 3.5 below. 
Another important factor in the development of local 
strategies was the ambiguity of central government policies 
and proclamations. With no clear and authoritative voice 
coming down from the centre, local leaders were free to 
interpret central orders in a way that best suited their own 
priorities. 17 For example, Central Document No. 1 for 1983 
gave entrepreneurs approval for private hiring of labour, 
private purchase of large-scale producer goods, and pooling 
18 . --, +-, fn, of capital in private investment. Each owner of a priviate 
enterprise in rural areas could employ one or two hands, and 
a person with special skills could take on no more than five 
apprentices. But the central government adopted an ambiguous 
attitude towards employing more people; although it gave no 
encouragement or publicity to violations of the rules, 
neither did it take any action to stop or punish them. This 
policy left room for local leaders to manoeuvre. In 
conservative areas such as some parts of rural Hebei, local 
leaders began harassing them and demanding a cut when the 
businesses continued to expand and proliferate. 
19 
In contrast, local leaders in some areas went as far 
as to provide protection for the development of rural 
enterprises. One simple way of doing this was to classify 
private enterprises as "local collective enterprises" or 
"partnership enterprises". They subsequently qualified for 
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those advantages developed to encourage the collective 
sector such as tax breaks. 
To return to the case study of Wenzhou, of the 225,000 
private enterprises, 110,000 with a total work force of 1.76 
million, were registered in this fashion. 20 This practice 
was termed trying to get a 'red hat' meaning trying to make 
private enterprises appear 'not that bad' according to old 
ultra-leftist standards. It is worth noting that the local 
authorities also gained from this practice as entrepreneurs 
were forced to hand over a portion of their profits to the 
administrative organizations in return for which they 
obtained their red hats'. 
Local leaders have not only exercised flexibility in 
explaining and implementing central government policy, but 
they have also made their own policies. Local governments 
in Wenzhou and Southern Jiangsu provide the best examples of 
how local governments transcended the boundaries between 
flexibility in policy implementation, and policy making. In 
Wenzhou, "The policy adopted by the local governments is to 
let the market solve various basic problems in economic 
development". 21 After the central authorities gave approval 
for Wenzhou to operate a pilot scheme to test further ways 
of developing the commodity economy in 1986, Zhejiang Party 
Committee and Provincial Government of Zhejiang and 
Municipal Government of Wenzhou drew up the "Wenzhou Region 
Pilot Scheme". 22 The main features of the scheme are as 
f ollows: 
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First, the scheme provided for legal guarantees for 
the rights of ownership and management of private businesses 
and allowed free, unlimited hiring of labour. Qualifying 
private businesses might apply for permission to issue 
shares on the open market. Family businesses, joint 
enterprises and agricultural trades could work in 
conjunction with state-owned or collective industries. 
Second, the scheme accelerated the reform of state- 
owned and collective industry through adjustment of their 
ownership structure and business management. Ordinary small- 
scale industries and enterprises were gradually 
"restructured, converted, leased, and sold". Some were 
turned into collective enterprises; some were leased out to 
collectives or private operators; and a small proportion 
were sold off, thus becoming completely privately owned. 
Enterprises that had been running at a loss over a long 
period and that had no assets to pay off their debts were to 
be declared bankrupt, with guarantees being provided for 
their workers. 
Third, the scheme provided gradual price liberalization 
and the creation of a regional pricing system based on 
market prices. Three price scales were applied to basic 
means of subsistence: currently rationed goods continued to 
be priced in accordance with practical criteria and 
governmental regulations; some secondary products were 
subject to guided pricing, with upper and lower limits being 
set to curb fluctuation. Other products were regulated by 
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the market. Industrial products of daily use were subject to 
price liberalization, except for a small number of products 
subject to state allocation. 
Fourth, the scheme proposed the implementation of 
financial reform and liberation of the capital market. 
Various forms of financing organizations were developed, 
including city credit cooperatives, and joint stock 
cooperative banks. Old-style money lenders might also 
continue to operate. 
This scheme not only provided the legal guarantees 
for the development of private rural enterprises before 
their formal legalisation on a national scale, but also 
offered more liberal policy for the development of the 
market. As a result, private rural enterprises have rapidly 
developed ahead of other regions, and different markets have 
been established in Wenzhou. 
In contrast, the local government in Southern Jiangsu 
formulated an entirely different set of policies. The main 
characteristic of local government policy for rural 
enterprises in the Southern Jiangsu region has been to 
discourage the development of the private sector of rural 
enterprises and to encourage the development of the 
traditional collective sector of rural enterprises. 
For example, in Wuxi, community-run enterprises have a 
strong base. Local government in Wuxi has firm leadership 
over the rural enterprises and stressed the development of 
industrial collective enterprises. Its strategy is to 
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discourage the development of rural enterprises below the 
village level and protect the collective sector of rural 
enterprises as much as possible from competition for human 
and financial resources. 23 Therefore, although private 
enterprises are tolerated, their development has been 
restrained by limits on loans, restricted access to inputs, 
and environmental and other regulations. 
One of the most distinguishing characteristics of 
rural enterprises in Southern Jiangsu is the strong 
involvement of local governments. Governments in Southern 
Jiangsu at various levels have played an important role in 
the development of rural enterprises. Jiangsu government has 
actively promoted the development of township and town 
enterprises. Former Provincial governor Gu Xiulian said: 
"We are emphasizing the development of rural industry that 
is the pillar of all industry in this province. 1124 Jiangsu 
local government has also given various forms of support 
towards the development of rural enterprises. 
First, local governments have helped rural enterprises 
to raise funds from both local and external sources for 
developing production. With more funds, it is possible to 
set up larger enterprises, most of which are mechanized or 
semi-mechanized, producing small and medium-sized items. 
Their technical standards are also high. 25 
Second, local governments have played an active role 
in regulating local development and forging external ties. 
As a result, a production structure with industry as the 
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dominating factor has been formed. 26 For example, local 
government in Wuxi has supplied initial funds for collective 
rural enterprises, shared their risks, served as a 
supervisory body, appointing managers and allocating 
workers. Workers enjoy job security but have no right of 
management, and their wages largely consist of piece rates 
and profit-related bonuses. The community government's 
leadership role includes providing assistance in product 
selection, marketing, and financing. 27 
Local governments also have the power to redistribute 
part of the profits of rural enterprises. Rural enterprises 
have to pay certain net incomes to village and township 
governments besides what they pay in taxes to the state. 
These funds are used to build new enterprises and to 
reinvigorate existing enterprises, to give various forms of 
subsidies and help to agriculture, and to accumulate the 
common welfare fund. For example, in Wuxi ten percent of 
profits remitted by rural enterprises is used to finance 
agricultural investment and support services. The government 
tries to keep the difference between wages of workers in 
rural enterprises and in agriculture relatively small, and 
so it imposes wage controls on collective rural 
enterprises. 
28 As a result, industrial and agricultural 
development is fairly well coordinated, and peasant income 
is relatively even. According to a survey, among 454 
households in two medium-income villages in Southern 
Jiangsu, less than 3 percent had an average annual per 
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capita net income of under 200 yuan, about 11 percent, had 
more than 1,000 yuan; and 74 percent, had 400 to 1,000 
yuan. 29 Thus, the income of most agricultural workers is 
nearly equal to that of industrial workers. 
A third case study, of Nanhai County in Guangdong 
Province provides yet a third set of policies. Here, the 
local government has chosen to encouraged a mix of different 
forms of rural enterprises, rather than emphasising either 
the private or the collective sector. During the early 
1980s, local government in Nanhai encouraged the development 
of collective rural enterprises, but local leaders did not 
discriminate against the development of private rural 
enterprises. After 1978, with the development of the open 
door policy, the relatives of overseas Chinese started to 
run their own rural industry supported by foreign capital, 
equipment, business methods and economic information 
supplied by their kin. The local government has also 
established joint ventures with foreign (mostly Hong Kong) 
firms so that collective rural enterprises have been able to 
obtain advanced technology and to modernize their production 
30 methods. 
However, although local government has emphasized 
development of all forms of rural enterprises, it is not as 
directly involved in the management of rural enterprises as 
in Wuxi. Moreover, rural enterprises were less subject to 
macroeconomic control from the central government since 
rural enterprises in Nanhai could by-pass the state sector 
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and seek financial (and other) resources through foreign 
31 channels. 
The above three examples show that local governments 
have taken different policy directions to develop rural 
enterprises, and they have also different roles in 
developing rural enterprises. However, regional policy 
variations are not only related with variations in the 
desire of local leaders to adhere to central policy, but are 
they also involved with economic and geographical and 
historical factors. These factors will be analysed in detail 
below. 
3.4 The Economic Legacy 
In China, all enterprises are not equal in status. 
Among the enterprises, township-run enterprises are lower 
than state-run enterprises; village-run enterprises are 
lower than township enterprises; private enterprises are 
lower than village enterprises. Higher ranking enterprises 
receive more preferential treatment and favours from the 
government, as well as more resource allocations. Therefore, 
local leaders prefer to support and develop higher ranking 
enterprises if this is a viable option. The Southern Jiangsu 
example is a case in point. 
In southern Jiangsu, collective rural enterprises had 
started to grow in China's old economic system of the 60s 
and 70s. For example, in Wuxi in the early 1970s, after an 
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intense debate, county authorities decided not to abandon 
rural enterprises, even though in accordance with the spirit 
of the times they stressed the development of agriculture 
and grain production. By the late 1970s, rural industrial 
development in Wuxi was far ahead of that in other 
counties. 32 
Therefore, Southern Jiangsu has a good economic base, 
rich financial resources, abundant human talents, and early 
development of collective rural enterprises. Higher levels 
of economic development in Southern Jiangsu can be used to 
explain why local leaders prefer to develop collective rural 
enterprises rather than private rural enterprises. 
Nanhai County, however, is located in a highly 
developed and urbanized area. Rural enterprises in Nanhai 
like Wuxi derived much of their initial technical strength 
from workers who returned to rural areas in the 1960s and 
1970s. Guangzhou provided rural enterprises with 
opportunities to obtain technical assistance in various 
ways. Although Nanhai does not have as strong an industrial 
base as Wuxi, it has greater access to foreign technology 
through joint ventures and processing arrangements. Rural 
enterprises in Nanhai are on a smaller scale. The collective 
sector of rural enterprises is weaker and the private sector 
is stronger than in Wuxi. 
33 
Therefore, Nanhai also has a good economic base, and 
experienced early development of collective rural 
enterprises. Moreover, Nanhai has greater access to foreign 
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technology. As a result, many joint ventures have also been 
established. Since many production factors such as equipment 
and technology and land belong to different owners, 
collective rural enterprises are less predominant. Given 
these features, the local government is willing to encourage 
the development of rural enterprises at all forms of 
ownership. 
By way of contrast, local governments in poor regions 
have many difficulties in developing collective rural 
enterprises since poor regions receive less state 
investment and lack economic strength. Therefore, if local 
leaders in poor regions want to develop rural enterprises, 
they have to adopt more liberal policy to encourage peasants 
to establish their own businesses. This brings us back to 
the Wenzhou region. 
Wenzhou is situated opposite Taiwan across the Taiwan 
Strait. It was the "frontline" in the 1950s when the 
situation between Taiwan and the Mainland was tense. It was 
the hottest spot in the country during the "Cultural 
Revolution" in the 1960s when various factions of the Red 
Guard held pitched battles with guns and artillery. From 
1949 to 1986, state investment in local economic activity 
accounted for only 1 percent of the total spent on the 
province, despite its area being 11 percent of the province 
and its population 15 percent of the province's 
34 total. 
Thus, the local economy remained relatively stagnant. In 
Wenzhou the industrial and geographical conditions are not 
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conducive to supporting large sized enterprises. In the 30 
years between 1949 and 1980, this area's total agricultural 
output value increased at an average annual rate of 4.9 
percent, which was 0.5 percent lower than the national 
average for the same period. 35 In sum, the Wenzhou area has 
a poor basis in its collective economy, but there are more 
people than the land can support, and during 1949 to 1978 
there was limited investment in capital construction. 
Therefore, before 1978 Wenzhou had a relatively 
stagnant economy, and a poor base in the rural collective 
economy and a limited level of economic investment. 
Local leaders from each level of the village were willing to 
tolerate and even support private enterprises. In general, 
rural enterprises in Wenzhou are small scale. They need 
little investment since the cost of household industry is 
low, so that it has been possible to gain small profits but 
quick turnover in selling products by securing a good 
market. Most of the production units are labour-intensive 
handicraft and semi-mechanized operations, producing small 
and medium-sized commodities. They tend to produce small, 
low price goods which urban enterprises find it unprofitable 
to produce, and they depend on the process of self- 
accumulation to run their private enterprises. 
Since Wenzhou had a lower level of economic development 
and little investment from the state, local government was 
not able to rely on collective economic strength to develop 
collective enterprises, and had little choice but to 
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tolerate and even support the development of private rural 
enterprises. Thus, the contrasting economic legacies in 
Wenzhou, Southern Jiangsu and Nanhai had clear implications 
for the development of rural enterprises in these areas. 
3.5 The Importance of the Unique Geographical and 
Historical Factors of Different Areas 
For some scholars36 the key element in determining the 
type of local government policy adopted to encourage rural 
enterprises is the degree of geographic isolation of that 
area. For example, they argue that local governments in 
geographically isolated areas receive less interference from 
the central government. As a result, policies that deviate 
(or even contradict) official central policy are more likely 
to remain unchallenged in these peripheral areas. It is true 
that Wenzhou37 in particular has faced geographic isolation. 
However, this argument is not convincing since private 
enterprises have not been developed in many other 
geographically isolated areas. In fact, geographically 
isolated regions have disadvantages in securing capital and 
technical support from big industrial cities, and have also 
difficulties of access to the market. Therefore, the factor 
of geographic isolation can become an obstacle to the 
development of rural enterprises. Furthermore, as we have 
already seen in this Chapter, Wenzhou's isolation did not 
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prevent it from receiving very close central government 
attention in the mid and late 1980S. 
Since state-run businesses and supply and marketing 
cooperatives do not take the responsibility for rural 
enterprises' purchases of raw materials and selling their 
products, rural enterprise have to rely on themselves. In 
particular, rural enterprises in geographically isolated 
areas have to rely on procurement and distribution personnel 
to sell their own products. Whether the region has enough 
talented people to purchase materials and sell products has 
been crucial. 
For example, although Wenzhou is located in the 
mountainous areas, people in Wenzhou have the tradition to 
engage in business and handicraft. There are lots of skilful 
craftspeople and competent managers. Many of China's 
tailors, barbers and cooks come from Wenzhou. They are known 
in terms of the three professional skills: the scissors, the 
razors and the kitchen knives. Before liberation, the 
peasants worked partly in the fields, partly in family 
handicraft work, and partly in business. Even in the years 
of the "Cultural Revolution", they engaged in business 
activity, sometimes publicly, sometimes underground. 
Business tradition has been a very important factor for the 
development of private rural enterprises. Yia-ling Liu 
argued that the revolutionary legacy has been the most 
important factor to make Wenzhou the pioneer of private 
economy. 
38 However, many other regions have a similar 
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revolutionary legacy, but as rural enterprises have not 
developed in these areas, the "isolation hypothesis" alone 
does not appear to be very convincing. 
Private enterprises in Wenzhou are characterized by 
distant purchases and distant sales and belong to the 
category of small commodity production which is neither 
closely linked with agriculture nor closely linked with the 
local economy. The products are mainly sold in the remote 
cities and towns. Selling and purchasing agents are 
scattered around the places of origin of products, and are 
linked with the national specialist markets, forming the 
commercial network. Liushi town in Wenzhou gives an example 
39 of their operation. In Liushi, the development process 
consisted of four steps: First, more than 1,300 sales people 
went into remote areas, selling their products in factories 
and mines that other sellers had rarely visited. Second, 
they paid close attention to the different orders at each 
annual national machinery and electrical products fair. 
Third, they tried to reduce prices through reducing 
production costs by making use of scrap materials from big 
factories to produce small commodities. Fourth, they 
cooperated with colleagues in Shanghai, Guangzhou, Hangzhou 
and other cities, making use of their larger counterparts, 
technology and selling some of their products through these 
enterprises. Therefore, as we can see from this case, rural 
enterprises in Wenzhou have paid close attention to the 
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market in developing their production and marketing 
strategies. 
Moreover, some collection and distribution markets for 
nationally known small commodities have appeared in Wenzhou. 
In 1986 in the urban and rural areas of the whole of 
Wenzhou, there were nearly 400 markets, among which 113 
were specialized markets. The most outstanding markets were 
40 the 10 big, well-known, nationwide specialized markets. 
The market liaison basis was on households that specialized 
in buying and selling, involving 100,000 peasants who 
travelled all over the country to big and medium-sized 
cities and remote and backward places to buy raw materials, 
41 sell products, sign contracts and pass on information. 
Therefore, although Wenzhou region faced geographic 
isolation, people in Wenzhou have the tradition to do 
business, and have established effective market networks so 
that private enterprises can still develop. Although many 
mountainous and minority regions in western and central 
areas also face geographic isolation, private rural 
enterprises have not developed since these regions lacked 
talented marketing staff. 
In geographical terms, the area of the Southern 
Jiangsu is mostly scattered around large and middle sized 
cities. As there are many industrial cities such as Suzhou, 
Wuxi, Changzhou in the Southern Jiangsu, rural enterprises 
can receive capital and technical support from these cities, 
and can also access the market. Moreover, in Southern 
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Jiangsu there is an ancestral relation between the cities 
and rural areas. Those town people who returned to rural 
areas brought with them not only their technical and 
management skills but also their networks of social 
connections, which are essential in obtaining market 
information and other assistance. Those urban people are 
always the initiators in running rural enterprises. For 
example, Wuxi has derived much of its initial technical 
strength from workers who returned to rural areas in the 
1960s and 1970s. The proximity of Wuxi to Shanghai has 
provided rural enterprises with opportunities to get 
technical assistance in various ways. For example, rural 
enterprises offer both short and long-term employment to 
workers retiring from city factories, and also part-time 
work to technicians in the city and researchers in nearby 
academic institutions. 42 
Nanhai County is located in a highly developed and 
urbanized area about 20 kilometres from Guangzhou. The 
agriculture produces enough to support its own population 
and to export a substantial quantity of products to Hong 
Kong. There were many small factories in the area before 
1949, but the industrial base is much smaller than in 
Wuxi. 43 The rural areas benefited from the return of skilled 
workers who began to set up their own factories in the 
countryside. Throughout history, many local people travelled 
and lived abroad. The overseas Chinese can bring back 
tangible industrial resources such as overseas remittance, 
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overseas capital, foreign capital, foreign equipment, raw 
materials. They can also bring back intangible industrial 
resources such as market information, management knowledge 
and technology. 
Therefore, both Southern Jiangsu and Nanhai County 
have the conditions to develop collective rural enterprises 
since they have good geographic conditions and an ancestral 
relation with the cities. Moreover, Nanhai County is close 
to Hong Kong, and has many overseas Chinese connections. 
Therefore, many joint ventures have been established. 
3.6 Conclusion 
The analysis in this chapter has displayed 
considerable variations in local governments' policies 
towards the development of rural enterprises. I have argued 
that the support of central leaders is the most important 
factor which determined the scope and extent to which these 
policy variations could exist and develop. However, other 
factors such as the changes of the central-local relations, 
financial incentives for local leaders, local economic 
legacy, geographic and historical factors, have also 
influenced the existence and development of regional policy 
variations towards the development of rural enterprises. 
Regional policy variations have important implications 
for the development of rural enterprises. Although some 
regions have a weak economic foundation and geographic 
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isolation, rural enterprises have nonetheless been able to 
flourish in these regions. For example, in 1977, a Wenzhou 
farmer's average per capita income was only 55 yuan, amongst 
the lowest in the country; by 1985, the average yearly 
44 income had reached 447 yuan. Private enterprises began to 
dominate state enterprises, and the ownership structure of 
the area fundamentally changed. 
The emergence of regional policy variations towards 
the development of rural enterprises can reduce regional 
development imbalance of rural enterprises. As Lin Qingsong 
and Wang Tuoyu 45 have demonstrated, in the first few years 
after 1978 the government depended almost solely on 
collective rural enterprises to develop rural 
industrialization. The gap among regions had widened 
alarmingly since a few relatively developed areas enjoyed 
industrialization while the backward areas were unable to 
develop collective rural enterprises. Since 1984 the 
blossoming of private enterprises has helped narrow the 
gaps, and has offered new hope for solving the problem of 
regional imbalances. 
Moreover, regional policy variations have also produced 
political implications. The development of rural enterprises 
in Wenzhou has caused national debate concerning the role of 
private enterprises. This has facilitated the legalization 
of private enterprises in China. 
The experience of developing private enterprises in 
Wenzhou has undoubtedly become a challenge to state 
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enterprises. But it is also beneficial as a spur to improve 
management methods in state enterprises and to deepen reform 
further. In July, 1986, the "Regulations on Enlivening 
State-Owned Enterprises" were promulgated by the Wenzhou 
municipal government. 46 Aimed at extending the decision- 
making power of enterprises, it stipulated that the total 
wage bill of a profitable enterprise could fluctuate in line 
with its profits after tax, and an enterprise might allocate 
those wages in whatever form it chose. Moreover, a loss- 
making enterprise might be allowed limited losses, beyond 
which no more subsidies could be given by the government. 
But if the enterprise lost less than the full amount 
permitted, it might keep the full subsidy. Poorly run or 
less-profitable enterprises could be leased or contracted to 
individuals or collectives or could be operated as 
shareholding co-operatives on a trial basis with the 
approval of the city government. Therefore, the development 
of private rural enterprises has not only become a challenge 
to the state economy, but it has also forced state 
enterprises to improve their management methods. 
The development of private enterprises has formed a 
strong political force. For example, in January 1989 in 
Wenzhou, 78 successful entrepreneurs established the People 
Run Business Association (minying gonghui) Moreover, one- 
quarter of association members were also Party members. 
47 
Therefore, private entrepreneurs represent a political force 
within the Party and society. 
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Since 1978, China has undertaken fundamental economic 
reforms--from the centrally planned economy to market 
economy. The development of rural enterprises highly depends 
on the market. Therefore, in the next chapter, I will 
discuss the implications of the measures of market reform 
and market expansion for rural enterprises. 
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Chapter 4 The Implications of Market Reform and Market 
Expansion for the Development of Rural Enterprises 
In Chapter Three, I have discussed two development 
models of rural enterprises. In this chapter, I will examine 
the implications of market reform and market expansion for 
rural enterprises. Since 1978, China's economy has been 
divided into a planned and a non-planned sector. China's 
rural enterprises are highly dependent on the market. The 
reform of the market has played a critical role in the 
development of rural enterprises. In this chapter, I do not 
intend to work out why China carried out the reform of the 
market and what kinds of the measures of market reform should 
take place in the future. ' My main intention in this chapter 
is to analyze how the measures of market reform and market 
expansion influence the development of rural enterprises, and 
examine some characteristics of the market's use of rural 
enterprises. First I will analyze the measures of market 
reform and their implications rural enterprises. Secondly I 
will deal with market expansion and its implications for 
rural enterprises. Thirdly I will examine some characteristics 
of the use of the market by rural enterprises. Finally I will 
discuss the likely effects of further reform of the market 
for the development of rural enterprises. 
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4.1 The Implications of the Measures of Market Reform 
for the Development of Rural Enterprises 
After 1949, China adopted a centrally planned command 
economy. Although the experience of the Soviet Union provided 
the basic model for this economic system, both in its initial 
inception and subsequent revisions, it marks a separate and 
distinct economic model from its Soviet forefather. This 
system created a strict rationing system for key consumer 
goods for the entire population and the direct allocation of 
raw materials and capital goods for enterprises. The system 
kept the aggregate demand and supply of basic consumer goods 
under government administrative control, thus making it 
feasible to guarantee minimum subsistence levels to most 
people and to achieve artificial price stability. 
Liu Guoguang and Zhao Renwei2 have demonstrated that 
Stalin's model of a centrally planned command system in China 
had the following problems: First it separated supply from 
demand since most of the goods produced by the enterprises 
were regulated under state unified procurement and marketing, 
and the bulk of the means of production was also under state 
unified supply and planned allocation. There was little 
coordination between consumers and producers. Second, there 
were no objective criteria to determine the value of a 
product, the planned prices of many products deviated from 
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their values by a wide margin. Third, under planned economy, 
enterprises were not responsible for profits and losses, and 
so the enterprises and their employees made little effort to 
meet the consumers' demands by reducing costs and improving 
quality, and increasing the variety of products. Fourth, owing 
to ignorance of the market and backwardness of the petty mode 
of production, the enterprises were driven to self-sufficiency 
instead of specialization. As a result, there was an autarky 
tendency. 
This system was particularly harmful to the development 
of rural enterprises. First, under this system, all raw 
materials and important production means were distributed by 
the state. The priority of the supply of these materials was 
given to the state enterprises. Rural enterprises hardly 
obtained raw materials and energy from the state. Second, 
under this system, different markets such as information 
markets and financial markets did not exist, making it very 
difficult for rural enterprises to obtain the information and 
funds. Third, under the provisional measures for rationed 
supply of grain for city and town people, people who wished to 
transfer their domicile or to add a member to their family 
had to present their household registration book and 
credentials for permission; when people changed jobs, they had 
to present a certificate from the labour department in order 
to transfer their household registration; when personnel 
settled in the villages or townships, their household 
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registration and grain coupons were transferred to the place 
where they settled. They had to get permission, or they would 
lose their rations. Thus, the system controlled migration of 
technological personnel to rural enterprises and enforced 
labour assignments. 
After the December 1978 3rd Plenum of the 11th Party 
Committee, China engaged in a series of market reforms. I will 
discuss the implications of these market reforms within the 
following periods: (a) October 1979 to October 1984; (b) 
October 1984 to late 1988; (c) late 1988 to 1991; (d) 1991 to 
early 1992.3 Then, I will analyze the implications of the 
measures of market reform towards the development of rural 
enterprises according to above different periods. 
4.1.1 From December 1978 to October 1984 
During this period, the following reform measures were 
introduced: First, the household contract responsibility 
system was implemented in rural areas, thus providing farmers 
with an incentive for work. As a result, agricultural output 
increased. This offered two bases for the development of 
rural enterprises. First, it provided a sufficient supply of 
grain for farmers to engage in rural enterprises. Second, a 
considerable proportion of farmers became surplus. This 
provided a sufficient supply of labour for rural enterprises. 
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Second, the state's monopoly on the purchase and 
marketing of agricultural products was reduced. By 1984, the 
number of agricultural commodities subject to compulsory state 
procurement had been reduced from 29 to 10.4 Agricultural 
price reforms had increased payments for compulsory deliveries 
of agricultural products and raised rural income. Higher 
incomes had led to increased rural demand for consumer and 
producer goods, though the quantities supplied had been 
insufficient. 5 Thus, this created a demand market of 
consumer goods for the development of rural enterprises. 
Although price reforms such as adjustment of ex- 
factory prices throughout industry and reform of the existing 
price management abolishing "pricing-fixing by directive" 
were recommended during the period 1980-1981, the plan for 
general price reform was not put into effect. 6 Thus, the 
reform of the market was limited during this period. 
4.1.2 From October 1984 to Late 1988 
In 1984 the political and economic atmosphere shifted 
to favor more radical reform. For example, the economic 
retrenchment of 1979-1983 was phased out. Inflation had 
dropped from 6 percent to 2.9 percent. Shops were well 
stocked. 7 Therefore, some reforms of the market took place. 
During this period, the most important reform of the 
market was the implementation of the dual pricing system. The 
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ecision of the State Council, in May 1984, "On further 
Expansion of Decision Making Power on the Part of State Run 
Industrial Enterprises", stipulated that there were in the 
planned economy and the non-planned economy, two types of 
material supplies for the enterprises, namely, state 
allocation and free purchase by individual enterprises; and 
the prices of the goods produced outside the state quota 
system could be varied within a range up to 20*-. higher or 
lower than state prices. 8 In February 1985, the State Price 
Administration and the State Material Administration jointly 
cancelled the 20'0-. limit. 9 Thus, the dual pricing system was 
formally in place. The dual pricing system had very important 
implications for the development of China's national 
economy. 10 This system had also very important implications 
for the development of rural enterprises. 
Its main result was to stimulate production and 
alleviate the pressure of demand. Since industrial enterprises 
that formerly had to obey government production directives had 
been given more freedom to produce products they could dispose 
of them at prices set by themselves. Thus, they had a great 
incentive to seek markets and profit. 
" As a result, rural 
enterprises could buy more raw materials and some products 
from the market. The market environment was thus much improved 
for rural enterprises. 
However, since there were the shortages of raw materials 
and funds, competition existed between rural enterprises and 
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those owned by governments at county, provincial and central 
levels. Rural enterprises had an inferior competitive position 
compared with government-run enterprises at higher levels. The 
former had relied completely on the market for everything they 
need, the latter had been more or less guaranteed by the State 
a supply of production materials, advanced technology and 
professional people. Moreover, their products enjoyed easier 
access to the market due to their firmly established sales 
channels and information networks. These unfair conditions 
forced rural enterprises to pay a high price for their 
survival and development. 
The dual pricing system also created an opportunity 
for producers and commercial intermediaries. Certain people 
with official positions or personal connections could use ties 
of friendship, and the power to give orders, to grab illegal 
profits. This was mainly because industrial growth had 
outstripped intermediate level support, causing bottlenecks to 
emerge in the supplies of coal, electricity, and transport 
facilities. The prices of consumer goods and raw materials on 
the free market were always double or triple the planned 
prices. In order to survive, rural enterprises had to depend 
on favours and gifts in order to obtain raw materials and sell 
their goods and get loans. However, these illegal activities 
were very unpopular, and the dual price system was criticized 
for facilitating them. These (and other) irrationalities in 
the economic system also contributed to economic and social 
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disorder during the summer of 1988, with a series of bank runs 
and uncontrollable panic buying in some cities. 
12 
Since 1978 China has adopted an open door policy. There 
are four special economic zones, 14 port cities and three 
river deltas in Guangdong and Fujian provinces and around 
Shanghai which enjoy special privileges in order to encourage 
their economic development and by opening them to the outside 
world. In addition, the State has decided to turn Hainan 
Island into the country's largest special economic zone and to 
extend more open policies in the pilot provinces of Guangdong 
and Fujian. China's rural enterprises are also linked with 
foreign trade. Although the first step linking the rural 
areas to foreign trade in the post-Mao era was started in 1978 
in Guangdong, the first nation-wide effort to link the rural 
economy with the export sector occurred in 1984.13 As David 
Zweig has pointed out that Zhao wanted to restructure 
agricultural production to meet the needs of export markets. 
However, at this time Zhao's strategy was still limited to 
particular rural export bases, not extended to the whole of 
the countryside. 14 
In 1987 Wang Jian in the State Planning Commission 
proposed a world market-oriented economic development strategy 
for China's coastal areas. In this strategy he suggested that 
rural enterprises should play an important role in the labour 
intensive export economy. The arguments in favour of the 
development of rural export-oriented enterprises are as 
121 
follows'S: there is ample cheap labour in the country's 
coastal areas to assist in the development of labour intensive 
products which still make up a comparatively large part of the 
world markets. Coastal areas have the advantages of cheap 
labour and a highly skilled workforce, better industrial 
facilities, more capability of scientific and technological 
studies and convenient transport compared with other 
developing nations. With independent decision- making powers 
and flexible management methods, rural enterprises can easily 
adapt to the ever changing international market. In addition, 
rural enterprises can make full use of local resources to 
reduce processing costs and improve competitiveness of the 
products for export. However, his arguments for the 
development of rural export-oriented enterprises were too 
optimistic since many problems remained for the development of 
rural export-oriented enterprises. 
In 1988 China adopted the world market-oriented economy 
development strategy for China's coastal areas. According to 
this strategy, China's coastal areas, which cover 320,000 
square km and have a population of 160 million, introduce 
flexible preferential policies to attract more foreign funds 
and technology, and further expand foreign trade and economic 
exchange. 16 However, the development of rural enterprises not 
only seriously challenged the job security of the state 
industrial workers, the development of rural exported-oriented 
enterprises but also weakened central control of foreign 
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exchange earning. This strategy was opposed by the planning 
faction-17 
Moreover, the development of a rural export oriented 
economy has faced some problems. First, with the improvement 
of labour productivity in the world, the cost of labour has 
not occupied such a large proportion of production costs any 
more in many export-oriented enterprises, so that the 
competitive superiority of low wages has weakened. With the 
development of advanced technology and modern management, the 
decisive role of low wages in market competition has 
disappeared even for traditional labour intensive enterprises. 
Second, rural enterprises have for too long lacked information 
about the world market situation. The Chinese foreign trade 
department has always discriminated against rural enterprises 
in providing useful information about the international 
market. Unnecessary formalities in examination and approval 
have also made things more difficult for rural enterprises. 
Third, rural enterprises have also been hampered by a lack of 
technical personnel, raw material supply shortages and absence 
of direct export rights. 
Although the development of rural export oriented economy 
has faced some difficulties, rural enterprises have been the 
most important growth sector of foreign trade. For example, in 
eastern China, there were about 35,000 township and town 
enterprises, employing nearly 3 million employees, earning 
foreign exchange. From 1984 to 1989, township and town 
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enterprises accumulated a total of 20 billion US dollars in 
foreign exchange earning for the state. In 1989, foreign trade 
purchases from township and town enterprises in eastern China 
amounted to 22.9 billion yuan, accounting for 30 percent of 
all foreign trade purchases in eastern China. 18 The open door 
policy and the world market-oriented economic development 
strategy for China's coastal areas have encouraged rural 
enterprises to develop an export-oriented economy, and have 
made it possible for rural enterprises to access international 
markets. 
As was demonstrated in Chapter Three, this period also 
witnessed a considerable decentralisation of economic 
administrative control. This resulted in high economic growth. 
As a result, rural enterprises developed very rapidly. From 
1986 to 1988, rural enterprises increased at an average annual 
growth rate of 38 percent. 
19 
However, although grain output peaked in 1984, further 
grain production stagnated. Moreover, after the reform of the 
urban-industrial sector in October 1984, the urban industrial 
economy has become extremely resistant to structural change in 
two areas: prices and property relationships. 
20 Finally, while 
there was a weakening of the instrumentalities of central 
administrative command planning, there was no corresponding 
adequate strengthening of market instrumentalities of 
information, coordination, and incentives-21 As a result, 
there was overheating of the economy, inflation, widening 
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income differentials, and corruption. This led to the third 
stage, from 1988 to 1991, a period of austerity. 
4.1.3 From late 1988 to 1991 
Faced with economic crisis and resistance by conservative 
forces, the government postponed further price liberation and, 
in late 1988, adopted a series of austerity policies. 
First, the authorities introduced administrative 
guidelines to reduce state investment in 1989 by 20 percent 
and to cancel or defer a large number of projects in low 
priority sectors such as services, office construction and 
processing industries. 22 These measures reduced the rate of 
inflation from an annual rate of 26 percent in December 1988 
to less than 1 percent in the first quarter of 1990, 
alleviated cost push pressures, and increased exports. 
23 
However, there was a marked slackening in the rate of 
industrial growth through 1989, which became negative in the 
last quarter. By the first quarter of 1990, industrial output 
regained lost ground and at the same level as a year 
24 earlier. However, urban unemployment had worsened, and the 
large number of rural migrants had returned to the 
countryside. 
Second, a contradictory monetary policy, relying 
principally on the administrative allocation of credit, was 
imposed. For example, the People's Bank of China set a target 
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of 15 percent for the growth of credit in 1989 and began 
stringently monitoring changes in credit supply. 25 During that 
period, state loans for rural enterprises reduced rapidly. 
Former Agricultural Minister He Kang asked rural enterprises 
to rely on their own funds to compensate for the reduction of 
bank credit and to practise thrift and cut unnecessary capital 
26 construction during the austerity period. 
Third, direct control on prices and marketing was 
introduced in late 1988. For example, local governments were 
required to notify the central authorities whenever they 
raised prices for a range of daily necessities and certain raw 
materials. The wage bill of the urban formal sector was frozen 
until the last quarter of 1989.27 Rural enterprises faced 
severe shortages of raw and semifinished materials, 
particularly iron and steel materials as well as increased 
prices. For example, the price of coal rose from 130 yuan per 
ton at the beginning of 1988 to its 1989 price of 250 to 300 
yuan per ton. Because of a lack of coal, the amount of 
electricity being generated by power plants suddenly declined. 
For example, a major power plant in Jiangsu, the Jianbi Power 
Plant with an installed capacity of 1.6 million kilowatts, in 
January 1989 only produced 500,000 kilowatts. The negotiated 
price of electricity had increased from 40 yuan per kilowatt- 
hour in 1988 to 65 yuan per kilowatt-hour in 1989. Since 
negotiated price electricity only supplied a portion of 
enterprise needs, more and more enterprises were buying diesel 
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generators, and because of the increased number of plants 
using them, the price of diesel oil was pushed up. It rose 
from 1,200 yuan per ton in 1988 to 1,800-2,000 per ton in 
1989. The price of raw and processed materials also greatly 
28 increased. 
During this period, rural enterprises faced serious 
difficulties under the austerity programme. More than 
million companies were shut down, merged with others or 
shifted to other businesses in 1989, and 8 million employee 
had to return to the land. 29 
4.1.4 From 1991 to early 1992 
After 1991, government policies have turned reformists 
again. The reform of the market has continued. In January 1991 
the remaining export subsidy was abolished, and series of 
30 micro-devaluations of the yuan was begun. On May 1 1991, the 
Chinese government greatly increased the sale price of grain 
and edible oil, prices which had stayed and unchanged for 25 
years(1966-91). 31 In addition, the government also raised 
prices for railway transportation, crude oil and steel 
products. These price adjustment were designed to eliminate 
the distorted price structure. 
32 
Reform of the financial market included establishment of 
a money market, including bond and stocks markets, both short- 
term and long-term. For example, the exchange rate of Renminbi 
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was slightly adjusted and the value of Renminbi reduced so 
that the official and market exchange rates were basically in 
balance. 33 The interest rate for savings deposits was reduced 
on average by one percentage point and interest rates for 
loans by 0.7 percentage point. 34 Some 25 percent of the state 
treasury bonds were purchased and sold exclusively by other 
financial organizations with satisfactory results. With 
approval of the State Council, the pilot share-holding system 
35 was further expanded in Shanghai and Shenzhen. 
These reform measures were successful. For example, 
after price adjustment of grain and edible oil took place, 
except for a few cities where residents queued up to buy grain 
and oil for a short period of time, the grain and oil market 
was stable and no panic buying similar to that which occurred 
in 1988 took place. 36 Further market reform will give rural 
enterprises even more opportunities to gain access to 
different markets. However, they will also face an 
increasingly competitive market environment putting great 
pressure on them to perform well. This environment will 
undoubtedly continue to increase the efficiency and 
flexibility of rural enterprises. 
To summarize, since 1978, China has engaged in a 
series of market reforms. In the process of these reforms, the 
scope of the mandatory plans has been reduced and the scope 
of the guidance plans extended. Other economic activities were 
regulated partly or entirely by market adjustment in 
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accordance with their respective circumstances. A nationwide 
survey made by the State Planning Commission in 1989 found 
that the mandatory plans covered 17 percent of the nation's 
industrial production; the guidance plans of various 
departments of the State Council, various provinces and 
cities, 43 percent; and market regulation, 40 percent. 37 As a 
result, the Chinese system of material allocation has become 
more decentralized. Even such key products as coal and steel 
were produced in enterprises at both central and lower levels 
of control and were allocated through largely separate and 
self-contained channels. These reforms were vital for rural 
enterprises to survive and develop. Although China's market 
system has not been perfect, it cannot be denied that the 
reform of the market has made a noteworthy contribution to the 
outstanding development that has taken place among enterprises 
since 1978. 
4.2 The Expansion of the Market and its Implications 
for the Development of Rural Enterprises 
The expansion of the market has created many opportunities 
for the entry of rural enterprises into the market economy. 
Since 1978, the extent of rural and urban markets has 
undergone a remarkable development. Table 4.1 indicates that 
there has been a dramatic increase of market activity in 
China. The number of free markets increased from 33,302 in 
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1978 to 72,130 in 1989. The value of trade in the market 
increased from 12.50 billion yuan in 1978 to 197.36 billion 
yuan in 1989. 
Table 4.1 The Growth of Free Markets, 1978-1989 
Year Total Rural Urban 
------- 
1978 
--------- ---------- 
33,302 
----------------------- 
33,302 
------------ 
0 
1980 40,809 37,890 2,919 
1981 43,013 39,713 3,298 
1982 44,775 41,184 3,591 
1983 481000 43,515 4,488 
1984 56,500 50,353 6,144 
1985 61,337 53,324 8,013 
1988 711359 59,178 12,181 
1989 72,130 59,019 13,111 
---------------- 
(Continued) The 
---------- 
Value of 
------------------------ 
Trade in Free Markets 
------------ 
(billions of 
yuan) 
------- --------- ---------- ------------------------ ------------ 
Total Rural Urban 
Markets Markets 
------- 
1978 
--------- 
12.50 
---------- ------------------------ 
12.50 
------------ 
0 
1979 18.30 17.10 1.20 
1980 23.50 21.10 2.40 
1981 28.70 25.30 3.40 
1982 33.31 28.79 4.52 
1983 38.58 32.99 5.59 
1984 47.06 39.03 8.03 
1985 70.50 52.40 18.10 
1988 162.13 107.60 54.53 
1989 197.36 125.00 72.36 
Source: 
Bureau. 
China Statistical Yearbook (1990), State Statistical 
China has also set up a variety of markets. For 
example, China now has more than 800 trading centers for daily 
necessities, 239 wholesale markets for small industrial 
products, 1,267 wholesale markets 
I 
for agricultural and 
sideline products, 72 , 000 urban and rural free markets and 
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more than 400 markets for means of production. 
38 Many labor 
exchanges, science and technology markets and financial 
markets have also come into being. 39 
The markets for means of production, consumer goods, 
technology, information, labour services, real estate, etc. 
have expanded in different degrees in different regions. 
Nevertheless, several general patterns can be distinguished. 
First, the country's consumer goods market's growth is now at 
a more mature stage, with most of the commodity items already 
liberalized. The number of commodity items directly controlled 
by the government dropped from 55 in 1978 to 22 in 1986. The 
number of agricultural by-products whose prices are directly 
set by the government, have also been lowered from 113 items 
to 25, accounting for an estimated 30 per cent of total sales, 
the other 70 percent being sold at prices following government 
guide lines or market-adjusted prices. 
40 State-dictated prices 
on industrial commodities have likewise been limited to items 
which totalled merely 40 percent. Pricing of more than 1,000 
small commodities was gradually liberalized. 
41 
In the 1980s the Chinese people's consumption erupted 
into what economists called an unprecedented spending spree: 
electrical household appliances, expensive home furnishings, 
and fine clothing quickly became part of the everyday life of 
the average Chinese family. China's urban enterprises had not 
taken time to complete the necessary process of structural 
adjustments to this consumer boom, and this created a perfect 
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opportunity for rural enterprises. At the same time, 
traditional heavy industries made the transition to light 
industries, and the production of small volumes of a large 
variety of parts and components opened more doors for rural 
enterprises. Therefore, the emergence and expansion of the 
commodity markets had created enormous business opportunities 
for rural enterprises. 
Second, a market in materials of production gradually 
began to emerge. By 1986 the market dependent share of steel 
products reached 45%. Pig iron reached 53-.. Soda ash and 
caustic soda reached 55% and 31%, respectively. 42 This 
indicated considerable success for the market dependent 
system in the circulation of materials of production. 
Essential materials of production used to be uniformly 
rationed by the State. After an enterprise fulfilled the plan 
of commodity production set by uniform regulations, all 
additional products could be sold for their own benefit. For 
example, rolled steel was sold at two different prices. The 
state-set price for one ton was 700 yuan while the market 
price was up to 1,400 yuan. 
43 In general, the free market 
price was much higher than the state price, and this had 
encouraged enterprises to produce and sell more materials in 
the market. As a result, more materials were available in the 
market. 
One surveY44 shows that although rural enterprises, 
mainly collective rural enterprises, also became eligible for 
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the supply of planned allocated materials as part of the 
reform of the materials supply system, the supplied materials 
did not amount to as much as one percentage of rural 
enterprise's total materials consumed. Thus, the reform of the 
market benefited rural enterprises. The opening of markets 
for the means of production reduced their difficulties in 
getting materials. Other surveYS45 show prices of materials 
distributed by county and rural governments were oriented to 
markets since most of the materials distributed by county and 
rural governments were purchased from markets. In some cases, 
materials bought from markets were bundled together and 
distributed together with materials purchased under plan at 
parity price. As a result, the price of distributed materials 
was either the market price or close to the market price. 
However, the proportion of materials of production 
provided by planning systems differed for different business 
categories. In general, for most medium-to-big businesses 
planned distribution had a larger share while for small 
businesses it had a relatively small one, or none at all. This 
unequal competition among businesses differed in terms of 
investment and production, and limited the efficiency of the 
market-dependent system. The disparity and imbalance in their 
reliance on the market for materials of production market also 
weakened the system's effectiveness in regulating production 
and circulating commodities. 
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Another problem that existed in the materials of 
production market was that reselling had become a rampant 
practice due to insufficient supply. This not only triggered 
blind development of some commodity businesses, multiplied the 
distribution for some means of production, and enlarged 
distribution profits, but also ultimately added to the 
consumers' burden. This will be discussed further below. 
Although there were many problems in the market for materials, 
the reform enabled rural enterprises to advance to a new 
stage in which there were more opportunities to buy raw 
materials. 
Second, other important markets such as the money 
market, the technology market and the labour market started to 
develop. For example, the stock markets in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen began operation with the approval of the department 
concerned under the State Council. In 1991, a national 
issuance of more than 60 types of securities exceeded 200 
billion yuan; some 60 cities opened markets for the transfer 
of state treasury bonds; and the country had more than 500 
stock exchange networks. 
46 The country's labour service 
institutions in 1991 reached over 8,000, while technological 
development markets and business organs were around 20,000.47 
In sum, the market developed very rapidly in a variety of 
sectors. 
The expansion of the market created an environment 
favourable for the development of rural enterprises. In both 
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developed and undeveloped areas alike, the main channels of 
purchase and sales for rural enterprises were markets, 
including direct procurement markets and cooperative markets 
among enterprises. According to a survey of rural industrial 
enterprises48., the enterprises were themselves responsible 
for their purchase and marketing of 84.601 of input goods and 
90%ý of product sales. 
Du Haiyan49 has demonstrated that profits obtained from 
the assets in operation entirely hinge on the ability of 
township industrial enterprises to make use of market 
opportunities. Thus, rural enterprises have placed strategic 
emphasis on sales as well as purchases. Most rural enterprises 
have followed the pattern of having a ratio of one person in 
charge of production, two in charge of purchase, and three in 
charge of sales. This has led to a widely held belief that the 
success of rural enterprises has owed much to their marketing. 
Rural enterprises' production and business activity 
were also affected substantially by the market situation. 
According to the surveys5o, more than half of the sampled 
enterprises said that their production activities were 
primarily dependent upon the market. For example, in terms of 
enterprise fixed price regulations, market supply and demand 
factors have a major position in the way in which rural 
enterprises set prices. According to the surveys5l, market 
supply and demand directly determined the way in which rural 
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enterprises set prices although rural enterprises' prices were 
affected by state plans. 
In short, since 1978 the market has considerably 
developed, and a variety of markets have been established in 
China. The expansion of the market and establishment of 
different markets have created a favourable environment for 
the development of rural enterprises. 
4.3 Some Characteristics of the Use of the Market by 
Rural Enterprises 
Rural enterprises have gradually begun to develop some 
unique characteristics in the use of the market. There have 
no been consistent marketing channels provided by commercial 
units to moderate market fluctuations, and since demand has 
not been sustained by government planning units, rural 
enterprises have been unable to control markets. Thus, 
rural enterprises market environment has been unstable and 
subject to fluctuation. In order to meet changes in market 
conditions, rural enterprises have readjusted the make-up of 
their production by shifting the application of production 
elements within the enterprises. For example, some enterprises 
have a production mix of two types of industry. In other 
cases, some enterprises start work when market conditions are 
good, and stop work when market conditions are poor, using 
this strategy to cope with market fluctuations. 
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Rural enterprises simultaneously use price competition 
and non-price competition. Price competition is an important 
ingre lent in rural enterprises' market behaviour. In a 
situation of severe market competition, enterprises face the 
problem of the jacking up of prices in the procurement of 
their raw and processed materials, and competition to lower 
prices in the marketing of their products. 
Non-price competition has an even more important 
position in rural enterprise competitiveness. William A. Byrd 
and N. Zhu52 demonstrated that there have been the different 
patterns of competition: imitative competition, investment 
competition, innovative competition. Imitative competition is 
that a resourceful entrepreneur finds a new product or process 
that has been successful elsewhere and earns high profits, and 
many imitators soon follow since entry is easy. Consequently 
prices and profits decline. 53 Investment competition is 
similar to imitative competition. However, it involves large 
investments of community resources to build facilities that 
are capital intensive, and often use advanced, sometime even 
imported technology. 54 Innovative competition is when some 
rural enterprises adopt innovation, which continually disrupts 
market equilibriums and leads to improvements in products and 
efficiency. It primarily involves adaptation and a continual 
search for new ideas and better methods from elsewhere in 
China and from abroad. 
55 
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In addition, rural enterprises have used several other 
improper methods to compete with state enterprises. During 
1980s, state enterprises engaged in structural reforms. The 
shrinking of administrative controls and the strengthening of 
the profit motive for state enterprises under the reforms have 
resulted in rapid growth of activities such as barter trade, 
and speculation on commodity quotas at state prices. 56 Rural 
enterprises could obtain part of state enterprises's profit 
by such means as giving sales commissions, paying sales 
agents, and making out blank invoices. Although rural 
enterprises had to pay much more for inputs, they often 
boasted higher economic benefits. 57 For example, in rural 
enterprises in Jieshou 3-5 percent of the value of purchased 
inputs or of products sold could be drawn out as operational 
fees and funds to gain access to supply and sales links. 58 
In addition, during early 1980s, it was very common that 
rural enterprises used agricultural and sideline products as 
quasicurrency to buy raw materials and sell their goods to 
state commercial departments because of shortages and high 
prices of agricultural and sideline products. In counties 
where rural enterprises were highly developed, agricultural 
and sideline products were often used as a medium for 
establishing cooperative ties with urban industrial bases. 
59 
Rural enterprises have encouraged widespread participation 
by enterprise staff in obtaining supplies and promoting sales. 
Enterprises in Wuxi, for instance, used three main methods 
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when they hired permanent supply and sales personnel, part- 
time supply and sales personnel and temporary supply and sales 
personnel to obtain supplies and promote sales. 60 Moreover, 
supply and sales personnel in rural enterprises in general had 
high incomes in order to give them an incentive to sell more 
products. The income of supply and sales personnel was 
generally several times higher than the average for all 
employees and might even exceed a factory director's salary. 
Some sales people could earn more than 100,000 yuan a year. 61 
Thus, non-price competition has become an important 
component in rural enterprises, market conduct because of the 
restrictive market environment in which rural enterprises have 
f aced. 
As the growth of rural enterprises expanded, competition 
became increasingly intense. As a result, many industrial 
product markets in which rural enterprises dominated or were 
important, suffered declining profit margins. According to 
studies conducted by the State Council's Rural Policy Research 
Center, 62 48 per cent of the same enterprises have competitors 
in their own township. Sample enterprises frequently cite 
"society's limited supply capability, " and "too many 
enterprises need the same kinds of raw materials and energy 
resources". They also blame poor sales on "overproduction of 
the same kinds of production". The studies showed that, based 
on sample enterprises, the value of output per hundred yuan of 
fixed assets rose from 291 yuan in 1981 to 320 yuan in 1985, 
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but actual pretax profit fell in every year, from 64.5 yuan in 
63 1981 to 47.5 yuan in 1985. 
The reasons for this over-competition and lower profit 
among rural enterprises were as follows. First, because the 
prices of the country's farm product were still irrational, 
simple agriculture was reduced to a low-profit, or no-profit 
basis. Accordingly, "relying on industries to supplement 
agriculture" or even "using industries to support agriculture" 
was a way of shoring up the farm economy. This was the reason 
behind the zealous rush to set up local-owned enterprises. 
Setting up rural enterprises became the official business of 
many local administrative organs in a majority of China's 
rural communities. Because rural enterprises were fairly 
profitable they could afford many appropriations, and they 
were the source of welfare support for the village people. As 
a result, there were more and more rural enterprises which 
became progressively smaller; they were less and less 
profitable in a market which had become increasingly 
competitive. 
Second, rural enterprises had more difficulties in 
assessing financial, commercial, or information markets. This 
was why rural enterprises often reacted slowly to market 
signals, and it also accounted for their chaotic investment 
behaviour. Rural enterprises which entered the market early 
when profit margins were high, could survive and prosper even 
when margins became narrower, but more recent entrants faced 
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greater difficulties. The increasing size and changing 
structure of rural enterprises themselves and continued 
increases in urban and rural individuals' income had created 
numerous opportunities and market niches. But the new 
opportunities were often used to best advantage in the more 
advanced areas and by well-established firms, whereas profit 
margins of rural enterprises in the backward areas were 
narrow. 
In short, rural enterprises' production and business 
activity are determined substantially by the market situation. 
There is the simultaneous existence of price competition and 
non-price competition in rural enterprise competitiveness; 
both are important, but the later is more critical. Rural 
enterprises/ market environment has been unstable and subject 
to fluctuations. Many industrial product markets in which 
rural enterprises dominate or are important have thus been 
characterized by declining profit margins. 
4.4 The Likely Effects of Further Reform of the 
Market on the Development of Rural Enterprises 
Since 1978, reform of the market has had an important 
impact on the development of rural enterprises. Although 
China's free market system has not been completely 
established, the development of the market has been extremely 
helpful in boosting rural enterprises. Rural enterprises, free 
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from state plan restrictions, have been able to buy much 
needed raw materials and equipment on the market and get 
financial assistance from society and individuals. Du has 
indicated that "changes in the macroeconomic environment and 
in market conditions created space for the survival and 
expansion of TVP industry.,, 64 In fact, this conclusion can be 
extended to affirm that changes in the macroeconomic 
environment and in market conditions created space for 
survival and expansion of rural enterprises. 
Therefore, further reform of the market is very 
important in relation to the future development of rural 
enterprises. However, further development of the market is 
highly dependent on the development of politics at the 
national level in China. As I have discussed in Chapter Two, 
during late 1988 to 1991, the central planners have prevailed, 
rural enterprises were a major target of this retrenchment 
policy, and rural enterprises have faced a considerable 
shortage of materials and funds. At least two-thirds of the 
enterprises were affected, causing enormous losses to local 
interests and huge rural unemployment. 
As I have discussed above, rural enterprises have used 
different strategies to cope with market fluctuations. The 
reporter for the Economist Journal indicated: "it finds that 
the non-state businesses grow bigger and stronger still, 
making the next clampdown in favour of state firms that much 
harder to impose and maintain.,, 
65 Despite the national 
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retrenchment policy, rural enterprises have managed to survive 
and even expand. 
The further expansion of rural enterprises' markets, 
however, faces serious challenges from both urban enterprises 
and local protectionism. China's urban enterprises are 
undergoing structural changes, and their production is less 
dictated by mandatory plans. Urban enterprises and rural 
enterprises compete under the most unfair terms; urban 
enterprises unlike rural enterprises have huge capital, 
advanced technologies, and well-trained personnel; they are 
well supplied with raw materials under state plans, and they 
have well-established sales channels and good information 
networks; more important, large industries enjoy economies of 
scale beyond the reach of rural enterprises. Therefore, when 
state enterprises begin to enter the commodity market in a 
grand style to compete with rural enterprises, rural 
enterprises will be severely tested. 
Rural enterprises have also faced serious local 
protectionism. This has restrained further expansion of rural 
enterprises's markets. During the late 1980s, some local 
leaders tried to safeguard their local interests by creating 
barriers and checkpoints to prevent goods leaving their 
territory, with some provinces even employing armed police 
forces and militia units at provincial borders. 
66 Other 
provinces adopted more sophisticated protectionist methods. 
They used the central government austerity policies and its 
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programmes for strengthening market management, and rectifying 
wholesale commerce and control sales of fake and inferior 
products, as pretexts for excluding goods from outside the 
region. Some provinces even imposed fixed ratios on the sale 
of goods by commercial departments, wholesale trades and 
retail stores. 67 
Thus, if rural enterprises want to expand their 
markets, they must change their marketing strategy. At 
present, rural enterprises in developed regions lack 
opportunities for foreign market development. At the same 
time, rural enterprises in backward regions have very little 
ability to seize upon development opportunities and are 
presented with few opportunities to develop nonagricultural 
production. The best strategy would be to push the rural 
enterprises in developed regions into the international 
market. This would also simultaneously create further 
development opportunities for the rural enterprises of mid- 
level regions and backward regions. Moreover, rural 
enterprises should readjust their product mix. Retail 
strategy should be changed. Rural enterprises should not only 
consolidate their existing partnerships to open up product 
retail sales channels, but also hold goods ordering fairs and 
exhibitions to promote the sale of their products. Rural 
enterprises should further cooperate with urban enterprises so 
that they might expand their markets and overcome their 
shortage of technology. 
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Since 1978, the government has changed rural employment 
strategies and regional development strategies. The changes of 
these strategies have important implications on the 
development of rural enterprises. In the next chapter, I will 
examine how the changes of the strategies have influenced the 
development of rural enterprises. 
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Chapter 5 The Implications of Rural Employment and 
Regional Development Strategies for Rural Enterprises 
In the previous chapter, I have discussed how market 
reform and market expansion influenced the development of 
rural enterprises. In this chapter, I will discuss the 
implications of the government strategies for rural 
employment and regional development policy for rural 
enterprises. 
5.1 Government Strategies for Rural Employment and 
their Implications for Rural Enterprises 
China's countryside has experienced a rapid decline in 
its mortality rate and an increasing life expectancy while 
at the same time the implementation of family planning 
policies was less successful. As a result, the natural 
increase in population in rural areas is much higher than in 
the cities. Thus, the rural population has increased and 
will continue to increase significantly till the next 
century. Moreover, the introduction of the rural 
responsibility system from 1978 to 1983 has been a major 
incentive to improve the efficiency of labour use. Further 
mechanization will also free more farmers from their land. 
Additionally, since the revival of China's rural economy, an 
increasing amount of agricultural land has been lost to non- 
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agricu tural use. Therefore, less labour is required on the 
land, and surplus rural labour has gradually increased. 
Official information has predicted that by the year 2000 
this surplus labour will increase to more than 200 million 
people. ' 
Since the end of the 1970s, the success of the rural 
reforms and China's insufficient amount of cultivated land 
compared with the size of its labour force, resulted in 
large numbers of surplus farm labourers. Rural surplus 
labour force could not move to the cities since the cities 
had yet to find a way to solve their own unemployment 
problems. The government sought to deal with the problem 
locally rather than permitting thousands of people to swarm 
into the cities. The main strategy was to encourage peasants 
to set up rural enterprises through self-accumulated capital 
and bank loans. In 1988, rural enterprises employed 95 
million people, a quarter of the rural labour force. 
2 Rural 
enterprises have played a very important role in solving the 
problem of rural surplus labour. In this section, I will 
concentrate on the Chinese government's measures for rural 
surplus labourers and employment in rural enterprises rather 
than discuss the general issues of rural employment. In 
doing so, I will first briefly assess the extent of 
unemployment in rural areas. Secondly, I will examine the 
government's strategies for solving rural underemployment. 
Thirdly, I will consider the relation between the 
development of small towns and rural employment. Fourthly I 
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wi 1 discuss the employment in rural enterprises. Finally, I 
will analyze the future prospects for employment in rural 
enterprises. 
5.1.1 Unemployment in Rural Areas 
China is the most highly populated country in the 
world. The population density per square kilometre of the 
30 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities on the 
mainland, was 118 persons in 1990.3 As table 5.1 shows, the 
majority of Chinese people are still engaged in agriculture. 
Table 5.1 Labour Force Employed in Industrial and 
Agricultural Sectors (Year-end figure) 10 thousand 
-------------------- 
Labour force e 
------------------ 
mployed in: 
---------------------- 
Composition(-. ) 
Year -- ------------- ------------------ --------- ------------- 
------- 
Industry 
------------- 
Agriculture 
------------------ 
industry 
--------- 
Agriculture 
------------- 
1952 1,246 17,317 6.7 93.3 
1957 1,401 19,310 6.8 93.2 
1962 1,705 21,278 7.4 92.6 
1965 1,828 23,398 7.2 92.8 
1970 2,809 27,814 9.2 90.8 
1975 4,284 29,460 12.7 87.3 
1976 4,692 29,448 13.7 86.3 
1977 4,809 29,345 14.1 85.9 
1978 5,009 29,426 14.5 85.5 
1979 5,340 29,425 15.4 84.6 
1980 5,600 30,211 15.6 84.4 
1981 5,796 31,171 15.7 84.3 
1982 5,930 32,013 15.6 84.4 
1983 6,023 32,510 15.6 84.4 
1984 6,338 32,538 16.3 83.7 
------- 
Source: 
------------------------------- 
Statistical yearbook of 
--------------------- 
China 1985 (English 
Edition), compiled by the State Sta tistical Bureau, PRC. 
Oxford University pr ess, Oxford, New York, Tokyo, 1985 
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This proportion is not only higher than that in the 
developed nations but also higher than that in many 
developing countries. 
Since 1949, urban migration in China has been strictly 
controlled. As Taylor noted, "Administrative measures, such 
as the household registration system and the urban grain 
ration system have traditionally served as barriers to the 
spontaneous migration of peasants to large cities.,, 4 As a 
result, China's farmers have been forced to stay in rural 
areas to make a living. Taylor argued that "The primary 
reason why rural surplus labour has continued to exit in 
China is that tight constraints on rural to urban migration 
and the existence of fixed land resources in rural areas 
have forced many more Chinese farmers to make a living from 
tilling the soil than is necessary.,, 5 
It is difficulty to measure exactly how many surplus 
labourers there are in China's rural areas. Jeffrey 
R. Taylor6 has summarized three approaches used by Chinese 
scholars to calculate rural surplus labour: the "experience 
method,, 7, the "estimation method,, 
8., and the I'labour norm 
method, 19. Each of these methods shows that there is a huge 
surplus of labour in China's rural areas. The different 
findings by the different analysts indicated the same 
conclusion: more than 100 million were redundant and about 
30 per cent of China's rural work force was in surplus-10 
Furthermore, the number of rural surplus labourers will 
increase in future. China will have 240 million to 260 
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mi ions surplus workers by the year 2000, most of them in 
rural areas. " 
In 1991, it was estimated that along the coast 
migrants numbering about 23 million to 80 million were 
looking for work. 12 One southern city, Guangzhou, has 
attracted a floating population estimated at 516,000. The 
situation became so severe that the officials issued an 
"urgent circular" for "the greatest efforts possible to keep 
them from leaving home". 13 If the Chinese government can 
not provide enough jobs for its surplus rural labourers, 
China's social and economic development will be seriously 
disrupted. Solving rural surplus labour has become a very 
important issue. 
Table 5.2 Number of Persons Entering Employment in Cities 
and Towns 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Item 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Total .......... 544.4 902.6 900.0 820.0 665.0 628.3 721.5 
1. Major sources 
Labour force in 
cities and towns 274.9 688.5 622.5 534.3 408.1 406.5 449.7 
Rural labour 
force 
...... 148.4 70.8 127.4 92.0 66.0 68.2 123.0 Graduates from 
university, colleges 
secondary technical 
schools and workers 
training schools.. 37.7 33.4 80.0 107.9 117.4 93.4 81.7 
Others ......... 83.4 109.9 
70.1 85.8 73.5 60.2 67.1 
2. Assignment 
State-owned units. 392.0 567.2 572.2 521.0 409.3 373.7 415.6 
Collective-owned 
units in cities 
and towns.. 152.4 318.1 278.0 267.1 222.3 170.6 197.3 
Individual labourers 
in cities 
and towns.. 17.0 49.8 31.9 33.4 84.0 108.6 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: (1) Unit = 10 thousand 
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(2) Assignment in state-owned units in 1984 includes 
persons assigned to joint units. 
(3) Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1985 
(English Edition), compiled by the State Statistical Bureau, 
PRC. Oxford University press, Oxford, New York, Tokyo, 1985 
The number of persons entering employment in cities 
and towns is still small. Table 5.2 shows that there were 
only 7.215 million people entering employment in cities and 
towns in 1984. At planned economic-growth rates, industry 
will only absorb 7 million a year. By the end of the 
century, therefore, the number of unemployed workers in 
China could have risen to 250-300 million. 14 It is 
impossible for the Chinese government to invest huge funds 
to solve the problem of rural unemployment. China has to 
find other ways to solve this problem. 
5.1.2 Strategies for Rural Employment 
Thomas G. Rawski and Jeffrey R. Taylor15 indicated 
that the Chinese government decided on the following 
strategies to deal with rural employment in China before 
19 78 : 
The first strategy was to raise the labour intensity 
of farming by promoting multiple cropping, intercropping, 
deep ploughing, extensive fertilization, and expanded 
irrigation. Taylor demonstrated that average annual labour 
expended per hectare increased sharply from 1953 to 1978.16 
The second strategy was to organize the construction 
of irrigation canals, dams, roads and other forms of rural 
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infrastructure to reduce underemployment. In particular, 
during the winter months, rural construction campaigns 
increased labour utilization. 
The third strategy was to develop urban industry to 
recruit rural labour. There were considerable numbers of 
peasants recruited into urban industry during the Great Leap 
Forward and during the Cultural Revolution, when urban 
youths were sent to rural areas. 
The final strategy was to develop rural enterprises 
to absorb surplus rural labour. However, this did not become 
an important strategy for rural employment before 1978. 
Developing rural enterprises was considered as a supplement 
to agricultural development rather than as strategic measure 
to increase rural employment. 
Since 1978 when the production responsibility system 
was introduced, rural surplus labourers have become visible 
as a serious social problem. A number of scholars have 
discussed possible ways to deal with this problem. 
17 Three 
main strategies can be identified: (1) leaving the land and 
the native place, (2) not leaving the land, nor the native 
place, (3) leaving the native place but not the land. 
Leaving the land and the native place means that 
rural labourers enter the cities. The income differential 
between urban inhabitants and peasants provides a strong 
incentive for farmers, especially young people, to flow into 
the cities. Since 1978, a considerable number of peasants 
have gone to the cities to work as maids, housekeepers and 
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tai ors, and to open restaurants. Some peasants entered 
urban factories and were officially employed, but most have 
been accepted as contract workers and casual labourers. 
However, as Feng Lanrui and Jiang Weiyu 18 have argued, the 
cities' accommodation capacity for rural labourers is 
restricted by the number of jobs available in the cities. In 
addition, the unchecked entry of peasants into the cities 
was bound to cause difficulties in the areas of housing, 
transportation, health care and administration. Some 
economists have proposed that the Chinese government should 
encourage the peasants to enter the cities and open 
factories to develop medium scale cities to large scale. 
However, as Feng Lanrui and Jiang Weiyu pointed out: "this 
proposal was still at the stage of theoretical study and 
policy exploration and has not become a reality. 1119 
Not leaving the land, nor the native place has two 
elements: first it refers to the adjustment of the internal 
structure of crop farming. on the one hand, this strategy 
would reduce the acreage sown to grain crops and labor 
input. On the other hand, it would expand the acreage for 
labor-intensive economic crops and labor input. Second, it 
refers to the development of peasants' part-time production. 
When peasants are in slack seasons, they engage in 
diversified undertaking, including industrial, commercial, 
transport, labour and other service businesses and various 
kinds of household sideline production. However, this 
strategy has two limitations: first, there is the limitation 
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of adjustment of the production set-up within the framework 
of farming because of the inadequate scientific and 
technological knowledge, the decrease of land, and the 
increase of population. 20 
Leaving the land but not the native place means 
peasants set up rural enterprises locally. This can include 
peasants engaging in rural enterprises full-time or part- 
time. After 1978, peasants have been allowed to engage in 
non-farming activities. They undertake industrial, 
commercial, building, transport and service business near 
their small towns or their villages but they do not change 
their permanent residence registration nor their grain 
ration relations. Their families still stay in the 
countryside. 
Many articles in Chinese journals have been published 
to support the third strategy. The main justification of 
this strategy can be seen in chapter 2. However, some 
Chinese scholars2l hold that China should not depend on the 
small towns solely to absorb the rural surplus labour force 
in their localities, when the rural population still 
account for 80 per cent of China's total population. They 
point out that the density of population in the cities, not 
including the 16 major cities such as Shanghai and Beijing, 
is not high. It is totally possible for these cities to 
provide employment for rural surplus labour. 
Feng Lanrui and Jiang Weiyu 
22 have also argued that 
while it is true that most rural enterprises are located in 
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areas near and closely related to large and medium-sized 
cities and coastal areas, in the areas far from big cities 
and conditions for agricultural production are poor, and 
peasants even have problems of obtaining adequate food and 
clothing. It is impossible for them to set up rural 
enterprises to solve the problem of rural surplus labour. 
Nevertheless, although the strategy of leaving the land 
but not the native place has some limitations, the Chinese 
government has adopted this strategy since 1978. On the one 
hand, the emigration from rural areas to urban areas has 
been strictly controlled. On the other hand, the 
construction and development of small towns utilizing a 
large number of surplus rural labourers has been undertaken 
to prevent their immigration into big cities. Over the 
years, millions of peasants have left the land, but not the 
village, to enter rural enterprises. Their practice has 
become a strategic principle formulated by the Chinese 
government since 1978. One official document clearly 
indicated this strategic principle. 
"It is estimated that by the end of this 
century China's countryside will have 450 million 
(labour force). By then, crop cultivation will be 
able to employ only 30 percent of the labour 
force, and forestry, animal husbandry and fishery, 
just 20 percent. Another 10 percent can find 
employment in the cities, leaving 40 percent 
looking for work in other directions. They will 
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mainly be employed in industry, construction, 
transportation and communications, commercial 
undertakings and other service trades in the rural 
towns as well as the family-operated industrial 
and sideline occupations in the rural areas (towns 
included) 
, otherwise they will become a serious 
social problem.,, 23 
Thus, the development of rural enterprises represents 
an important strategy of solving the employment problem in 
China. 
5.1.3 The Development of Small Towns 
Since 1978, China's government has maintained tight 
control to prevent peasants migrating to big cities, but it 
has taken a more liberal policy in allowing peasants to work 
in small towns. The small town boom has provided job 
opportunities for millions of peasants in industrial 
production, commercial activities and various kinds of 
service trades. 
Many Chinese scholars24 supported the development of 
small towns. The main arguments are as follows: small 
towns can link the urban market to the rural market since 
small towns can serve as distribution centres for 
agricultural and sideline products as well as industrial 
goods. Small towns can become processing centres for 
agricultural and sideline products and play a supporting 
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role for urban industries. Furthermore, small towns can 
enrich the cultural life of peasants, and change the overall 
relationship between cities and the countryside and develop 
the rural economy. Finally the policy serves to narrow the 
gap between town and country. The assumption is that China's 
cities are already fully expanded and their factories and 
population have reached saturation point. The growth rate 
of population in middle-sized cities can basically meet the 
needs of their own development. So the many small towns in 
China, which have plenty of room for development and can 
hold many people, are targeted for expansion. The surplus 
labour in the rural areas should be encouraged to work in 
small towns nearby their homes. This can help the big and 
middle-sized cities reduce the pressure of increasing 
population and avoid the "city disease" caused by the 
expansion of population. 
Fei Xiaotong, a renowned Chinese sociologist, strongly 
supported the development of rural enterprises in China. 25 
He pointed out that during the process of industrialization 
in capitalist countries, many peasants in the countryside 
were on the brink of bankruptcy. The farmers were forced to 
leave, and they swarmed into the cities. Industrialization 
in China was, however, following an utterly different road 
from that of capitalist countries. On the basis of a 
prospering agricultural sector, it could run collectively 
owned township industries. These industries, by assisting, 
consolidating and promoting the agricultural economy, 
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brought about the simultaneous development of agriculture, 
sideline occupations and industry. 
Having to meet China's rising food requirements with 
an agricultural work force that is increasingly composed of 
the elderly, women and children, and those with relatively 
low educational levels, is a recipe for disaster in the eyes 
of Chinese policy makers. To counter this trend, the 
authorities have strongly encouraged part-time farming, 
rather than a complete migration from the land for rural 
migrants, which in any case would have been impossible for 
the Chinese government to absorb in the cities. Since rural 
underemployment in China has traditionally been seasonal, 
peasants have long been encouraged to do jobs in small 
towns, but return home to help farming when labour is short 
of supply in the busy planting and harvesting seasons. 
Thus, the Chinese government's policy was to actively 
encourage peasants to move to small towns located near 
farmers, plots rather than to large and medium-sized cities. 
For example, in April 1983 the promulgation of the State 
Council's "Regulations Concerning Co-operative Endeavours of 
City and Town Labourers" eased barriers to urban entry by 
allowing peasants to work in market towns while retaining 
their rural household registrations. 
26 A further loosening 
of constraints on rural-to-urban migration took place when 
the State Council released its circular on "Questions 
regarding the settlement of peasants entering villages" in 
October 1984.27 This regulation was extended to small towns, 
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and has been popular despite the fact that residents of 
these towns must obtain their own food, and cannot rely on 
urban grain reserves. This means that voluntary migration to 
urban areas is permissible under the condition that grain is 
provided by themselves. 
With the encouragement of China's state policy, the 
small towns have mushroomed. There were about 8,000 medium 
sized and small towns across the country, in addition to 
50,000 rural market towns in 1986.28 Small towns include 
towns, county seats and factory and mining districts and 
commercial centres. Towns are administrative divisions 
ratified by the provinces, municipalities and autonomous 
regions according to State Council's regulations. They are 
equivalent to townships under the county governments. 
Generally, each county has one town. Occasionally there are 
several towns in one county. Each county has a county seat. 
Most of the county seats have city or township governments. 
In 1982, there were 2,800 county seats. 29 Factory and mining 
districts refer to those industrial and residential areas 
independent of nearby cities and towns. They do not have 
city or township governments. 
30 There were 54,000 commercial 
centres, most of which are also the seats of township 
governments (the people's communes in the past), and they 
still have the foundations for light industry, handicrafts, 
31 
commerce and services. 
Small towns have the characteristics of both the 
cities and the countryside, and of industry and agriculture. 
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Some of them have been gradually developed into new kinds 
of medium-sized and small cities. The growth of small towns 
has changed the relationship between cities and the 
countryside and has enabled rural enterprises to concentrate 
in small towns. Small towns have been built into 
comprehensive economic, technical and cultural centres for 
the development of agriculture, industry, commerce and 
transportation services in which rural energy resources can 
be put to more rational use. 32 
Small towns help absorb the surplus labour force and 
check the flow of peasants into large and medium-sized 
cities, by providing job opportunities for millions of 
peasants in industrial, commercial activities and various 
kinds of service trades. It is estimated that by the end of 
this century China's rural towns will provide jobs for 300 
million people no longer needed on the farms, a figure 
amounting to 40 percent of the total rural population. 
33 
In summary, the Chinese government's policy of 
encouraging the development of small towns has stimulated a 
boom for small towns and created favourable conditions for 
production and investment for rural enterprises. As a 
result, the development of small towns in China has created 
immensely more employment for peasants. 
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5.1.4 Employment in Rural Enterprises 
The development of rural enterprises has played a very 
important role in absorbing surplus rural labour. In 1989 
township enterprises employed 95.4 million people in the 
countryside, making up 23.8 percent of the country's labour 
force. 34 As Taylor35 has indicated, agricultural employment 
in rural areas grew at an annual average rate of less than 
one per cent between 1978 and 1986, whereas rural non- 
agricultural employment has quadrupled in the short span of 
nine years. 
However, the development of rural enterprises of 
opportunity and ability has been extremely uneven because of 
both comparative economic advantage and China's regional 
development strategy. As a result, the imbalance development 
of rural enterprises has made an important impact on spatial 
distribution of rural employment. Employment in rural 
enterprises is highly concentrated in the coastal provinces 
and the municipalities of Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai. I 
will analyze this issue late. 
The majority of workers in rural enterprises are now 
engaged in industrial activities. The rest are engaged in 
agriculture, construction, transport, commerce, catering and 
the service trade. The precise breakdown of employment in 
rural enterprises is shown in the following tables. The 
Tables indicate that 60-70 percent workers in rural 
enterprises were engaged in industrial activities. As the 
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different branches of rural industries are analyzed, 
appendix 1 shows that a large proportion of employment in 
both townships and villages run industries involved in 
manufactured goods of building materials and other non-metal 
minerals, garments, yarn and farm equipment. Rural 
industries not only account for a large proportion of 
employment in rural enterprises but also play a very 
important role in China's national economy. For example, in 
1990 rural industries supplied almost one-third of China's 
coal, cement, paper and silk products, and 60-80 percent of 
the country's garments, yarn and farm equipment. 36 
Table 5.3. Breakdown of Employment in Rural Enterprises 
Year 1978 1981 1984 1987 
------------------ 
Total 
---------- 
2826.56 
---------- 
2969.56 
--------------------- 
5208.11 8776.40 
Agriculture 608.42 379.94 283.93 244.11 
Industry 1734.36 1980.80 3656.07 5265.37 
Construction 235.62 348.83 683.49 1364.00 
Transportation 103.83 107.38 129.30 615.35 
Commerce, Catering 
and Service trade 144.33 152.61 455.32 1287.57 
--------------------------- 
Unit: 10,000 persons 
---------- ---------------------- 
Source: Statistica l Yearbook of China 1988 (Chinese Edition) 
Compiled by the State Sta tistical Bureau, PRC. Chinese 
Statistical Press, August 1988, p. 288 
Note: The data in 1978 and 1 981 only included the number of 
workers within village-run and township- run enterprises. 
The data in 1984 and 1987 include all workers of both 
private and collective sectors of rural enterprises. 
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Table 5.4. The Percentage Breakdown of Employment in Rural 
Enterprises 
Year 
-------- 
1978 1981 1984 1987 
------------- 
Total 
----------- 
100 
--------- 
100 
--------- 
100 
--------- 
100 
Agriculture 21.5 12.8 5.5 2.8 
Industry 61.4 66.7 70.2 60.0 
Construction 8.3 11.8 13.1 15.5 
Transportation 3.7 3.6 2.5 7.0 
Commerce, Catering 
and Service trade 5.1 5.1 8.7 14.7 
Source: as above. 
The number of labourers in secondary industries, 
including food processing, sideline production, small mines, 
manufacturing and building, reached nearly 39 million in 
1985,73.7 percent more than in 1980. Finally tertiary 
industry, involving transport, commerce and service 
businesses, employed more than 28.4 million workers, 135 
percent more than in 1980.37 Nevertheless, rural industrial 
employment has grown at a somewhat slower rate than other 
sectors of rural enterprises. The reason is that peasants 
have shown more interest in investing their funds in 
housing. This has created vast opportunities for individuals 
transporting the materials and supplies that these sectors 
need. 
The majority of employees in rural enterprises are 
from rural areas. A survey in 1987 
38 showed that 88 percent 
of employees in these enterprises were rural people, the 
rest urban. Each of these worker families had an average of 
2.82 able-bodied men, with 1.64 persons working in rural 
enterprises and making 63.6 percent of the family's total 
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income. As many as 91 percent of these households still had 
contracted fields which supplied them with their grain needs 
and 71 percent of enterprise employees took part in farming 
during the busy seasons. 39 This indicates that workers in 
rural enterprises still have a close relation with 
agriculture. 
However, the rate of increase in employment in rural 
enterprises has slowed down. He Kang, chairman of the China 
Township Enterprise Association, has disclosed40 that in the 
first five years of 1980s the increase of employment in 
rural enterprises was 44 million and in the last five years 
22 million, so in the former the annual average was 8 
million and in the latter the annual average was 4 
million. 41 
During late 1988 and 1991, the Chinese leadership 
implemented a retrenchment policy, and imposed tight a 
policy on finance and the supply of raw materials for rural 
enterprises. In the countryside many rural enterprises have 
been forced to close down. The policy of retrenchment 
increased the local burden of surplus rural labour. Since 
rural enterprises were the major way of easing the problem 
of too many people tilling a fixed area of land, soon after 
this road was obstructed, albeit temporarily, large-scale 
bankruptcy of rural enterprises, occurred and squeezed large 
number peasant-workers out of employment. This has been the 
major cause of the so-called mangliu or 'blind population 
mobility' of roaming unemployed workers, representing a 
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potential threat to social stability. The information 
indicated that township enterprises absorbed 50 percent less 
42 rural workers in 1989 than 1988, and about 3 million rural 
enterprises were closed down in 1989.43 Especially in the 
construction sector many former peasants have been fired and 
sent back to the countryside. For example, Shanghai cut its 
contingent of construction workers by 100,000 or one-seventh 
in 1989 in an attempt to curb excessive capital 
44 
construction. 
Moreover, during this period, some conservative leaders 
did not want the development of rural enterprises to 
threaten the dominance of state enterprises in the national 
economy, and tried to control the development of rural 
enterprises. They planned that during 1990s only about 3 
million persons will be assimilated every year, so the total 
will be 120 million persons. 
45 However, according to the 
preliminary plan, the total output value of township 
enterprises should double by 1990 over 1985, and then have a 
two-third increase by the year 2000. About 170 million 
labourers will be employed. 
46 
However, although China's leadership prefers to 
develop state enterprises rather than rural enterprises, 
state enterprises can not provide sufficient opportunities 
for employment. According to statistical predictions, there 
will be an average increase of nine million new labours 
annually during the Eighth Five-Plan, and an average 
increase of seven million new labourers annually during the 
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Ninth Five-Year Plan. By the end of the century China will 
have 500 million agricultural labourers. only about 200 
million of them can be absorbed by agriculture, and while 
township enterprises can absorb 140 million, this still 
leaves about 160 million labourers . 
47 Since the Chinese 
government can not afford the social risk of disturbance, 
it will still have to depend on further development of rural 
enterprise to solve the problem of rural surplus labour. 
Future rural employment trends include "a continuing 
decline in agriculture's rural employment share, and a rapid 
increase in the number of workers in industry, construction 
48 and other non-agricultural sectors". However, predictions 
of the future development of different sectors of rural 
enterprises are quite varied. China's two research reports 
on this issue described by Taylor49, presented different 
findings. one report suggested that the employment growth 
rate in rural industry, construction, and other non- 
agricultural sectors will be roughly the same. The second 
report suggested that job creation in industry, and 
construction will be much lower than transport, retail and 
wholesale trade, and services. Past experience suggests that 
this second report is more convincing. The rural employment 
trends from 1978 to the present show that industry accounted 
for 60 percent, while transport, retail and wholesale trade, 
and services increased more rapidly. For example, workers 
in transport sector of rural enterprises increased from 3.7 
percent of total workers in 1978 to 7.0 percent in 1987. 
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China faces serious shortage of transportation and service 
sectors. Thus, employment in transport, retail and wholesale 
trade, and services is likely to increase at a higher rate. 
The rate of employment in rural enterprises will still 
increase. 
5.2 Implications of Regional Development Strategies 
for Rural Enterprises 
In this section, I will discuss the impact of China's 
regional development policies for development imbalances of 
rural enterprises. In doing so, first, I will examine 
regional development imbalances of rural enterprises, then I 
will analyze the impacts of China's regional development 
policy for regional development imbalances of rural 
enterprises. 
5.2.1 Regional Development Imbalances of Rural 
Enterprises 
China can be divided into three regions: the coastal 
developed region, the central region, the interior backward 
region. The coastal developed region includes the nine 
provinces and municipalities of Shanghai, Tianjin, Beijing, 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Liaoning, Shandong, Guangdong and Hebei. 
The central region includes the 11 provinces of Shanxi, 
Fujian, Jilin, Hubei, Heilongjiang, Henan, Anhui, Shaanxi, 
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Jiangxi and Sichuan. The interior backward region includes 
the 10 provinces and autonomous regions of Ningxia, Gansu, 
Neimenggu, Guangxi, Xinjiang, Hainan, Yunnan, Guizhou, 
Qinghai and Xizang. 
Ye Bingsheng used two indexes to analyze regional 
development of rural industry in 1988: the value of the 
rural industry output per capita of agricultural 
population50, and geographical density5l. The coastal 
region's value of the rural industry output per capita of 
agricultural population was 5.2 times that the central 
region and 14.2 times that of the interior region. The 
geographical density of the coastal region's value of rural 
industry output was 8.5 times that of the central region and 
167 times that of interior region. Over 80 percent of 
China's gross rural industry exports were made by the nine 
52 provinces and the cities of the coast in 1988. 
In term of absolute values, in 1982 the value of 
rural industry output per capita of agricultural population 
in the coastal region was 109 yuan/person higher than the 
central region and 138 yuan/person higher than the western 
region; in 1988 the difference between the two had increased 
sharply to 2,140 yuan/person and 3,191 yuan/person, 
respectively, a more than 20 fold increase. 
53 
Li Shih Chun's studY54 also showed that regional 
development imbalances have been very wide. In 1986 the 
gross value of output from rural enterprises in 8 provinces 
and cities-Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Liaoning, Shandong, 
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Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Guangdong-accounted for 50 percent of the 
gross value of output for rural enterprises nationwide. By 
contrast, the gross value of output from rural enterprises 
in 8 northwestern and southwestern provinces, Shaanxi, 
Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, Xinjiang, Guangxi, Guizhou, and 
Yunnan- accounted for only 5 percent of the gross value of 
output for rural enterprises nationwide. 55 Furthermore, 
regional development imbalances have also appeared in 
different regions of a single province. For example, the 
gross value of output from rural enterprises in Suzhou, 
Wuxi, and Changzhou-three southern Jiangsu cities near 
Shanghai accounted for 50 per cent of gross value of output 
for the entire Jiangsu Province in 1986. By contrast, rural 
enterprises in Xuzhou, Huaiyin, Yancheng, and Lianyun--four 
cities in northern Jiangsu-accounted for only 11 percent. 56 
The unbalanced development of rural enterprises has 
widened the regional income differential since farmers' 
income from rural enterprises has become the main source for 
farmers, income increase. For example, between 1982 and 1988 
income supplied by the rural industry of developed coastal 
provinces and cities to each person in the rural areas 
increased from 27 yuan to 200 yuan, while that of the 
central and western undeveloped region increased from only 
2-5 yuan to 9-27 yuan. 
57 Thus, the gap between China's east 
and west in terms of production and living standards in 
rural areas has widened. Since the imbalance development of 
rural enterprises between China's coastal and interior 
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provinces is continuing to expand, it will be impossible 
for the farmers in the central and western interior regions 
to expect to narrow the income gap with the coastal regions. 
This could result in social tension. 
Although most rural enterprises are distributed in 
coastal provinces and economically developed areas, the 
majority of rural enterprises are located in townships and 
villages. Surveys estimated that only 12 percent of China's 
rural enterprises in 1985 were distributed in market towns, 
barely 1 percent in cities above the county level, and more 
than five-sixths in townships and villages. 58 This spatial 
distribution of rural enterprises has caused much economic 
inefficiency. First, rural enterprises take up too much 
land, which is costly. Second, as the enterprises are 
constructed in a dispersed manner, their infrastructure 
cannot be provided in a unified basis. Almost every 
enterprise has its own set of facilities for delivery and 
conversion of electricity, water supply, transportation, and 
communication. This occupies excessive fixed assets but with 
a low utilization rate. Third, the dispersed distribution of 
enterprises in the countryside has hampered the 
transportation of goods and materials, information 
transmission, and funds settlement, leading to higher costs 
and slower responses to the market. Furthermore, it has 
hampered the integration of enterprises. And the linkage 
between the enterprises and the city as well as the market 
is particularly impeded, which makes management and 
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integration of the market as well as the introduction of 
technology very difficult. Finally, although locating 
enterprises in the countryside makes it convenient for 
peasants to have part time farming, it is unfavorable for 
the improvement of the quality of the enterprises' staff 
and workers and for pollution control. 
5.2.2 Implications of Regional Development Strategies 
for Rural Enterprises 
Dali Yang demonstrated that there has been a significant 
change of China's regional development strategy since 1978. 
During the 1953-78 period, China's regional development 
strategy emphasized regional industrial balance and sought 
to correct the inherited coast-interior imbalance by 
directing a large portion of industrial investment into 
inland area. 59 Since 1978 China's leaders adopted the 
"uneven development strategy", which focuses on economic 
results, and emphasizes regional comparative advantage, 
accepts regional disparities as inevitable, encourages 
foreign investment and international interaction, and seeks 
to foster technological innovation. 60 China's government has 
increased investment of fixed assets in coastal areas since 
the late 1970s. For example, in early 1980s the coastal 
region accounted for about half of all central government 
investment. 61 A series of preferential policies have been 
granted to the coastal region, enabling it to attract most 
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of foreign investment. For example, China made use of over 
US$5 billion in foreign investment by 1987. most of that 
investment went into the coastal region, with Guangdong 
alone hosting over 65 per cent of all foreign investment 
enterprises in China. 62 In addition, the favourable policies 
were granted to coastal areas and especially the Special 
Economic Zones. As a result, rural enterprises in the 
coastal region enjoy vast advantages in their dealing with 
other provinces and they have more business opportunities to 
cooperate with state enterprises and foreign enterprises. 
Since 1978, China's government has given not only 
preferential financial treatments but also tax relief for 
rural enterprises in poor areas so that these policies could 
bring these areas out of poverty (by Chinese standards: per 
capita annual income 200 yuan) . However, Dali Yang 
demonstrated that the centre's policy towards the poor 
areas has been undermined by three factors: first, China has 
seen the decentralization of economic decision-making powers 
from the centre to lower levels since 1978. This has 
resulted in increased revenue retained by lower 
administrative levels. Government and party administrative 
expenditures are higher in poor areas than in more developed 
areas. These poor areas have less funds left for the 
development of rural enterprises. 
63 Bank deposits in the 
poor areas prefer to invest in the more developed central 
and coastal regions since the intervention by multi-tier, 
low quality, and overstaffed governments and a host of 
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geographical, cultural and social factors reduced returns on 
investments and frighten potential investors away. 
64 
Finally, poorer conditions in the underdeveloped area have 
made it difficult to attract and keep talented personnel, 
thereby making development even more difficulty. 
65 Thus, 
although China's government has implemented some policies to 
develop rural enterprises in the poor areas in the 1980s, 
the Chinese government's ability to alleviate regional 
development imbalances of rural enterprises is limited. 
The uneven development of the economy and comparative 
advantages were another reason for development imbalances 
of rural enterprises. Shuan Breslin66 has demonstrated that 
uneven development and comparative advantage not only 
exists between provinces, but also within provincial 
boundaries. In particular, municipalities with high economic 
status have massive comparative advantages over the rest of 
their provinces. 
The coastal regions have enjoyed superior factor 
endowments compared with the interior. Coastal regions 
possess an industrial labour force with long years of 
experience, and also accumulated superior managerial skills 
compared with the interior. Coastal areas such as Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang, and other economically developed areas have more 
technological personnel than interior areas. Hence, coastal 
areas can also provide more assistance for rural enterprises 
in terms of technological personnel. The fundamental 
economic advantage of poorer, more backward areas is their 
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low wage rates. However, capital and entrepreneurs are 
largely immobile and are not attracted to poor areas. As a 
result, the advantage of low wage rates in the interior is 
of limited use. 
The development of rural enterprises is contingent 
upon the availability of urban markets. A developed urban 
economy can provide its surrounding rural area with vast 
quantities of timely economic information, which in turn 
stimulates growth of the rural market economy. A developed 
urban economy with substantial demand for products from 
rural enterprises undoubtedly stimulates rapid growth of 
rural enterprises. 
5.2.3 Sununary 
Since 1978, regional development imbalances of rural 
enterprises have widened. Rural enterprises are highly 
concentrated in the coastal provinces and the municipalities 
of Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai, but very undeveloped in 
the broad interior regions of central plain and western 
China. The development imbalances of rural enterprises have 
also widened regional income differentials. China's regional 
development strategy and comparative advantages in coastal 
areas are the main reason of regional development imbalances 
of rural enterprises. 
177 
5.3 Conclusion 
The government has been incapable of solving the 
problem of rural surplus labour, and was forced to let 
localities deal with the problem of rural underemployment. 
The urbanization which accompanies industrialization creates 
problems for most developing countries: millions of 
impoverished farmers have crowded cities beyond capacity, 
and many cities are plagued by slums, vagrants, high crime 
rates, and other urban ailments. The development of China's 
rural enterprises however provides an exception. The growth 
of rural enterprises has provided a local solution to the 
problem of rural surplus labour. China's experience has 
shown that in shifting rural surplus labour toward the 
development of rural enterprises, not only has this avoided 
large-scale shifts in rural population, but it has also 
avoided a decline and dissolution of the countryside. The 
development of rural enterprises has recently quickened its 
pace, and traditional agricultural areas have reaped 
considerable benefits as a result. 
From a short-term perspective, there will not be a 
dismantling of the barriers between the cities and the 
countryside, nor will there be much greater freedom of 
population migration. The current household registration 
system will still remain as a barrier to the migration of 
peasants to large cities. Chinese peasants do not have the 
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opportunity to change their household registration into a 
non-agricultural one because of this system. This system 
impedes economic development and social justice, and has 
many other negative impacts on Chinese society, but it is 
very difficulty to reform. "Attempts to reform certain 
components of urban privileges such as the housing rents 
have failed till now. A gradual erosion of these privileges 
will take decades while a sudden abolition could cause 
political unrest. 1167 Therefore, following the increase in 
population pressure and the decline of the land for 
agriculture, the development of rural enterprises will still 
be China's main strategy for resolving the problem of the 
surplus population in China's countryside. 
Moreover, in the future, the transformation of rural 
surplus labours will still concentrate on small towns. As I 
have discussed above, the development of small towns has 
many social and economic advantages. "China has decided to 
check the expansion of cities with over half a million 
people. Cities with fewer than 500,000 people will be 
developed rationally and the development of small towns with 
less than 200,000 residents will be encouraged.,, 68 In 
particular, the focus will still be placed on the 
development of county seats and small towns within county 
boundaries. At the same time, rural enterprises would be 
encouraged to gather at small towns. However, the main 
factor restricting the movement of rural population to small 
towns is the current land system, which serves as a 
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guarantee of peasants' production as well as a guarantee of 
social security. It will be necessary in the long distant 
future that a pension system will be introduced in rural 
enterprises and together with new social security 
mechanisms, this will replace the social security presently 
provided by the land. 
It is essential for China's government to take further 
measures to reduce the regional development imbalances of 
rural enterprises. Wang Tuoyu69 provided some suggestions 
for reducing regional development imbalances of rural 
enterprises in the future: free interregional flow of labor 
and of other factors of production should be encouraged; 
private enterprises should be allowed to develop further; 
and limited amount of state support available for the more 
backward areas should be targeted at sound investment 
projects and at areas with low per capita incomes and poorer 
agricultural resources. 
However, due to the restrictions of the market and 
funds and limitation of technological personnel in the vast 
central and western region, the development of rural 
enterprises will still be limited. Moreover, the 
possibilities for redistributing resources to the 
underdeveloped region are limited. Therefore, regional 
development imbalances of rural enterprises may become worse 
in the foreseeable future. 
In addition, it is necessary to create favourable 
conditions for reasonable spatial concentrations of rural 
180 
enterprises. As I have discussed in the first section, 
China's small towns have developed very rapidly. Through 
planning of industrial districts or zones, constructing 
infrastructures such as roads, electricity and water 
supplies, facilities for communication and environmental 
protection, rural enterprises could further be concentrated 
in small towns. 
Since 1978, the government has provided more preferential 
financial and taxation policies for rural enterprises. Thus, 
in the next chapter, I will discuss China's government 
financial and taxation policies for rural enterprises. 
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Chapter 6 
Rural Enterprises 
Financial and Taxation Policies towards 
In Chapter Five, I have discussed China's government 
rural employment strategies and regional development 
strategies and their implications for rural enterprises. In 
this chapter, I will examine the government financial and 
taxation policies towards rural enterprises. I will analyze 
these policies under the following headings. First I will 
examine the state's financial policy towards rural 
enterprises and its implications. Secondly I will discuss 
the state's tax policy towards rural enterprises. Thirdly I 
will consider the sources of capital in rural enterprises. 
Fourthly I will examine the fundraising methods in rural 
enterprises. Finally I will analyze future prospects of 
finance in rural enterprise. 
6.1 Financial Policy towards Rural Enterprises 
It is estimated that 80 percent of rural enterprises 
depend to a greater or lesser extent on bank loans. Roughly 
20 percent of rural enterprises depend entirely on bank 
loans to run their businesses. Among the entire nation's 
rural enterprises, operating fund loans account for 
approximately 50 percent of total operating funds, and for 
an even higher percentage of fixed capital-' Therefore, 
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financial policy towards rural enterprises is a very 
important factor which determines the extent of the 
development of rural enterprises. 
Since 1978, the policy of granting credit to rural 
enterprises has been more liberal than before, but credit 
fund supply has been changeable. 
Table 6.1. Credit Growth of Township and Village Enterprises 
from Bank and Credit Cooperative Credit M 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Year 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
87.3 21.5 19.6 22.6 108.9 20.4 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Source: Wang Xingchun, Nongye Jingji Wenti (Problems of 
Agricultural Economy), No. 23, October 1991, pp. 20-25. 
(Continued) Credit Increase of Township and Village 
Enterprise from Bank and Credit Cooperative Credit (0-. ) 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Year 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
56.7 28.1 20.1 12.8 21 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Source: As above. 
Table 6.1 shows that growth of credit supply fluctuated 
greatly during the period 1980 to 1990. Fluctuations in 
aggregate credit occurred during three periods: During 1979 
to 1984, following several years of rural enterprises 
readjustment, rural enterprises moved from an early 
development stage to a stage of rapid development. Credit 
was tightened during 1981 to the end of 1983, but eased in 
1984. During this period, credit issuance peaked twice, the 
highest peak took place in 1984 when credit increased 108 
percent over that of 1983. 
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Influenced by deflation policies, credit supply 
fluctuated once again during 1985. Credit supply skidded 
sharply. The Communist Party Central committee's document 
no 1 for 1985 set out ten measures aimed at encouraging a 
market-oriented rural economy. This document further called 
for relaxing rural financial policies, raising returns on 
funds, and encouraging rural credit and insurance business. 
Local credit cooperatives were allowed to operate 
independently. The document said that the money they raised 
would be put at their disposal after they delivered a set 
amount of reserve funds to the Agricultural Bank of China. 
The term of loan repayment for equipment purchase was one to 
five years while for technological transformation of old 
enterprises, the repayment term was one to three years, and 
for overhauling of equipment, it was one year. The interest 
rate on loans was also reduced. The document stated that 
planning, supply, financial, banking and communications 
departments at all levels of government should let the 
township and village enterprises open accounts and given 
them guidance and support. 
2 Thus, credit supply rose greatly 
in 1986 and 1987. 
In the fourth quarter of 1987, however, the State 
Council handed down instructions to tighten finance and 
credit in an effort to stabilize currency and product 
prices, and therefore credit supply was tightened again. 
This contradiction in central government policy has not been 
the only occasion since 1978 when later pronouncements and 
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decrees have conflicted with earlier statements. For 
enterprise managers trying to adapt to the rigours and 
demands of a newly emerging market economy, such 
fluctuations in government policy made the process of 
planning (even in the short term) extremely difficult. 
During late 1988 to 1991, Chinese conservative 
leadership dominated in China. Credit supply showed a 
downward trend. In 1989, the increase in credit reached the 
lowest. Rural enterprises thus faced serious financial 
difficulty. The information showed that if the growth rate 
in 1989 for rural enterprises was assumed to be 15 percent, 
that would demand at least 25 million yuan in operating 
funds. The state in practice only satisfied a small part of 
that sum. 3 
The retrenchment policy has particularly hit the 
expansion of newly opened enterprises. Many of the newly 
opened enterprises had to rely on bank credit for working 
capital. Retrenchment policy has caused a considerable 
proportion of enterprise assets to be left idle. For 
example, Xinxing Building Materials Plant in Luhe County, 
Jiangsu, with the help of county townships, had received a 
loan of 11.5 million yuan to import advanced Italian 
equipment for the manufacture of various types of newly 
developed building tiles. In October 1988, the equipment was 
installed and put into operation. Because of the shortage of 
funds, materials, and electrical power, in 1989, the three 
production lines having an annual production capacity of 7.5 
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million square meters were only able to produce 20-30 
thousand square meters. They had not even begun to pay off 
the interest on their loan itself. A large plant and 
advanced equipment were idle, therefore creating a vast 
amount of waste. 4 
The flutuation in the total credit supply has been 
attributed to the following political and economic factors. 
First, as I have demonstrated in Chapter two and Chapter 
Four, rural enterprise policies have been inconsistent 
because of the struggle of conservatives and reformists 
within China's leadership. Some consevative leaders 
emphasized the development of state enterprises and adopted 
a policy to definitely incline state enterprises to acquire 
credit supply, energy and raw materials. In particular, when 
economic development overheated and market supply became 
tight, restriction of bank credit was imposed. Second, as 
Wang Xingchun5 demonstrated, credit supply was directly 
influenced by the agricultural harvest. In good harvest 
years, rural enterprises had a solid base and developed very 
rapidly. As soon as a lean harvest occurred, credit supply 
was directed to grain and cotton production. Third, China 
has only undertaken partial reform of the market. Market 
mechanism for regulating and controlling the total volume of 
credit for rural enterprises has not fully been developed. 
The government mainly depended on the plan to control the 
supply of credit. Excessive control also resulted in large 
fluctuations of credit supply. 
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Table 6.2 Township and Village Credit and output Value As a Percentage of National Bank Credit and Social Cross Output 
Value (%) 
------- ---------------------------------------- 
Year 1983 1984 198S 1986 1987 1988 
----------- 
------- 
1989 
------ 
1990 
------------------------------------ (1) 4.0 6.6 6.0 7.3 7.8 8.0 
------- 
8.0 
------ 
8.3 
(2) 6.8 13.0 16.6 18.7 20.6 23.5 
------------ 
24.3 25 
----------------------------------- 
Source: ------- ------ 
Wang Xingchun, Nongye Jingji Wenti (Problems of 
Agricultural Economy), No. 23, October 1991, pp. 20-25. 
Key: 
(1) Township and Village Enterprise Credit as a 
Percentage of the National Bank Credit Balance 
(2) Township and Village Enterprise Gross Output Value 
as a Percentage of Social Gross Output Value 
Table 6.2 shows that township and village enterprise 
credit as a percentage of all national credit increased 2.1 
times between 1983 and 1990; however, during the same 
period, township and village gross output value as a 
percentage of total social gross output value increased 3.8 
times, much faster than the change in the percentage of 
credit. In 1990, township and village enterprise gross 
output value as a percentage of social gross output value 
reached 25 percent, but township and village enterprise 
credit only accounted for only 8.3 percent of total national 
bank credit. Thus, rural enterprises have used relatively 
little credit input to produce a fairly large value output. 
This further indicates that the government has still adopted 
discriminating policy against rural enterprises. Thus, rural 
enterprises have raised funds from individuals and society. 
An informal financial market has inevitably appeared to 
supply the fund requirements of rural enterprises. I will 
further discuss this issue in section 6.4 of this chapter. 
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However, despite such disturbance from political and 
economic factors, financial policy towards rural enterprises 
was generally more liberal during 1980s than in any pevious 
history. In addition, the government established special 
funds for supporting rural enterprises. There were two 
sources of such supporting funds. As one source, rural 
enterprises were allowed to take 1 percent out of their 
after-tax profits to be used by the administrative 
departments for rural enterprises. The other source of 
funding was the assistance from the financial department 
allocated for developing rural enterprises. Such funds were 
distributed through consultations between the local 
financial departments at various levels and the 
administrative departments for rural enterprises. The 
supporting funds were not gratuitous. There was a deadline 
for using such funds, and when this time period expired, the 
return of the unused funds was demanded so that they could 
be used over again on a constant, revolving basis. Accounts 
of enterprise funds and financial assistance funds were 
required to be kept by the administrative departments for 
rural enterprises and by the financial departments concerned 
respectively. 6 
Loans for rural enterprises are mainly used as 
circulating capital, and as fixed capital formation, as 
repaying temporary loans and as meeting the higher prices of 
raw and semifinished materials, energy, etc. To take 1985 as 
an example7 , the uses of 
loans are mainly as follows: 
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First, a very large portion of the loans were used as 
fixed capital. In 1985, the value of fixed assets of 
enterprises at the township and village levels in the 
country increased 17 billion yuan. 8 
Second, a large amount of credit was used to help 
enterprises to repay temporary loans. In 1985, a policy was 
implemented to tighten credit for township enterprises 
throughout the country. The enterprises' sales increased 44 
percent, fixed assets increased 59 percent, and self- 
generated circulating funds increased 53 percent. Credit 
extended to them as circulating funds increased only 4.8 
billion yuan, or 22 percent. To keep production and business 
operations going, rural enterprises, particularly those 
operating on a regular basis, were forced to raise funds by 
delaying wage payments or defaulting on loans. In 1985, 
rural enterprises owed workers and staff members more than 2 
billion yuan in back wages and defaulted on payments for 
goods totalling some 5 billion yuan. They had to borrow 
nearly 3 billion yuan from units and individuals. Most of 
these temporary loans were repaid out of their sales 
receipts to buy raw and semifinished materials. According to 
typical case surveys and national accounting analysis, about 
5 billion yuan, or 38 percent, of the increased 1986 credit 
was used to repay the temporary loans raised by the 
enterprises in 1985.9 
Third, more loans were extended owing to market 
factors. Bank loans increased to meet the higher prices of 
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raw and semifinished materials, energy, etc. According to 
typical cases studied, about 20 percent of the credit 
increase was caused by price rises. For example, the 
purchasing price of fresh tea leaves rose about 30 percent, 
and the prices of feed and raw materials rose nearly 50 
percent. Owing to the state's strict control over the scale 
of investment in fixed assets and other reasons in 1985, the 
building materials, machinery, and electrical industries 
were faced with a temporary overstocking of products, which 
also increased their needs for credit. 10 
Thus, we can see that the policy of granting credit to 
rural enterprises was considerably liberalised during the 
1980s. The more open access to the state's investment funds 
clearly created a more favourable environment for the 
development of rural enterprises. However, the evolution of 
a freer credit system was far from unproblematic. The 1980s 
saw relatively wide fluctuations in credit supply policy. 
Although access to investment capital was relatively easy at 
times, macro-economic retrenchment occurred on a number of 
occasions, and credit supply was reined in. During these 
periods of credit retraction, rural enterprises were 
particularly hard hit and found their access to funds 
severely reduced. In times of difficulty, the state returned 
to its discriminatory policies towards rural enterprises, 
instead favouring the more easily controllable state-owned 
sector. Rural enterprise managers were thus unable to plan 
with any confidence that existing credit supply arrangements 
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would stay in place, a factor which obstructed the even 
greater development of rural enterprises during this period. 
6.2 Taxation Policy towards Rural Enterprises 
In general, tax policy instruments were used to 
encourage the growth of collective rural enterprises. The 
rates of tax paid by the collective sector of rural 
enterprises have relatively been low. For example, in 1966, 
the rate of industrial and commercial income tax for 
commune- and brigade- run enterprises was 20 percent and the 
starting point of the levy was 600 yuan. 11 In 1979, the 
starting point was raised to 3,000 yuan. Difficult 
enterprises run by communes and brigades in old 
revolutionary bases, minority-inhabited areas, and border 
areas were allowed to enjoy tax reduction or remission for 5 
years from 1979. If newly established rural enterprises run 
by communes or brigades had difficulties in their business 
operations in the initial stage, they were allowed to enjoy 
tax reduction or remission for 2 or 3 years. 
12 Thus, the 
rate of industrial and commercial income tax for commune- 
and brigade- run enterprises was considerably low. 
The state council promulgated some regulations 
concerning the readjustment of industrial and commercial 
taxes on enterprises run by rural communes and brigades and 
they became effective on 1st April, 1981.13 By this 
provision, taxes might be continuously reduced or exempted. 
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In some cases this was designed to encourage the development 
of production by commune and brigade-run enterprises; for 
example, products directly serving agricultural production 
such as chemical fertilizers and pesticides and 
manufacturing or repairing farm implements. Rural 
enterprises were also allowed exemption from tax on their 
industrial and commercial income for two to three years 
after they were set up. 
In 1984 the taxation system was further adjusted. The 
"Provisions on readjusting industrial and commercial tax 
rates on rural enterprises run by townships and villages on 
grass-roots supply and marketing cooperatives" were put into 
14 
effect from ist January, 1984. These provisions include 
the following main points: 
As of 1982, the 20 percent proportional tax rate of 
the industrial and commercial income tax which rural 
enterprises paid was gradually changed to the eight-grade 
progressive tax rate. 15 The eight-grade progressive tax rate 
was implemented in 1982 only on rural enterprises in the 
suburbs and small towns under county jurisdiction which 
produced 20 products, including cigarettes, wine and sugar. 
Only by 1984 was this extended. 
16 The purpose of this 
change was to address the unbalanced development of rural 
enterprises as well as to legislate a rational tax 
burden. 17 Industrial and commercial income taxes were levied 
on all rural enterprises run by communes and brigades 
according to the eight-grade progressive rates with 
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specified minimum rates. The proportional tax rate of 20 
percent was repealed. 18 
The eight-grade progressive tax rate was different 
from the proportional tax rate, which was suitable for an 
enterprise with a smaller income. Correspondingly, a higher 
tax rate was imposed on an enterprise with a higher income. 
Thus, taxation corresponds to the profit obtained by an 
enterprise as well as its ability to shoulder the tax 
burden. This produced some shift of the tax burden to those 
enterprises with greater profits and those localities where 
rural enterprises had developed relatively rapidly together 
with some shift of the tax burden from those enterprises 
with smaller profits and localities where rural enterprises 
had developed relatively slowly. However, in overall terms, 
the change in the tax burden of rural enterprises was 
slight. 19 
In 1978, rural enterprise profits totalled 9.55 billion 
yuan, with 640 million yuan of income tax. The effective 
20 
rate of tax burden was 6.7 percent. In 1983, the state 
used the eight-grade progressive tax rate to configure the 
income tax for rural enterprises in the suburbs of large 
cities and small towns under county jurisdiction. Although 
the actual burden had increased to 11.49 percent, compared 
with 38.13 percent for the collective enterprises under 
urban No 2 light industrial system in 1983, this burden was 
still light. 
21 
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However, tax policy towards rural enterprises was 
ambiguous. For example, as for some special enterprises 
which needed further tax reductions or remissions, local 
governments in various provinces, autonomous regions and 
municipalities could handle their cases according to the 
following provisions: First, if newly established rural 
enterprises run by townships or villages had difficulties in 
their business operations in the initial stage, they could 
be given a year tax grace period; Second, if enterprises 
which engaged in the primary processing of agricultural 
products, small-scale hydraulic or thermal power generation, 
or mining industry found it difficult to pay industrial and 
commercial taxes. Reduced taxes could be imposed on them 
within a set period. 22 In addition, when townships and 
villages were hit by natural disasters, industrial and 
commercial income taxes on rural enterprises could be 
reduced or remitted within a certain period. Difficult 
enterprises run by townships and villages in old 
revolutionary bases, minority-inhabited areas, and border 
areas were allowed to enjoy tax reduction or remission. 
23 
Therefore, some local governments have used this 
ambiguity in taxation policy to develop their own strategies 
towards rural enterprises. They have unilaterally reduced 
and even exempted income tax on rural enterprises if this 
measure best suits their own local fiscal interest. My own 
observations of the situation in Zhejiang Province confirms 
that this practice was widely spread in some counties. 
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After the issuance in April 1985 of the Provisional 
Income Tax Regulations Governing Collective Enterprises, a 
new system of eight-grade progressive taxation was adopted 
for all collective enterprises. 24 Under the new system the 
lowest grade is 1,000 yuan, the tax rate on which is 10 
percent, and the highest grade is 200,000 yuan, the tax rate 
on which is 55 percent. Newly established township and town 
enterprises are exempted from paying income tax during a 
fixed period. Some enterprises which still experience 
difficulties after the expiration of the term may continue 
to enjoy tax exemption or reduction during another fixed 
period. Spending by a township and town enterprise on public 
welfare may be listed as expenditure and is entitled to tax 
exemption, but the total amount is limited to only 10 
25 
percent of its total profit. 
Therefore, from the above detail it is clear that the 
state has adopted preferential tax policies with tax 
reduction or tax exemption measures for collective rural 
enterprises (township and village run enterprises). This has 
undoubtedly played a positive role in the development of 
rural enterprise. However, tax rates for collective rural 
enterprises have gradually increased. There have been other 
tax regulations which have discriminated against rural 
enterprises. For example, no reduction and remission of 
industrial and commercial income taxes have been allowed for 
rural enterprises and other enterprises which competed with 
large-scale industrial enterprises for raw materials. Thus, 
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on the one hand, local governments have exercised the power 
to reduce and even exempt from income tax on rural 
enterprises for local interests, whilst on the other, the 
shortage of fiscal income in local communities and local 
government funds for welfare work and agricultural funds has 
also led to the problem of local government exacting a large 
percentage of profit, collecting excessive charges. I will 
analyze this issue in section 7.2.2 of Chapter Seven. 
Moreover, China's taxation system has worked in 
accordance with a commercial ownership type of tax appraisal 
and collection system, and favours state owned and 
collectively owned enterprises over private enterprises. 
Before June 1988 state owned enterprise fitted into the 55 
percent tax rate bracket. Collective enterprises were 
adjusted at eight-grade progressive tax bracket where the 
highest tax rate was only 55 percent. Individual industrial 
and commercial firms along with private enterprises have 
been placed in the tenth grade of progressive tax rates 
where the highest actual tax rate can be up to 84 percent. 
This progressive tax system, administered to the individual 
industrial and commercial enterprise established in the 
1950's was enacted in order to restrict and reform these two 
sections. This tax system had the following effects: First 
large numbers of private enterprises committed tax evasion. 
According to a survey conducted by the State Tax Bureau, 
more than 80 percent of all individually owned industrial 
and commercial businesses were guilty of tax evasion. In 
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1988, taxes worth 7 billion yuan were collected from such 
businesses; but it was estimated that an equal amount was 
not paid. 26 "One informant, engaged in conducting surveys on 
Shanghai's self-employed, stated that: 
"official tax rates, as well as local "fees" are 
often calculated at artificially high levels since 
the expectation is that 
underreporting. Therefore, 
everyone is 
those who are 
completely honest will find it difficult to remain 
in business. Self-employed businessmen of 
necessity commonly raise prices seeming 
arbitrarily -- to cover these costs.,, 
27 
Thus, falsified tax returns could be regarded as a 
part of a systemic flaw rather than as criminal intent on 
the part of the entrepreneurs. Secondly, faced with mounting 
tax bills, some private enterprises found it more profitable 
to reduce production and seek to re-register as 
"individually owned enterprises" rather than maintain 
production and pay the higher tax rate. Thus, continuing to 
use a 1950s policy of levying high taxes eventually hampered 
development in the private sector. 
In June 1988 the State Council published new tax 
regulations for private enterprises. In the new regulations, 
private enterprises have to pay 35 percent income tax and 
to use at least 50 per cent of their after-tax profits for 
production expansion. A 40 per cent personal income tax is 
levied on the amount private enterprises spend on personal 
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living costs. 28 New tax regulations try to offer tax 
incentives to enterprise expansion and investment of 
profits. However, private enterprises still suffer from the 
arbitrary collection of other fees and duties by local 
government. A private entrepreneur complained that: "At 
present, I have to pay 11 kinds of taxes and duties such as 
business tax, income tax, and taxes for education, 
construction, real estate, land use as well as industrial 
and commercial consolidated duties. To be frank, I am taxed 
too much.,, 29 A number of private enterprises have not been 
able to bear the burden and have had to close down. 
In summary, the extension of preferential fiscal 
policies towards rural enterprises has been one of the main 
central policies aimed at facilitating the development of 
rural enterprises. However, despite initially providing a 
great help for rural enterprises, taxation rates have 
gradually increased. Rural enterprises have thus fallen foul 
of the increasing budgetary pressures on central (and local) 
government. Although the need to increase state finances is 
a very real one, it is notable that foreign and joint owned 
ventures have not been subject to an equivalent degradation 
of special taxation policies, and the further expansion of 
the rural enterprise sector has certainly not been aided by 
this move. Given the massive potential long term benefits 
that rural enterprises can bring to the Chinese economy (as 
demonstrated in Chapter One), the reduction of tax benefits 
marks the triumph of short term consi erations over long 
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term strategy. Indeed, in almost all respects, the 
development of the rural enterprise sector has been 
obstructed by short-termism in central government policy 
making. 
Furthermore, although the collective sector has done 
relatively well from preferential taxation policy, private 
enterprises are actually penalised by the fiscal system, 
paying very high taxation rates. This uneven policy has had 
two major affects. Firstly, the expansion of the private 
sector has obviously been obstructed. Secondly, many private 
enterprises have officially registered as collective or 
individually owned. Such an illicit registration is 
dependent on the collusion of local government officials, 
which rather than drawing attention to the extent of 
official corruption in post-Mao China perhaps instead 
indicates that local cadres are more aware of the need to 
develop this sector than their central government superiors. 
6.3 Sources of Initial Capital of Rural Enterprises 
In William A. Byrd's research, the sources of capital for 
rural enterprises was divided into three: household capital, 
community capital, and enterprise capital. 
30 Household 
capital is private funds invested directly in rural 
enterprises by households. It consists of investment by 
partners or proprietors, informal loans to private 
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entrepreneurs, purchase of bonds issued by community 
enterprises, and provision of capital in return for 
31 jobs . 
Community capital is investment funds which are determined 
or strongly influenced by community government, particularly 
at the township level. This capital consists of local 
government budgetary funds for rural enterprises investment, 
loans of fiscal revolving funds to rural enterprises, 
profits from community enterprises pooled by township or 
village industrial corporations, and banks and rural credit 
cooperative loans. 32 
Enterprise capital is the retained profits, depreciation 
allowances, and other funds of rural enterprises as well as 
funds provided by other enterprises. Capital from other 
firms is largely trade credit, of indefinite maturity and 
highly unstable. The allocation of part of the retained 
profits and other funds of community enterprises are 
influenced by the community government, but enterprises may 
have considerable autonomy in making smaller investments. 33 
In addition, some capital comes from previously existing 
enterprises such as county industry, later transferred to 
village and township. As table 6.3 shows, the state 
accounted for only a small share of the capital 
requirements. 
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Table 6.3. Source of Funds for Large-scale TVPs (percentage 
of total) 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Source At End End End June 
founding 1984 1985 1986 
-------------------------- 
State capitala 
------- 
4.0 
-------- 
1.8 
--------- 
1.6 
---------- 
1.7 
Community capitalb 67.6 35.2 30.1 27.8 
Bank loans 38.2 28.9 24.1 23.4 
Contributions by 
community governmentc 29.4 6.3 6.0 4.4 
Enterprise capital 13.0 55.8 59.8 63.0 b own funds 0.0 41.0 40.7 43.2 
other firmsd 13.0 14.8 19.1 19.8 
Household capital 7.6 4.2 5.6 4.9 
e Enterprise's own workers 6.5 3.5 4.6 4.0 
outside individuals 1.1 0.7 1.0 0.9 
Unidentified f 8.9 3.7 3.9 3.5 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: Figures for 1985 were adjusted to correct apparent 
arithmetic errors. 
a. Included grants and loans from state agencies. 
b. The share of community capital for 1984-86 is understated 
and that of household capital is overstated somewhat because 
"own funds" includes nonpayable capital provided by the 
township government as well as internally accumulated 
capital. 
c. Includes fiscal revolving funds 
be to some extent controlled at the 
township level. Grants funds from 
for 1984-86 are not included. 
lent to TVPs, which may 
country rather than the 
the community government 
d. May include some debts owned to 
since it includes narables as well 
investment provided by other 
capital comes from outside the 
e. Wages payable to workers 
government entities, 
as loans and capital 
enterprises. The buik ot this 
locality. 
and investment contributed by 
them. 
f. For time of founding, other funds; for 1984-86, other 
long-term debt. 
Source: 
Zhou Qiren and Hang Zhuangjun(1987), from a sample of 
200 relatively large and successful TVPs in ten provinces, 
see also William A. Byrd, "Entrepreneurship, Capital, and 
Ownership", in edited by William A. Byrd and Lin Qingsong, 
China's Rural Indus try- -Structure, Development-, and Reform, 
Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 201. 
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It was very importance for the community to provide initial 
capital for community enterprises at their founding. The 
community's share declined as enterprises developed and 
generated investment funds internally. The role of household 
capital in financing community enterprises was relatively 
small. 
Table 6.4. Sources of Increased Investments in Township and 
Town Enterprises 
---------------------- 
Year 1980 
---------- 
1981 
-------------------- 
1982 1983 
-------- 
(1) 
---------------------- 
(2) 91.0 
---------- 
72.0 
-------------------- 
84.0 85.0 
-------- 
332.0 
(3) 51.6 59.4 56.7 59.4 56.5 
(4) 40.0 23.9 25.0 32.5 30.8 
(5) 8.4 16.7 18.3 8.1 12.6 
(6) 123.0 139.0 152.0 206.0 
---------------------- 
Source: 
---------- -------------------- -------- 
Tai_vuan Nongye Jingji Xiaoguo(Agro-Economic Results) 
in Chinese No 2,25 Apr 86, pp. 8 -15. 
Key: 
(1) Four-year total and average 
2 (2) Increase in f ixed assets and circulating capital 
funds (100 million yuan) 
(3) Proportion of the above from increased accu mulation 
in township and town enterprises (percent) 
(4) Proportion from increased loans (percent) 
(5) Proportion from increases in other sources of capital 
(percent) 
(6) Total amount of loans issued during the year (100 
million yuan) 
Table 6.4 shows that most of the added sources of 
investments during 1980-83 for the development of rural 
enterprises were: an average of about 56.5 percent 
accumulated within the enterprises themselves, about 30.8 
percent from bank and credit cooperative loans and 12.6 
percent from other lenders. This indicates that capital 
accumulated within the enterprises played an important role 
in source of added investment in rural enterprises, while 
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the funds from the banks 
expansion of rural enterprises. 
also highly influenced the 
Over this period, the amount of capital raised by the 
enterprises themselves basically stayed between 5 and 6 
billion yuan and the rate of growth was small, expanding 
only with township and town enterprises production. About 60 
percent of these loans were assistance loans for circulating 
capital and investments in fixed assets in township and town 
enterprises. 34 Without this rather substantial assistance, 
it would have been hard for township and town enterprises to 
sustain expansion. It is apparent that township and town 
enterprises depend considerably on loans. 
The initial capital for private enterprises comes 
mainly from the following sources: 
First, since 1978 the Chinese government adopted a 
more liberal financial policy towards private enterprise, 
and the amount of state loans towards private enterprises 
have risen. According to two surveys of private rural 
enterprises, state loans accounted for about 50 percent or 
40 percent of the initial capital for private rural 
enterprises. 35 Thus, state loans are an important source of 
the initial capital for private enterprises. 
Secondly, previously existing poorly managed small 
scale collective enterprises have been sold or leased to 
individuals. The capital from these enterprises became one 
source of capital formation for private enterprises. 
According to some surveys, leased enterprises in 1984 
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accounted for 18.6 percent of total private enterprises in 
Hebei, 30 percent in Tianjin, and 40 percent in Liaoning. 36 
The third source of initial capital for private 
enterprise is from credits for the purchase of production 
materials and prepaid funds. This source is very volatile. A 
survey of 130 private rural enterprises in 18 provinces 
indicates that this source accounted for more than 50 
percent of initial capital in 1984, though it dropped to 20 
percent in 1987. 
Another important source of initial capital for private 
enterprise is from individuals and society. I will further 
discussed this issue in section 6.4 of this chapter. 
In conclusion, capital in both collective and private 
rural enterprises mainly consists of household capital, 
community capital and enterprise capital. State loans play 
an important role in the formation of the initial capital 
for both collective and private rural enterprises. Thus, 
if the state controls or reduces loans towards rural 
enterprises, then further development of rural enterprises 
would inevitably be restrained, and some rural enterprises 
could even face bankruptcy. The accumulation of individual 
funds is a less important source of initial capital for 
collective rural enterprises, but it is a considerable 
source for private rural enterprises. 
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6.4 Fundraising for Rural Enterprises 
The rise of rural enterprises has increased demand 
for capital. Capital determines the pace and scale of the 
development of rural enterprises, while at the same time the 
development of rural enterprises has affected the 
circulation of rural capital. 
For many years, the development of rural enterprises 
has relied on community capital, or accumulated capital by 
the enterprises themselves. However, particularly late 
1980s, owing to the rapid growth of rural economy, funds 
from these channels have fallen far short of demands. For 
example, the 1985 plans of Jinzhong Prefecture, Shanxi 
Province, called for the establishment of 7,429 new township 
and town enterprises of various kinds and the technical 
transformation of 718 enterprises to increase their 
production capacities, requiring a total of 246.76 million 
yuan. However, banks and credit cooperatives could provide 
only 68.32 million yuan in loans, meeting only 27.8 percent 
of the amount needed, and sufficient capital was not 
available for most of the planned new enterprises. 
37 Thus 
investment funds saved by individuals had become an 
alternative means of meeting the shortage of capital. 
When the state adopted measures to tighten the financial 
market and placed stricter and stronger controls on loans 
to rural enterprises, in particular, during late 1988 to 
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1991, rural enterprises have encountered serious capital 
shortage problems in their development. Therefore, 
fundraising for rural enterprises has become more important. 
Local party and government leaders are concerned about 
the effects of tight credit on the development of rural 
enterprises which affects rural employment and income and 
tax revenues generated by increased output and in turn 
affects local economic development. The objective of 
enterprise growth includes assuming responsibility for 
employing the residents of their own community, and also for 
various rural undertakings, including cadre compensation. 
To realize these tasks, enterprises can be given large 
concessions with respect to profits retention. When 
enterprises are confronted with serious financial 
difficulties, local governments will do all they can to 
support and protect them. 
After the implementation of the production 
responsibility system in Chinese rural areas, the income of 
Chinese farmers has considerably increased. With the 
development of the specialized households, in particular, 
some rich specialized households accumulated several 
thousand or even tens of thousands of yuan in saving 
deposits. Total saving deposits in urban and rural areas 
increased from 21,060 million yuan in 1978 to 307,330 
million yuan in 1987.38 
One reason was a shift from the collective to 
peasants' material accumulation in the countryside. Until 
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the end of the 1970's, accumulation in the countryside 
relies heavily on the collective as a source Of capital, 
equipment and raw materials. Eloquent proof is provided by 
the following: of the total agricultural output value in 
1979, output value of collectively owned enterprises 
accounted for 79.2 percent and that of household sideline 
occupations only 17 percent. 39 After the early 1980's, 
peasants' personal deposits in credit cooperatives grew at 
an extremely quick pace, while collective deposits dropped 
from year to year. In 1985, the peasants personally received 
in total more than 190 billion yuan, accounting for over 90 
percent of net agricultural income. The collective received 
only 8-plus billion yuan, accounting for 4 percent of net 
agricultural income. 40 The investment funds raised by 
individuals had become available in significant amounts for 
rural enterprises. 
Since late 1980s, rural areas throughout China have 
developed various capital raising activities for rural 
enterprises development. This has alleviated the capital 
shortage to a certain degree. For example, various places 
have permitted people with either capital or labour to enter 
the enterprises, investing in shares, importing outside 
capital i. e capital from another area of China or even from 
foreign countries. In addition, the enterprises can be made 
more efficient internally in ways like dealing with material 
overstocks as quickly as possible and pressing for repayment 
of loans in order to transform unused capital into active 
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capita . During the process of capital raising in rural 
areas across China, both economic and administrative 
measures have been employed to mobilize the funds. To take 
the example of rural Jinzhong Prefecture, Shanxi Province, 
Liu Zhihong4l demonstrated that the peasants' funds have 
been mobilized for town and township enterprises mainly in 
the following five ways: 
The first way of fundraising is from loans. These may 
be divided into several types. The first type of loan is 
interest-free. Generally this occurs when an individual 
household, planning to start a small business, borrows money 
from relatives, friends, and neighbours. As they trust each 
other, and only small amounts of money are involved, the 
loans are interest-free. The second type is low-interest 
loans. Investors earn interest on their money according to 
current bank loan interest rates. A common practice is the 
formation of a fundraising company with limited liability by 
related enterprises, units and individuals. The company 
issues shares and engages in credit and loan business. The 
enterprises, units, and individuals put their money in the 
company and become shareholders. The principal and interest 
of shares are guaranteed, but there is no distribution of 
bonuses or dividends. Those who apply for loans from the 
company must sign contracts. Shares have a longer time limit 
than loan contracts. Share interest rates should be higher 
than savings deposits. Units and individuals receiving loans 
pay interest rates which should be higher than deposit 
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rates. Units and individuals receiving loans pay interest at 
current loan interest rates. The third type of loan is 
the market interest rates loan. A trust and investment 
company is formed to accept deposits and extend loans at 
negotiated interest rates. 
The second way of fundralsing is labour-investors. An 
enterprise may combine labour recruitment with fundraising. 
Each worker hired is requested to invest a fixed amount of 
money in the enterprise. When a worker quits working for the 
enterprise, his money is paid back to him in full. Shares 
earn money in one of three ways: First, a certain proportion 
of the enterprise's after-tax profit is distributed as 
dividend among shareholders and workers. Generally a bigger 
portion is distributed for work than for shares. Second, the 
enterprise pays both interest and dividend. The interest 
rate is equal to or slightly higher than the bank rate. The 
investors are guaranteed interest payments, and the amount 
of dividends is tied to the enterprise's performance. 
Third, investors receive only interest and no dividend. The 
enterprise pays interest to the investors on a monthly or 
quarterly basis as stipulated in the contracts. 
The third way of fundralsing is joint ventures. Under 
this form of fundraising, investors take part in enterprise 
management. They share the capital investment, management, 
profits and losses. Joint ventures can be based on three 
kinds of economic ties. First, joint ventures between one 
household and another, combining labour with skills and 
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pooling financial resources. Second, joint ventures between 
one village and another, pooling financial, labour, and 
natural resources, breaking through the regional economic 
barriers formed by the administrative divisions. This leads 
to the horizontal flows of funds, technology, and labour 
between regions. Third, joint ventures between township and 
village enterprises and state-owned industrial and 
commercial enterprises, breaking through the barriers 
between different ownership systems and between urban and 
rural economies. This leads to the establishment of vertical 
urban-rural economic linkages. Finally, combined 
agricultural-industrial-commercial operations further expand 
economic contacts between urban and rural areas and promote 
integrated agricultural, industrial and commercial 
development in rural China. 
The fourth way of fundraising is dividend-earning 
shares. This method is often used by enterprises which 
require relatively large capital investment. As the main 
objective of this type of investment is to earn dividends, 
investors generally do not participate in management. To 
guarantee investors, economic benefits and encourage the 
peasants to buy shares, most enterprises not only guarantee 
interest payments, but promise dividend distributions. The 
interest rates may be lower than bank deposits interest 
rates, and dividends are determined by negotiation. 
The fifth way of fundraising is capital from elsewhere. 
Funds brought from other places play an important part in 
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accelerating the development of township and village 
enterprises. As production grows, so will the attraction to 
investment capital from elsewhere. Funds may come from other 
regions and provinces. Overseas Chinese and foreign capital 
can also be used. In actual practice, the following three 
forms are most commonly used by town and township 
enterprises. First, compensation trade: machinery, 
equipment, production technology and so forth are bought on 
credit. Loans are repaid with products or other commodities 
after the start of production. Second, rural enterprises 
provide the natural resources, plant sites, labour, and so 
forth; and funds, technology, equipment, and so forth are 
provided by investors from other places. Third, various 
credit organizations, such as fundraising companies, and 
credit forms, such as bond issues, selling on credit, 
commercial notes, commission shops, leases, etc., have 
appeared among the peasants in rural areas. Examples include 
some counties that have established specialized organs to 
raise capital in rural areas, convened various types of 
conferences, organized mobilizations, assigned capital 
raising tasks according to villages and set time limits for 
their completion. 
Fundraising for rural enterprises in rural areas has 
alleviated the shortage of funds. However, in some places 
local governments use administrative measures to force 
farmers to raise funds for rural enterprises. As a result, 
there have been negative outcomes. First, this has caused 
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blind action in township and village enterprises 
construction projects and resulted in half-completed 
projects. Many enterprises fail to make plans when they get 
underway and go into operation as soon as they raise a 
little capital. They place their hopes for a solution to 
their capital needs on the flexibility of bank credit and 
financial investments. Second, because capital collection is 
assisted by administrative measures, whoever you are poor or 
rich, you have to participate grudgingly in raising 
capital. Thus, some of the peasants are not happy with this 
way. 
6.5 Conclusion 
Since 1978, China has used diversification as the 
strategic principle to develop its agricultural economy. 
Rural enterprises were considered as an important component 
of a diversified economy, and an important source of state 
revenue. The government has provided more favourable tax and 
financial treatment for rural enterprises. As a result, 
financial and tax policies have provided more favourable 
financial condition for the development of rural 
enterprises. 
However, tax rates for rural enterprises have gradually 
increased. China's taxation system has still favoured 
collectively owned rural enterprises over private rural 
enterprises. In particular, credit supply fluctuated greatly 
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during 1980s. As a result, this has greatly affected the 
development of rural enterprises. In particular, during late 
1988 to 1991, a retrenchment policy has been implemented, 
the government has reduced loans for rural enterprises, and 
stopped granting loans to small textile mills, woollen 
mills, oil refineries, aluminium works, cigarette factories 
and distilleries. 42 Tightening financial policy has produced 
serious financial difficulty for rural enterprises. 
Therefore, fundraising by rural enterprises has become 
an alternative option. The experience during late 1988 to 
1991 has shown that rural enterprises will still survive in 
situation of financial difficulty. Nan Bei43 indicated that: 
"the rising tide of fundraising enables us to state one 
thing without doubt: rural enterprises born amidst the 
market mechanism have learned to depend on themselves to 
survive difficulties and crises. " Thus, although the 
government financial policy will affect the extent of the 
development of rural enterprises, rural enterprises have an 
ability to survive and overcome the shortage of funds. With 
the reform of the financial system, rural enterprises will 
have more opportunities to obtain funds by different 
methods. 
Moreover, although one third of industrial output 
value come from rural enterprises in 1991, state industrial 
loans towards rural enterprises accounted for only 2.5 
44 
percent of total state industrial loans. Ironically, 
nearly two thirds of state enterprises are sti running at 
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a loss. Recently, statements in favour of further promotion 
of rural enterprises are by far exceeding critical 
statements. Moreover, local governments have put great 
pressure on central government to relax credit towards rural 
enterprises. As a result, state loans towards rural 
enterprises are expected to increase again. 
However, since rural enterprises are developing very 
rapidly, rural enterprises will demand huge funds. 
Therefore, it is necessary to improve the use of loans in 
rural enterprises, and rural enterprises should take various 
measures to solve the shortage of funds. The banks should 
protect or restrain the growth of various categories of 
enterprises through readjustment of the credit structure. 
The enterprises which are efficient and have a rapid 
turnover of funds should be actively supported by the bank. 
The enterprises which are inefficient and have a slow 
turnover of funds and poor sales of their products should be 
cut back or have financial support terminated Rural 
enterprises could develop more joint-household enterprises 
by taking advantage of the funds collected by the multitude 
of peasant households and opening rural financial markets, 
so that idle social capital can be reasonably developed and 
used. 
Since 1978, China has adopted some policies to improve 
management in rural enterprises. In the next chapter, I will 
discuss how these government policies influence management 
in rural enterprises. 
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Chapter 7 Government Policies to Improve management in 
Rural Enterprises 
In Chapter Six, I have discussed government financial 
and taxation policies for rural enterprises. In this 
chapter, I will examine the effects of government policy on 
the management of rural enterprises. It is not a secret that 
many problems in the management of rural enterprises not 
only exist but are very serious. In general, management 
skills in rural enterprises are rather low. Very few of the 
management cadres now working in the enterprises have an 
upper middle school education. ' Every year many rural 
enterprises drop out of market competition and go bankrupt 
or close, and although there are many reasons for this, one 
of the main reasons is poor management. Therefore, the 
management of rural enterprises is an important issue. 
However, the issue of management is a very broad one. In 
this chapter, I will mainly concentrate on analyzing local 
government's role in the management of rural enterprises and 
the way in which some government policies influenced the 
management of rural enterprises. In doing so, first, I will 
examine the administrative management exercised by township 
and village governments. Secondly, I will deal with some 
government policies towards income distribution in rural 
enterprises. Thirdly, I will analyze the government policy 
of promoting the quality of production in rural enterprises. 
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Fina ly, I will draw some conclusions and make some 
suggestions for the improvement of management in rural 
enterprises. The research on this issue by Byrd and Gelb is 
a distinguished and pathfinding work, and as such provides 
the framework for analysis in this chapter. 
7.1 Administrative Management Systems of Rural 
Enterprises 
The owners of state enterprises belong to all the 
people. The owners of rural enterprise can be divided into 
two general categories: town and village governments, and 
private entrepreneurs. In the state-run enterprises the 
responsibility for the profits of the assets as well as for 
risks for the investment of the enterprises is unclear. The 
loss in state enterprises is often ultimately shifted to the 
whole of society. However, rural enterprises bear more clear 
responsibility for the profits of their assets and for the 
risks involved. The profits and risks of the assets of 
rural enterprises, especially the investment risks, have to 
be borne by the members of the villages, townships or 
individuals. 
Since the ownership structures in rural enterprises 
are different, their administrative management structures 
also take on different forms. For example, the assets in 
private rural enterprises belong to private entrepreneurs, 
accordingly township and village governments have only 
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indirect control over their management structure. I will 
analyze this structure later. By contrast, in traditional 
collective rural enterprises, township and village 
governments share in both rights of ownership and 
administrative management. Fiscal revenues of township and 
village come largely from rural enterprises in the form of 
profit remittances and management fees. The profit handed 
over by township enterprises in the sample counties 
constituted more than 38 percent of township government 
revenues, while remittances by township enterprises 
accounted for 43.6 percent of township revenues and tax 
payments by enterprises under other forms of township for 
14,3 percent. 2 Therefore, the income from rural enterprises 
is a very important source of fiscal revenue of township and 
village government. 
In addition, township and village leaders have personal 
financial incentives to develop rural enterprises. William 
A. Byrd and Alan Gelb's research3 has demonstrated that 
personal benefits for township and village leaders are 
associated with rural enterprise development. First, 
Community leaders, pay varied significantly with the degree 
of TVP (township, village, private enterprises) development 
in the community, and this variation was greater for 
villages and production teams than for townships and towns. 
4 
Secondly, in the more developed areas of rural enterprises 
more funds were available for consumption of community 
government or enterprise resources from cigarettes to 
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banquets to housing construction. 5 Thus, undoubtedly these 
personal benefits are another incentive for township and 
village leaders to promote the development of rural 
enterprises. Thirdly, as I have demonstrated in Chapter 
Three, there was a variation of personal financial 
incentives. 
Therefore, the development of rural enterprises, 
especially collective rural enterprises, is very important 
for the fiscal incomes of township and village governments 
as well as for the personal incomes and rewards and career 
prospects of village and township government leaders. 
William A. Byrd and Alan Gelb pointed out that "De spite the 
variation in personal incentives for community government 
leaders among regions and localities and among community 
levels, it is clear that everywhere and under almost any 
circumstance community government leaders have strong 
incentives to develop the TVP sector (township, village, and 
private enterprise).,, 6 
Township and village governments have actively aided 
and supported township enterprises in finance, marketing and 
technology. Of the township governments surveyed7,73.0 
percent have helped enterprises resolve problems with 
finances, 49.2 percent have opened a variety of marketing 
channels for enterprises, and 58.7 percent have provided 
firms with technological consulting and training. Township 
and village government-run enterprises were the major 
beneficiaries of this assistance. Song Lina and Du He8 have 
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shown that some preferential treatment has been given to 
rural enterprises by township governments. For example, in 
some cases township governments have been able to secure for 
their enterprises some materials that were in short supply. 
Moreover, the initial capital of rural enterprise largely 
came from state loans. With the help of local governments, 
rural enterprises could obtain preferential treatments from 
banks, industrial and commercial administrative bureaus, and 
tax and supply departments. Furthermore, local government 
could help rural enterprise to raise some funds from 
society in general in order to overcome the shortage of 
funds in rural enterprises. 
However, township and village governments exercised 
tight control over rural enterprises, especially township 
run enterprises and village run enterprises. For example, 
village and township governments took part in decisions for 
the selection of township enterprise managers. 9 Township and 
village government have been also directly involved in 
township enterprises management such as investment, 
planning, wage levels. 
10 This enabled local government in 
some areas, in particular in backward areas, to extract 
excessive profits from rural enterprises, and it became 
clear that some rural enterprises, especially some township 
owned enterprises, had very low rates of efficiency. As a 
result, the Chinese government took measures to improve the 
situation. The main reform took place in traditional 
collective rural enterprises which were under the direct 
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administrative control of township or village authorities. 
The main reform aim was to separate government and 
enterprises and to reduce interference from township and 
village governments and thereby to increase the efficiency 
of the enterprises. Reforms however were based on no 
fundamental change in the status of collective ownership. 
The main reform measure was to implement the system of 
contractual responsibility. 
Under this contractual responsibility system, all 
enterprises were contracted to managers, directors, 
workshops, production groups or to the entire staff. The 
contractor had management and utilization rights over the 
property of the enterprise. In other words, the contractor 
had decision-making rights over the manpower, finance and 
materials of the enterprise as well as over its production, 
marketing and sales. The contractor was still only the 
manager of the enterprise, not its owner; contracted 
responsibility did not entail a transfer of ownership. 
All contracts specified an output quota in physical 
terms on the basis of the record of past production. The use 
of some material inputs was fixed in terms of the quantity 
that could be absorbed in production. Finally the gross 
income was specified and a profit target was fixed. The 
contractual obligations were reinforced by the bonus system 
by which success was rewarded. Part of the after-tax profits 
were used to pay bonuses to the workers and staff members, 
and failure was punished through financial penalties, 
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providing a strong incentive to fulfill contracts. This 
system of contracted responsibility for management has been 
widely implemented among township and town enterprises. 
Through different sorts of contracts, the management of 
township and town enterprises was entrusted to a collective 
or an individual. 
Although management and business decisions have largely 
been left to enterprise directors as a result of the 
contract system, community governments were still intimately 
involved in important decisions such as investments, the 
establishment or dismantling of firms, significant changes 
in product lines, the appointment of enterprise management, 
managerial compensation, and bonuses. Community governments 
could also absorb risk for rural community enterprises and 
could also finance investments, both directly and through 
arranging other sources of funding such as bank loans. More 
generally, they still regard their collective enterprises as 
hostile administrative agents. Therefore, although 
traditional collective rural enterprises have gained more 
powers after implementing the contract system, township and 
village governments still deeply control township and 
village enterprises. 
The assets of private rural enterprises belong to 
private entrepreneurs. Thus, township and village 
governments have less control over private rural enterprises 
than over collective rural enterprises, though as a result 
private rural enterprises can obtain less preferential 
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treatment than collective rural enterprises. However, it is 
still vital for private rural enterprises to have close 
relations with local officials since private enterprises 
still face a discriminating environment as I have discussed 
in Chapter Two. 
Two surveys of private rural enterprises have revealed 
that there is a close relation between local officials and 
private entrepreneurs. In the first survey, " private 
entrepreneurs in the countryside were divided into the 
following types according to former occupation: (1) cadres, 
including the heads of Village Committees, secretaries of 
Village CCP Committees; (2) former supply and marketing 
staff in commune and brigade enterprises; (3) retired cadres 
or former workers or technicians and ordinary urban 
residents; (4) former specialized households; (5) ex- 
12 criminals 
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Table 7.1. The Enterprises and the Size of the Enterprises 
Types of 
Entrepreneurs All Samples (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Average Size 
of Enterprises 56.96 70.02 111.57 97.30 41.20 87.93 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Unit: Annual output value, 10,000 yuan 
Source: Liu Xiaojing, 'Siying qiye jiankang fazhan de ruogan 
wenti -- 18 xing(shi) 130 ge siying qiye shizheng 
fenxil (Some Issues in the Healthy Development of Private 
Enterprises: An Empirical Analysis of 130 Private 
Enterprises in 18 Provinces) Nongye Jingji Wenti (Problems 
of Agricultural Economy), No. 4,1988(Monthly), p. 41 
Table 7.1 shows that the enterprises operated by 
entrepreneurs of the second, third and fifth category were 
the largest, or considerably large among private rural 
enterprises. Enterprises operated by the 'cadre' 
entrepreneurs type were not as large, but still ranked 
above the average size. The size of the enterprises operated 
by ordinary farmers operated was below average. This is due 
to the fact that most ordinary farmers lacked good 
'guanxi'13, specialized skills and experiences, and certain 
other advantages which other 
enjoyed. The other surveY14 
types of entrepreneurs 
also showed that most 
entrepreneurs of private rural enterprises had special 
experiences. Before starting their enterprises, 10.3 percent 
had worked in state enterprises, undertakings or departments 
of government, 11.3 percent had been servicemen, 7.2 percent 
had been teachers, 18.6 percent had served as supply and 
marketing staff or as managers in township and village 
enterprises, and 17.5 percent had been village cadres. 
These findings show that there is a close relation between 
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local cadres and private entrepreneurs. As a result, private 
enterprises, like all other enterprises, are also subject to 
considerable township and village governments influence. For 
example, all private rural enterprises need permission from 
the community government in order to acquire land, buildings 
and bank loans. Close personal relationships with community 
government officials are thus necessary for private 
enterprises, if they are to flourish. 
Therefore, township and village governments are equally 
important for both private and collective rural enterprises. 
William A. Byrd and Alan Gelb have indicated that "without 
the deep involvement of community governments, China's TVP 
sector could not have grown nearly as rapidly as it did in 
the late 1970s and early 1980S. 1115 Alan Gelb and Jan 
Svejnarl6 argued that rural industrialization efforts have 
failed in Tanzania because local governments had no fiscal 
or other incentives to ensure their efficiency. As I have 
discussed in Chapter Six, after 1989 when China implemented 
a tightening policy towards rural enterprises, local 
government has played a very important role in protecting 
the development of rural enterprise. Township and village 
governments still have dual rights of ownership and 
management in the traditional collective rural enterprises. 
In the present situation, where the market is not fully 
operatational in China's economy, state enterprises still 
dominate China's national economy. The protection of rural 
enterprises by local government is still essential in the 
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foreseeable future. However, the problem remains of how to 
prevent excessive levies on rural enterprises imposed by 
township and village governments. I will discuss this issue 
later. 
7.2 Some Government Measures to Improve the Income 
Distribution of Rural Enterprise 
In this section, I will analyze the reform of wage 
systems within rural enterprises and the role of township 
and village government in determining wages in rural 
enterprises. Then I will examine what kinds of problems of 
profit distribution exist in rural enterprises and the 
impact upon profit distribution of government policy and 
provide some suggestions for future improvement. 
7.2.1 
Enterprises 
The Reform of the Wage System in Rural 
The older method of payment was a work points and 
bonus system. Workers, incomes related to the average income 
levels of the teams from which the workers came. When the 
work point system which linked agricultural and industrial 
incomes was used, all workers were paid an equal wage for 
equal work. Enterprises calculated in work points, which 
were then converted to a money wage according to the 
workpoint value of their team. However, since their income 
230 
did not relate to their individual performance, workers in 
rural enterprises did not have much incentive to work hard. 
Since 1978, the payment system for labour in rural 
enterprises has been changed. Since the ownership systems of 
rural enterprises are different, and their profitability 
varies tremendously, and their means of production range 
from the advanced to the backward, different rural 
enterprises have adopted different wage systems in the light 
of their practical circumstances. The essence of wage system 
reform in rural enterprises was to find a system that would 
mobilize worker initiative in production, improve labour 
productivity, and facilitate production development. Wage 
systems in rural enterprises can basically be divided into 
the following five wage forms17: 
The first wage system is the piece rate wage system. 
Under this system, a worker's wage is calculated in 
accordance with the number of products he makes which meet 
the required standards together with the unit rate for each 
product. The system may be subdivided into three forms -- 
the limited piece rate wage system, the mixed piece rate 
wage system and the graduated piece rate wage system: (a) 
under the unlimited piece rate wage system, a worker is paid 
for all his output, whether it falls within the quota or 
exceeds it, based on the unit rate for the product 
concerned; (b) under the mixed piece rate wage system, the 
worker is paid for fulfilling his quota in accordance with 
the amount of time he spends on it. For any output above the 
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quota, he is paid in accordance with the unit rate for 
output; and (c) under the graduated piece rate wage system, 
a worker is compensated for fulfilling his quota in 
accordance with a fixed unit rate for each unit of output. 
In addition, he is compensated for output above his quota in 
accordance with an ascending piece rate scale. 
The second wage form is the time wage system. A 
worker is paid for the amount of time he works. The time 
wage system is subdivided into the hourly wage system, the 
daily wage system, and the monthly wage system. The time 
wage system is usually used in conjunction with an incentive 
system. 
The third wage form is the contracting income (wage) 
system, used by the enterprises that adopt individual 
contracting. The contractor pays taxes in accordance with 
the contract, and defrays other expenses. The remainder is 
divided equitably among the workers in accordance with the 
amount of their labour, responsibilities, and contributions. 
The fourth wage form is the profit-sharing system. A 
worker is paid a basic wage as compensation for fulfilling 
his quota. For his output beyond the quota, he is paid a 
fixed percentage of the enterprise's profit or earnings. In 
some enterprises, profits are distributed in accordance with 
the results of workers' labor, their attitudes toward work, 
and their level of technical expertise. 
The fifth wage form is the floating wage system. Under 
this system, an enterprise adopts the existing standard wage 
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(plus bonus) as a basis and sets aside a certain percentage 
to be determined in accordance with the workers' work 
attitude, the magnitude of their contributions, and the 
balance sheets of the enterprise. A floating wage system can 
be applied in part or in whole. 
These different wage forms have various advantages and 
disadvantages. The advantage of the piece rate wage system 
is that since it directly relates the output of a worker 
with his wage, it corrects an egalitarian bias in the 
calculation of wages, and improves labour efficiency. This 
wage system is more acceptable to workers because its 
quantitative and qualitative demands are more concrete and 
the system is relatively simple to administer. Its 
disadvantage is that in their eagerness to exceed their 
quotas and make more money, some workers pursue volume and 
ignore quality. Hence there is a need to strengthen quality 
control. 
The advantage of the time wage system is that it 
guarantees a basic wage for workers. Under this system, all 
that is required is to determine a wage scale in accordance 
with the workers' technical standard and physical strength. 
However, the disadvantage is that under a time wage system, 
some people may do or contribute less than their 
capability. 
Under the contracting income system, a worker's wage is 
calculated in accordance with net income. When the final 
accounts are settled at the year end, the greater the 
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enterprise's net earnings, the higher the workers' wages. 
Conversely, the smaller the enterprise's net earnings, the 
lower the workers, wages. Thus, labour, output, and 
compensation are integrated. Under this system, managers and 
workers all concern themselves with production, the trend of 
investment, and economic benefits. 
The profit sharing system is more suitable for such 
industries as commerce, service, and repair. A worker is 
paid a basic wage each month after fulfilling his quota. 
This system encourages workers to give better services to 
customers. 
The floating wage system is for strong enterprises. It 
works best in an enterprise where sound labour quota 
management and evaluation systems and a full production 
schedule exist and where production, supply, and marketing 
are relatively normal. Otherwise, it will be difficult to 
enforce. 
Within any particular enterprise, it is common for one 
major wage system to be used in combination with and 
supplemented by others. Generally speaking, rural 
enterprises have shifted to the direct payment of workers, 
and performance based pay. This has provided an incentive 
for work and has improved efficiency in rural enterprises. 
China's rural enterprises generally face a more complete 
market environment than do state enterprises. Therefore, 
local labour supply and demand have a stronger influence on 
their wages. Alan Gelb18 found that TVP (township 
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enterprises, village enterprises and private enterprises) 
are directly linked to the enterprises, economic returns. 
However, township and village governments have varying 
degrees of control over rural enterprises, especially 
township-run and village-run enterprises. "Even if two 
communities have similar labour markets, their governments 
may exercise different forms of noneconomic control over TVP 
employees' incomes. 1119 A study of Wuxi, Nanhai, and 
iieshou 20 indicated that alternative opportunities play a 
great role in determining wage levels in different 
localities with similar levels of economic development. When 
township enterprises have absolute superiority, and 
competition from private enterprises is weak, the township 
government is likely to exercise stricter control over 
employment and wage of township enterprise workers. If there 
is fierce competition from private enterprises, township 
governments have relaxed their noneconomic control over 
wages in township enterprises. For example, in Wuxi, where 
most rural enterprises are township and village run 
enterprises, wages have been to a large extent under the 
control of community governments. 
21 However, in Nanhai and 
Jieshou where private rural enterprises accounted for a 
large proportion of rural enterprises, community governments 
have not played an important role in income distribution, 
and wages of workers and managers in rural enterprises have 
a strong linkage with profits or output. 
22 
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Because there has been no unified national system 
governing income distribution in township and town 
enterprises, the level of wages in rural enterprises has 
varied considerably. on average, however, the average wage 
level in rural enterprises generally was higher than that in 
agriculture. Although persons engaged in agriculture have 
greater opportunities to supplement their income from 
private sideline occupations, even so it was clear that in 
general rural enterprises paid their workers more than could 
be earned by farmers. 23 Within rural enterprises, wages of 
sales staff, technicians and directors were higher than 
those of workers. The sample from Wuxi and Jieshou revealed 
these income disparities within rural enterprises. The 
ratios of average monthly wages, with workers as 1.00, were 
1.74 for sales staff, 1.91 for technicians, and 2.07 for 
directors in Wuxi. In Jieshou the figures are 1.40 for sale 
staff, 1.96 for technicians and 1.47 for directors. 
24 
The structure of incomes in China in rural enterprises 
mainly arises out of wages. However, during 1980s some forms 
of income that were not work-related, such as interest on 
capital, have produced differential benefits. These forms 
of income mainly existed in rural private enterprises, and 
have resulted in a widening of income differential within 
rural enterprises, especially in private rural enterprises. 
No exact statistics are available for the differential 
of income within the rural private sector, but it is known 
that some entrepreneurs have become millionaires (Reruninbi). 
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The income earned by employers and employees in private 
enterprises also appears to differ widely. Moreover an 
investigation by Beijing's local government in 1987 revealed 
that the average monthly salary of employers was 14 times 
that of employees. The former was 1,600 yuan while the 
latter was 112 yuan. In HeilongJ lang the ratio of average 
employer's income to average employee's income is 32 to 1, 
in Shanghai 40 to 1, and in Xian 59 to 1.25 In general, 
therefore, China's entrepreneurs in private rural 
enterprises sector earned much more than employees 
collective rural enterprises; some are now among the 
wealthiest in China. 
In sum, since 1978, the wage systems in rural 
enterprises have been changed to give workers a much greater 
incentive to work. Since rural enterprises face a more 
complete market environment, the forces of local labor 
supply and demand have a much stronger influence on their 
wages. However, township and village governments still 
retain a varying degree of control over the income 
distribution of rural enterprises. The degree of control 
over wages from township and village governments depends on 
whether there is strong competition from private 
enterprises. In general rural enterprises paid their workers 
more than could be earned by farmers. Wages of sales staff, 
technicians and directors were higher than those of workers. 
Income differentials in private rural enterprises were much 
higher than in collective rural enterprises. Private 
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entrepreneurs earned much more than employees of private 
and collective rural enterprises. 
7.2.2 The Reform of Profit Distribution in Rural 
Enterprises 
Many problems in profit distribution in rural 
enterprises exist, and some of these problems are very 
serious. The main problems are as follows: the extraction by 
local governments of a large percentage of profit, 
collecting excessive charges, apportioning numerous 
expenses, and allowing township and town enterprises to 
retain little profit. The phenomenon of the "three many and 
three fews" has appeared in jointly run peasant enterprises: 
much distribution to the individual, much profit sharing 
among shareholders, and high incomes for many shareholders; 
little profit retained by the enterprise, little profit 
sharing for workers, and little income for hired workers. 26 
An investigation of 97 rural enterprises27 showed that in 
the first half of 1986, the enterprises paid a total of 
1.047 million yuan in various charges and apportionments, 
which accounted for 23 percent of their sales profits. 
Moreover, these enterprises paid a total of 0.325 million 
yuan in unlawful charges, accounting for 7.1 percent of 
their sales profit. 
28 
The shortage of local government funds is the main 
reason for local government exacting a large percentage of 
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profit and collecting excessive charges. Since 1978, there 
has been an increase in local government's expenditures on 
rural education, health, family planning, subsidies for 
military recruitment and militia training, and subsidies for 
households with difficulties, old-age homes, and other 
social welfare activities. This high level of social 
expenditure has led to encroachments on a large portion of 
rural enterprises profits. 
William A. Byrd and Alan Gelb29 found that the problem 
of fiscal predation was more serious in backward areas than 
in well-endowed areas. The reasons are as follows. First, in 
better-off areas there was a strong base of existing 
community enterprises, and so most community governments 
were in a relatively comfortable financial situation. 
Secondly, these areas had more personal incomes and bank 
deposits which could be used for loans to rural enterprises. 
As a result, more funds were available for reinvestment to 
develop rural enterprises. By contrast, in backward areas 
the development of rural enterprises was much more limited. 
The difficult financial situation of community governments 
made them draw funds from community enterprises for public 
expenditures regardless of the enterprises/ profitability 
and ability to pay. Even when firms were losing money, they 
still had to make payments to community governments in order 
to meet urgent and largely fixed public expenditure needs. 
Due to the lack of unified standards for profit 
retention and distribution, practice differed widely from 
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place to place. For example, the Beij ing Municipal Region 
has stipulated that township and town enterprises profits 
were distributed according to a 114: 3: 3" ratio. The 
enterprise retained 40 percent, handed in 30 percent to 
township government (or village government) to be used 
primarily for the support of agriculture, and delivered the 
remaining 30 percent to the township or village economic 
organizations (enterprise companies) to be used to expand 
production or build new enterprises. 30 In Simen Town, Yutao 
City, Zhejiang Province, a regulation was adopted using a 
"double 3-711 ratio in the distribution of after-tax township 
and town profit, in which 70 percent of after-tax profits 
was retained by the enterprises for use in expanded 
reproduction and 30 percent was given over to the town 
industrial bureau. Of the profit handed in, 70 percent was 
retained by the bureau to use in supporting the renovation 
of older enterprises and the building of new township and 
town enterprises, while 30 percent was given to the town 
government to use in the construction of small market towns 
and other expenditures of a social nature. 
31 
Pertaining to the problem of township enterprises, 
heavy social burden, low profit retentions, and other 
problems, the State Economic Commission's agriculture, 
animal husbandry, and fishery departments have jointly 
issued a circular entitled "Several Suggestions on the 
Question of Township Enterprises' Profit Distributions.. 
32 
Enterprises should be allowed to retain a minimum of 60 
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percent of the net profits. Village and township leaders 
should respect the right of the enterprises to operate their 
businesses and utilize their funds autonomously. Enterprises 
should have the right to reject equalitarianism and 
indiscriminate transfer of resources or unreasonable 
apportionment. However, the community's or the region's 
economic interests could undermine the authority of the 
central government and effectiveness of its functioning 
departments. Since most township and villages governments 
have the shortage of funds, the pressure on them to extract 
excessive funds from rural enterprises is immense. 
Some scholars have provided some good suggestions to 
prevent fiscal predation by township and village 
governments. William A. Byrd and Alan Gelb33 have suggested 
that the size of community government and the number of 
cadres should be reduced to correspond better with local 
community resources, and that some expenditures on 
activities such as primary education which are important to 
national objectives should be included in the state budget. 
These are indeed good suggestions. However, China's 
agricultural investment from central government is still 
limited, and this means that local governments require rural 
enterprises to turn over a large portion of funds from their 
profits for the development of agriculture. 
34 In addition, 
China's state budget itself requires the turning over of a 
large portion of funds from the profits of rural 
enterprises. Therefore, although China's central government 
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has formulated some measures to reduce financial burden of 
rural enterprises, some problems of profit distribution 
still remain in rural enterprises, and will exist in the 
foreseeable future. 
7.3 Government Policy towards Product Quality of Rural 
Enterprises 
The improvement of product quality is another important 
issue of management. In this section, I will discuss what 
kinds of problems of product quality in rural enterprises 
existed since 1978, and how government policy sought to deal 
wit t em. 
In general, technological level in rural enterprises 
is inferior. This is one of main reasons for its low level 
of product quality. According to an investigation in some 
township and town enterprises in Jiangsu and Shandong in 
198635, in many enterprises awareness of quality was quite 
poor. Emphasis was given to output and profits, not to 
quality. There were either no standards in product 
manufacturing or work was not done according to standards. 
Product quality was not stable. For example, of 16 products 
in Wuxi selected by the Bureau of Standards Jiangsu, only 7, 
or 44 percent, were up to standard. 
36 According to this 
analysis, the proportion of products up to standard 
throughout the province was estimated at approximately 50 
percent. In Yantai, Shandong 1,402 products from 990 
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enterprises were examined and 67.2 percent were found to be 
up to standard. Problems in product quality in some firms, 
particularly food enterprises, were even more serious. Of 
162 products in 140 enterprises throughout the province, 
only 45 percent were up to standard. 37 
Considerable numbers of enterprises lack even the 
most basic quality guarantees, and did not have the capacity 
to manufacture products that were up to standard. For 
example, in Jiangsu, over 50 percent of industrial products 
in township and town enterprises were substandard. Most 
enterprises were "imperfect in four areas", that is, in 
blueprints, standards, technology, and structure, so it was 
very difficult to guarantee quality. In Shandong 2,078 
enterprises were investigated. Of these, 361, or 17.4 
percent, lacked blueprints and technology; 252, or 12.1 
percent, lacked an inspection system; and 503, or 24.7 
percent, had unsound examination and measuring methods. 38 
A few enterprises used inferior material and did 
shoddy work, manufactured goods in a rough and slipshod way 
and even palmed off inferior goods as brand name products. 
For example, in Yantai, in 1985,870 bicycles, 725 cartons 
of cigarettes, and 46,000 bottles of alcohol and beverages, 
were found, all with fake name brands came from other parts 
of the country. 
39 Circumstances such as these have been 
discovered in quality inspections throughout the country. 
In addition, below the village level (including 
cooperative enterprise, joint households and individual 
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enterprises) there was basically no one in charge of product 
quality. 40 
Thus, the problem of product quality in rural 
enterprises was quite serious. In response to the problems, 
the State Economic Commission, Ministry of Agriculture, 
Animal Husbandry, and Fishery and the State Industry and 
Commerce Administration formulated "Opinions on 
Strengthening Product Quality Management Work in Township 
and Town. " 
"All township and town enterprises must do more to 
correct their administrative ideology, adhere 
earnestly to the principle of quality is number 
one' and strive to improve management and 
administration, raise economic results, and be 
concerned with preventing pollution of the 
environment.,, 41 
"The opinions" called for township and town enterprises 
administrative departments to establish quality management 
organs to work in conjunction with industrial management 
departments and industrial and commercial administration 
organs and thereby to strength management and supervision 
over product quality. 
"The opinion" suggested focusing on industrial 
enterprises at the township (town) level and key village-run 
industrial enterprises. The main concern for industrial 
enterprises below the village level was to strengthen 
quality supervision. 
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"The opinion" also called for township and town 
enterprises to organize production according to technical 
standards and technical norms and on the basis of the 
principle of "five things not permitted,, 
42 and "three things 
are not permitted,,. 43 
This account show that China's central government has 
been aware of the importance of product quality, and has 
taken some steps to improve product quality in rural 
enterprises. Information published in 199044 has disclosed 
that the quality of China's rural enterprises has improved. 
The proportion of superior-quality products produced by 
rural enterprises has risen. Some products have even earned 
a good reputation in the international market. The amount of 
high quality products produced and the amount of high-level 
equipment owned by rural enterprises is increasing steadily, 
in particular in the fields of electronics, light industry, 
textiles, and building materials. 45 Thus, it seems that 
government policy has had some effects in promoting product 
quality in rural enterprises. 
In summary, although the quality of goods produced in 
rural enterprises is still low. China's central government 
has implemented a policy of improving product quality in 
rural enterprises, and this policy has played a positive 
role in promoting the product quality of rural enterprises. 
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7.4 Conclusion 
Since 1978, fiscal revenues of township and village 
governments largely depended on the incomes from rural 
enterprises. In addition, there was a very close interest 
relation between township and village government leaders 
and the development of rural enterprises. Furthermore, the 
development of rural enterprises has played a very important 
role in increasing the incomes of rural community members 
and solving the problem of rural surplus labour. Thus, 
township and village governments actively defended the 
interests of rural enterprises and promoted the development 
of rural enterprises. In China, rural enterprises are lower 
in status than state-run enterprises, and as a result, they 
obtain less preferential treatments from central government. 
Under this situation, it is essential for rural enterprises 
to obtain some protection for township and village 
governments, though it is true that "for quite a long time 
it will be necessary for township governments to directly 
control some enterprises and to realize community goals 
through concerted efforts with enterprises.,, 
46 
Since 1978 different wage forms have been used in 
rural enterprises. The reform of the wage systems in rural 
enterprises has given workers a greater incentive to work. 
This has promoted the efficiency of rural enterprises. Since 
rural enterprises have faced a more complete market 
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environment, local forces of labour supply and demand have 
had a stronger influence on their wages. Unlike China's 
state enterprises, rural enterprises were directly linked to 
the enterprises' economic returns. However, township and 
village governments have varying degrees of control over 
rural enterprises. Rural enterprises paid their workers 
more than could be earned by farmers. Wages of sales staff, 
technicians and directors, especially private entrepreneurs 
were higher than workers. These income differentials will be 
widened since private rural enterprises develop at a faster 
rate and private rural enterprises have less control over 
wage differential from township and village governments. 
The shortage of fiscal income and local government 
funds for welfare work and agricultural funds has led to 
the problem of local government exacting a large percentage 
of profit, collecting excessive charges. Although China's 
central government has implemented a policy of reducing the 
financial burden of rural enterprises, some problems of 
profit distribution have still remained. In order to reduce 
the financial burden on rural enterprises, further measures 
such as the increase of agricultural investment and state 
budget for primary education from central government and the 
reduction of the number of leaders in township and village 
governments will be useful. 
Product quality in rural enterprises is still low. 
China's central government has implemented a policy to 
improve product quality in rural enterprises since 1978. 
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T is policy has played a positive role in promoting product 
quality in rural enterprises. It may be necessary to 
establish special offices to employ professional personnel 
to implement strict control of product quality and to give 
positive support for the improvement of product quality in 
rural enterprises. The current technological level in rural 
enterprises is however still inferior. In order to further 
improve product quality of rural enterprises, it is 
necessary to promote the level of technology in rural 
enterprises. Since 1978, China's government has adopted 
some measures to promote technology in rural enterprises. In 
the next chapter, I will examine how these policies have 
influenced technological progress in rural enterprises. 
248 
1. Liu Qiuhuang and Xie Leru, Caijing Kexue (science of 
Finance and Economics), Chengdu, No 6,1985, pp. 18-24. 
2. Song Lina and Du He, "The Role of Township Governments 
in Rural Industrial i zat ions,,, in edited by William A. Byrd 
and Lin Qingsong, China -s Rural Indu s try --S tru ct ure, 
Development, and Reform, Oxford University Press, pp. 342- 
357. 
3. William A. Byrd and Alan Gelb, "Why Industrialize? The 
Incentive for Rural Community Governments, " in edited by 
William A. Byrd and Lin Qingsong, China's Rural Industry-- 
Structure, Development, and Reform, Oxford University Press, 
pp. 342-357. 
4. ibid. 
5. ibid. 
6. ibid. 
7. Du Haiyan, "Analysis of China's Town and Township 
Enterprise Administrative System, " Zhongguo Nongcun 
iingji(China Rural Economy), No. 6,21 Jun 88, pp. 21-32. 
8. Song Lina and Du He, op. cit., pp. 342-357. 
9. ibid. 
10. ibid. 
11. Liu Xiaojing, "Siying qiye jiankang fazhan de ruogan 
wenti 18 xing(shi) 130 ge siying qiye shizheng 
fenxi'(Some Issues in the Healthy Development of Private 
Enterprises: An Empirical Analysis of 130 Private 
Enterprises in 18 Provinces), " Nongye Jingji Wenti(Problems 
of Agricultural Economy), No. 4,1988(Monthly), pp. 38-42 
12. Ex-criminals are a special category of the entrepreneurs 
who have been in jail. Some of them are innocent people or 
victims of Chinese political struggles. Liu Xiaojing, op. 
cit., p. 40. 
13. Iguanxil signifies functional and social linkages in 
economics and politics. 
14. "Dui baijia nongcun siying qiye diaocha de chubu 
fenxi(An Initial Analysis of the Survey of 100 Private rural 
enterprises) , 11 Nongye Jingji Wenti 
(Problems of Agricultural 
Economy), No. 2,1989 (Monthly), pp. 18-23. 
15. William A. Byrd and Alan Gelb, op. cit. 
16. Alan Gelb and Jan Svejnar, "Chinese TVPs in an 
International Perspective, " in edited by William A. Byrd and 
Lin Qingsong, China's Rural Industry--Structure, 
Development, and Reform, Oxford University Press, pp. 342- 
357. 
17. Bao Weihuo, "Variety of Wage System for Diverse Small- 
scale Enterprises, " Noncun Caiwu Kuaiji(Rural Financial 
Accounting), No. 7,6 July, 1986, pp 26-28. 
18. Alan Gelb, 11TVP Workers' Incomes, Incentives, and 
Attitudes, " in edited by William A. Byrd and Lin Qingsong, 
China's Rural Industry- -Structure, Development, and Reform, 
Oxford University Press, pp. 280-298. 
19. Wu Quhui, Wang Hansheng, and Xu Xinxin, "Noneconomic 
Determinants of Workers' Incomes, " in edited by William 
A. Byrd and Lin Qingsong, China's Rural Industry- -Structure, 
249 
Development, and Reform, Oxford University Press, pp. 323- 
337. 
20. ibid. 
21. ibid. 
22. ibid. 
23. There is a case which agricultural income caught up with 
and even surpassed those of rural enterprises workers partly 
because of strict administrative controls over wages. see, 
Meng Xin, "The Rural Labor Market, " in edited by William 
A. Byrd and Lin Qingsong, China's Rural Industry- -Structure, 
Development, and Reform, Oxford University Press, pp-299- 
322. 
24. Wu Quhui, Wang Hansheng, and Xu Xinxin, op. cit, p. 330. 
25. "The Development of Private Enterprises in Our Country 
and Initial Policy Measures, " Caijin Yangjiu(Finance & 
Economics Research), Shanghai, No. 10,1987, pp. 48-53, 
translated in Inside China Mainland, Vol. 10, No. 2, February 
1988, pp. 5-6. 
26. Bao Weihe, "Suggestions on Profit Distribution Reform of 
Township and Enterprises, " Nongye Kuaiji Yanjiu 
(Agricultural Accounting Research), No. 2,86, pp. 20-22. 
27. The investigation were from 97 collective enterprises(73 
town and township enterprises and 24 village-run 
enterprises) in the 10 townships (towns) and 10 villages 
under the jurisdiction of Handan City. See, "Serious 
Problems of Small Retained Profits and Inadequate Reserve 
Strength in Enterprises--Investigation on Profit 
Distribution in Town and Township Enterprises, " Nongmin 
Ribao(Peasant Daily), 13 Nov 86, p. 2. 
28. ibid. 
29. William A. Byrd and Alan Gelb, op. cit. 
30. Bao Weihe, op. cit. 
31. ibid. 
32. Nongmin Ribao(Peasant Daily), 22 Dec 86, p. l. 
33. William A. Byrd and Alan Gelb, op. cit. 
34. Zhang Xiaoli and Liu Yaguang, "Industrial Subsidy of 
Agriculture is the Strategic Measure to Stabilize 
Agriculture, " Sichuan Ribao, 15 Sep 86, p. 2. 
35. "Shift Focus of Work to Product Quality; Report on 
Product-Quality Inspection in Jiangsu and Shandong Township 
and Town Enterprises, " Zhongguo Xiangzhen Qiye Bao(Chinese 
Township and Town Enterprises), 15 Jan 86 p. 3, JARS-CEA-86- 
040,11 April. 
36. ibid. 
37. ibid. 
38. ibid. 
39. ibid. 
40. ibid. 
41. "Opinions on Strengthening Product Quality Management 
Work in Township and Town Industries, " Zhongguo Xiangzhen 
Qiye Bao(Chinese Township and Town Daily), 12 Mar 86, P. 3 
42. "five things not permitted" : (1) substandard products 
should not leave the factory nor be included in output or 
value of output; (2) substandard raw materials and parts 
250 
cannot be used or assembled; (3) products whose demise has 
been announced cannot be sold; (4) nothing can be produced 
if there are no product quality standards, quality- 
inspection organs or quality- inspection measures; (5) there 
can be no deception, switching substandard products for good 
ones, fake labeling or fraudulent brands. 
43. "three thing are not permitted": the first is not 
permitting substandard products to leave the factory, the 
second is not permitting the production and sale of products 
that have been eliminated, and the third is not permitting 
fraud. 
44. Wang Jian, "Assessment of the Development of China's 
Township Enterprises in 1990,11 Liaowang (outlook), Overseas 
Edition, No. 49,3 Dec 90, pp. 3-4. 
45. ibid. 
46. Song lina and Du He, op. cit. 
251 
Chapter 8 Government Policies to Promote TechnologY in 
Rural Enterprises 
In the former chapter, I have discussed government 
policies to promote management in rural enterprises. In this 
chapter, I will examine government policies to promote 
technological progress in rural enterprises since 1978. 
There is much published discussion on the economic aspects 
of technological change. However, there is considerable 
difference of opinion on several issues such as the causes 
and effects of technological change. For example, On the 
plus side, as a result of technological changes more and 
better durable consumer goods become available to most 
people, however, on the debit side, pessimists argue that 
while pessimists point out that automation can lead to 
unemployment and more or less enforced leisure on a large 
scale. However, the author has not found that any economist 
has denied the importance of technological change as a very 
important source of economic growth. Paul A. David's 
research on the American and British experience in the 
nineteenth century has indicated that a single, distinct 
technological innovation may lead to aggregate economic 
growth. ' Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky found that 
institutional changes as well as experience with new 
technologies stimulated Japan's social capability to import 
and eventually improve on advanced foreign production 
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2 methods. Despite political disruptions, China has also 
illustrated the important role of science and technology 
development on economic and social development. Tony Saich's 
research has demonstrated that "there is a clear recognition 
of the important role that science and technology plays in 
achieving economic and social objectives", and "the process 
of reform has led to the realization that much greater 
attention must be paid to the process of science and 
technology development itself. 113 
The concern in this paper is to examine one aspect of 
the impact of science and technology development on Chinese 
economic development--the impact on rural enterprises. In so 
doing, first I will analyze the level of technology in rural 
enterprises. Then I will analyze government technological 
strategy before and after 1978. Next I will examine the 
progress of technology in rural enterprises. Finally I will 
analyze the prospects for technological progress in rural 
enterprises. 
8.1 The Level of Technology in Rural Enterprises 
Technological level is defined as a general index of 
the scientific inputs and outputs of the enterprises. This 
index is examined in terms of material input of science and 
technology, the sophistication of machinery, number and 
quality of technological personnel, and stock of labour and 
capital of the enterprises. 
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In China's rural enterprises, old and new equipment 
exists side by side in most rural enterprises. The 
technological modernization process is more advanced in the 
coastal regions, but even in the coastal regions many 
rural enterprises still use old technology and equipment. 
Less than 20 percent of the equipment was made in the 1970s 
and 1980s; over 60 percent was made in the 1950s and 1960s; 
and about 20 percent is basically primitive hand-operated 
equipment. 4 The quality of workers and staff tends to be 
low. The capacity of these enterprises to develop new 
products on their own is also extremely limited. This means 
that they have to depend on technological assistance from 
outside to make the fullest use of technology. Lack of local 
technological capacity arises from the absence of any in- 
house research and design facilities. Assistance is sought 
by these enterprises from either large enterprises or from 
research institutes or universities. The proportion of 
technically trained personnel is only one-tenth that in 
state-run enterprises. The quality of 70-90 percent of all 
products is lower than the products of state-run 
enterprises. There tend to be more products of medium and 
inferior quality, more old-style products, and fewer new 
products. 5 
One surveY6 showed that in the sample enterprises, 
the equipment came from the following sources: 370-. was new 
equipment which was ordered from the factories; 290-. was 
bought f rom the market; 1396 was old equipment bought f rom 
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factories; 100-o was the equipment which had been retired from 
state-run factories; 9% was made by themselves; 2% was 
imported from overseas. 
Table 8.1 The Level of Technology in Sample Rural 
Enterprises 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Level of Techniques No. of Enterprises Percentage 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Before 1949 equipment 45 1 
50's equipment 1,363 31 
70's equipment 2,505 58 
80's equipment 438 10 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Source: 
Bi Guohua and Bao Yonghong, "An Analytical Report of the 
Questionnaire Data on Macro-Management of Township and Town 
Enterprises", Agricultural Economy, Liaoning, China, No. 3, 
1989, p. 4. 
The data in table 8.1 indicate that only 10% of these 
sample enterprises's equipment was made in 1980s. Most 
equipment in sample enterprises was out-of-date. 
Large and medium sized industrial enterprises have 
much higher technology than rural industrial enterprises. 
Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 indicate that technological 
personnel per 1000 workers and original value of fixed 
assets per worker engaged at the end of 1985 were much 
higher than those in rural industrial enterprises. As a 
result, large and medium sized industrial enterprises are 
more efficient than rural industrial enterprises as 
indicated by net value of output per worker in 1985 Appendix 
4. However, the level of technology in the different 
branches of Chinese rural industry is quite varied. The 
level of technology in light industry is more advanced than 
that in heavy industry. This can also be seen from Appendix 
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5, Appendix 6 and Appendix 7. However, during the 80s, the 
investment of fixed assets has increased significantly. The 
total investment of fixed assets in sample rural industrial 
enterprises from 1981 to 1985 accounted for 65.61 percent of 
total investment of fixed assets in sample rural industrial 
enterprises since 1949. In addition, the fairly high 
percentage of equipment value relating to years just 
preceding the 1985 survey date might also suggest 
considerable modernization of equipment in rural industrial 
enterprises. However, the much higher cost of recent 
acquisition would tend to exaggerate the extent to which 
production is carried on with modern equipment. 
Despite the considerable investment in new equipment 
since 1978, the low level of technology in rural enterprises 
is probably the main reason for the low quality of products. 
According to the investigation in 1986 in 110,000 
intermediate level rural enterprises, within 13,000 products 
221 products reached international advanced level, or only 
1.650-.. There were 916 backward products, accounting for 
6.8'-.. Most of products were ordinary products, accounting 
for 91.5%. 7 
According to research conducted in some township and 
town enterprises in Jiangsu and Shandong8, fair numbers of 
enterprises lack even the most basic quality guarantees, and 
do not have the capacity to manufacture products that are up 
to standard. For example, in Jiangsu, in 1986 over 50 
percent of industrial products in township and town 
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enterprises are substandard. Most enterprises were 
"imperfect in four areas", that is, in blueprints, 
standards, technology, and structure, so it is very 
difficult to guarantee quality. In Shandong 2,078 
enterprises were investigated. of these, 361, or 17.4 
percent, lacked blueprints and technology; 252, or 12.1 
percent, lacked an inspection system; and 503, or 24.7 
percent, had unsound examination and measuring methods. 9 
Thus, the problem of product quality in township and town 
enterprises is quite striking. 
In summary, in general, the level of technology in 
most rural enterprises is inferior. The low level of 
technology is one of the main reasons of the low quality of 
products. 
8.2 Government Technological Strategy for Rural 
Enterprises 
During 1955-57 China launched a large-scale agricultural 
cooperative movement. Commune and brigade enterprises, the 
predecessors of rural enterprises, began to emerge and 
develop on the basis of collective sideline production. 
During the Great Leap Forward, the choice of techniques 
strategy was an essential part of the "walking on two 
legs"10 approach, which entailed primary but temporary 
emphasis upon small-scale, labour-intensive methods of 
production within the framework of long-term priority for 
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large-scale and capital-intensive techniques-" The Great 
Leap Forward policy attempted rapid rural industrialization 
through mass mobilization and the use of primitive 
techniques. Because premature expansion of small plants led 
to waste and confusion, many commune and brigade enterprises 
were closed during the retrenchment of 1960-1962. But as 
agricultural conditions stabilized and the opportunity cost 
of small-scale industrial ventures declined, official policy 
began once again to encourage local industrial development. 
The volume of the resources devoted to commune and brigade 
enterprises has expanded steadily since 1963. Careful 
attention to pilot projects, cost reduction, and quality 
control has led to improved results. 12 
As research by Samuel P. S. Ho13 has indicated, rural 
industry differs from urban industry because it exists 
primarily to serve agriculture and local markets, consists 
mostly of small plants using primitive or intermediate 
technology, and depends on local resources. However, after 
1978 although China still demanded that rural enterprises 
support agriculture, rural enterprises have been considered 
as a policy of strategic significance in solving rural 
surplus labour and as an important source of the peasants, 
increased income. 14 Technological strategy places emphasis 
upon appropriate technologies. Although most rural 
enterprises are still small-scale and engage in labour- 
intensive methods of production, the State has not 
restricted rural enterprises wishing to become large-scale 
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and capital-intensive. An important official report clearly 
indicated this strategy. 
"Commune and brigade enterprises should not 
arbitrarily seek advanced equipment and technology 
without considering their actual conditions, nor 
should they be contended with their backwardness 
in technology and refuse to advance. They should 
adopt "suitable technologies" on the basis of 
their respective salient features. 1115 
The report suggested that the State should adopt a 
policy favourable to the replacement of very old equipment. 
The rate of depreciation on old fixed assets might be raised 
appropriately. With regard to the use of after-tax profits, 
the report suggested that priority should generally be given 
to technological transformation. 
In addition, the report encouraged cooperation in 
technology between state enterprises and rural enterprises, 
and between scientific research departments, colleges or 
institutions of higher training and rural enterprises. At 
the same time, the report offered some suggestions to 
improve the lack of technological personnel in rural 
enterprises. This will be analyzed below. 
Faced with the reality of a backward and generally 
inefficient domestic science and technology system, Chinese 
leaders have been engaged in an effort to re-structure their 
research sector and modernize indigenous science and 
IC technology capabilities since 1978. -LJ The March 1978 
259 
National Science Conference in Beijing was a milestone in 
the reform of science policy. Its main purpose was to 
announce publicly the government and party policy of 
encouragement and support of science and technology. A major 
speech by Deng Xiaoping reiterated the concept of science as 
a productive force and scientists as workers. However, the 
fundamental reform of the science and technology management 
system was made by the March 1985 Central Committee 
Decision. The reforms proposed in the "Decision on the 
Reform of the Science and Technology Management System"17 
represented a major break with past practices, by changing 
the method of funding research institutes, encouraging the 
commercialization of technology and the development of a 
technology market and rewarding individual scientists. It 
was envisaged that most research institutes would support 
themselves through partnerships, mergers, joint ventures, or 
other appropriate and mutually agreeable means. The ultimate 
goal was to encourage exchange and cooperation and to break 
down the compartmentalization characterizing China's 
research and development structure. 
The reform of the science and technology management 
system has very important implications for the technological 
development of rural enterprises. As I will discuss later, 
increasing numbers of technological personnel have worked in 
rural enterprises. Technological cooperation between state 
enterprises and rural enterprises and between research 
institutes and universities and rural enterprises have taken 
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place. A technology market and the commercialization of 
technology in the late 1980s were developed to encourage the 
transfer of technology and the transformation of research 
results into products and services. Thus, rural enterprises 
have opportunities to get technology through the 
technological market and via the system for the transfer of 
technology. 
Various technological fairs have operated since 1978. 
For example, Jilin Province signed a number of contracts and 
agreements on technological cooperation and transfers in the 
first North-east China technological cooperation fair on 26 
April 1986. The total transaction volume reached 40m yuan. 18 
According to statistics released by 17 departments in 22 
provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities, about 
87,000 contracts, worth 2.06 bn yuan were signed at the 
market in 1986. China has 5,000 organizations handling 
technological business activities, while 10,000 state-run 
and 10,000 privately-run research institutes are becoming 
more active in the country's commodity and technological 
markets. 19 
Private scientific research institutes have been 
allowed to be established since 1978. According to 
statistics, China had 10,000 private scientific research 
institutes with 800,000 employees in 1987, which made 
profits by selling the application of their discoveries. 308 
private scientific research institutes located in 20 cities 
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have technologically aided 221 small and village and 
township enterprises during 1985 to 1986.20 
Some private scientific research institutes have set 
up experimental plants in rural areas. one experimental 
factory was jointly launched by a private institute and a 
village in Dalian. With the help of the private institute, 
the factory, which went into operation in 1985 with an 
investment of 1.5 million yuan, sold its products to a dozen 
major cities. The institute was based in a rural area and 
had helped 30 rural enterprises become profitable. 21 
China's leadership also expected rural enterprises 
to play an important role in the development of the export- 
oriented economy. 22 Some rural enterprises in coastal areas 
have engaged in the processing of imported material, 
assembly of imported parts and compensation trade. In 1985, 
more than 8,000 township enterprises nationwide earned 
foreign exchange through exports. They produced 20 major 
categories, more than 10,000 varieties of products sold in 
nearly a hundred nations worldwide, and earned more than $4 
billion, 15.5 percent of the nation's total foreign exchange 
23 earnings in 1985. Some rural enterprises in coastal areas 
have also cooperated with foreign businesses. This will be 
discussed later. As a result, such enterprises have an 
opportunity to use foreign advanced technology. 
Because the development of rural enterprises in 
China is uneven24, different regions have been given 
different strategies for technological improvement. In the 
262 
in erior and in other regions where rural enterprises are 
relatively underdeveloped, technological improvement has 
emphasized the promotion of traditional arts and crafts. But 
in the coastal areas where rural enterprises are relatively 
advanced, input of more advanced technology has taken place. 
This could further widen the regional imbalance in the 
development of rural enterprises. 
Since 1989, the Chinese leadership has emphasized the 
development of state enterprises. Despite this, Chinese 
official documents still support technological progress in 
rural enterprises. One document calls for the government to 
organize and guide technological progress, staff training, 
and to create the conditions for rural enterprises to 
recruit skilled personnel and import advanced technology. 25 
However, it should be noted that the support and 
favourable conditions for technological progress in official 
documents were given more to township and village collective 
run enterprises than to private rural enterprises. This is 
due to the discrimination against private enterprises and to 
the low stature of private enterprises. 26 
China has tried to improve the quality of rural 
enterprises' products. In 1986, the State Economic 
Commission, Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, and 
Fishery and the State Industry and Commerce Administration 
studied and formulated these "Opinions on Strengthening 
Product Quality Management Work in Township and Town. " 
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"All township and town enterprises must do more to 
correct their administrative ideology, adhere 
earnestly to the principle of 'quality is number 
one' and strive to improve management and 
administration, raise economic results, and be 
concerned with preventing pollution of the 
environment. 1,27 
"The opinions" called for township and town 
enterprises administrative departments to establish quality 
management organs to work in conjunction with industrial 
management departments and industry and commerce 
administration organs to strength management and supervision 
over product quality. 
"The opinion" also called for township and town 
enterprises to organize production according to product 
technical standards and technical norms and on the basis of 
the principle of "five things not permitted,, 28 and "three 
things are not permitted,, 29 in township and town 
enterprises. 
Since 1978, the most important promotion of the 
application of modern science and technology to rural 
enterprises was the State introduced "Spark Plan". In 
essence, the programme was intended to replace the outdated 
equipment in rural areas by modern factory methods. This 
will be discussed below. 
To sum up this section, during the 1980s technological 
strategy for rural enterprises has been changed from the 
264 
emphasis on small-scale, labour-intensive methods of 
production and primitive or intermediate technology to the 
use of appropriate technology. The reform of the science 
and technology management system has given rural enterprises 
opportunity to obtain advanced technology. The open door 
policy and the policy of encouraging higher quality of 
products in rural enterprises has important implications for 
the promotion of technological progress in rural 
enterprises. The Chinese Government has also given some 
practical support towards technological progress of rural 
enterprises. 
8.3 The Progress of Technology in Rural Enterprises 
In this section, I will examine the progress of 
technology in Rural enterprises. This includes the following 
aspects: the "Spark Plan" towards rural enterprises; 
technological personnel in rural enterprises; cooperation in 
technology between state enterprises and rural enterprises 
and between research institutes and universities and rural 
enterprises. 
8.3.1 The Spark Plan (Xinghuo Jihua) 
The "Spark Plan" was initiated by the State Science 
and Technology Commission in March 1985. The plan, which 
derives its name from a Chinese metaphor that says a single 
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spark can start a prairie fire, aims at introducing modern 
science and techniques to the rural districts through the 
medium of technological demonstration centres with the 
object of accelerating economic growth in the countryside. 
30 
The "Spark Plan" was proposed in the spirit of the 
resolution by the Central Committee to restructure the 
science and technology system, and is aimed at invigorating 
the local economy. 31 The targets of the plan during the 
Seventh five-year Plan are: (1) to develop 100 complete sets 
of technological equipment suitable for the countryside and 
the town and township enterprises, and put them into batch 
production; (2) to help establish 500 model town and 
township enterprises and provide them with complete 
technology and production techniques and methods of standard 
management, product design and quality control; (3) to train 
a number of educated youths and grassroots cadres for towns 
and townships every year so that they can master one or two 
advanced technologies suitable for their own areas and 
obtain some knowledge of modern management. 32 In principle, 
the "short, level, and speedy,, 33 projects undertaken by the 
"spark plan" differ from key scientific and technical 
pro3ects that are medium and long term, and they are also 
different from those that are "small, indigenous, and mass- 
. 34 run 
The Spark Plan will introduce technology of a higher 
level in China's eastern seaboard to help produce better 
quality goods for the export market. Assistance will be 
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given to help the central part of China manufacture goods 
for the domestic market, so as to lay the foundation for 
starting an export-oriented economy. Under-developed western 
China is where the plan can help most by introducing 
techniques to enable millions of rural households to become 
well-to-do. The plan will help enterprises in western China 
to enter into cooperation with those in the central and 
eastern parts of the country so that they can turn out 
market goods with local characteristics. 
whole series of new measures were adopted: all 
projects to be listed as "Spark Plans" must undergo 
feasibility studies by experts and are no longer started up 
after nothing more than a simple administrative 
investigation. Technical projects for rural enterprises to 
be listed must have a technical institute, scientific 
research unit, or large or mid-sized enterprises to look to, 
in order to assure that the project is both advanced and 
appropriate. Some projects are not arranged through 
administrative channels but through public announcements in 
newspapers which solicit technological personnel and have 
the support of the state for loans. Capital accumulation 
channels have been expanded. Bonds and stocks were issued, 
and enterprises linked up to accumulate capital. All forms 
of venture capital investment and leasing system have been 
tried. 35 
Many kinds of technology transfer systems have been 
established. Compensation has been paid for the transfer of 
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technological contracts and markets for information and 
technology have been created. For example, a total of 87 out 
of 98 counties and prefecture have started rural technology 
markets, resulting in the spread of appropriate technology 
through a large segment of rural enterprises. 
36 Human 
resource exchange agencies have also been established. 
Science and technology workers have been given incentives to 
go to work in rural enterprises. 
These new methods have provided favourable conditions 
for the implementation of the "Spark Plans". Between 1985 
and 1987, the state put up 360 million yuan in support of 
the "Spark Plans". The capital accumulation in the different 
regions reached 1.9 billion yuan. 37 These funds have been 
used to develop technological application in 10 areas: new 
modes in the feed industries and for storing and shipping 
their products; processing technology for preserving 
freshness at the point of production; technology for the 
comprehensive use of farm, forestry and local products; 
development of rural township construction materials; 
production technology for small-scale mining excavation, 
extraction, primary processing and manufacturing; broadened 
utilization of new technology and materials; product lines 
for heavy industrial production; coordinated regional 
development; export commodities; and development of small- 
scale production installation technology and training of 
installation personnel. 
38 
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The work of personnel training has gone forward as 
well. Training centers have been set up all around the 
country; and 1.05 million young peasants with intermediate 
education levels have participated. 39 
After three years' implementation, the Spark Plan has 
achieved visible success. By the end of 1988,5,100 projects 
were completed, increasing output value by 11.2 billion yuan 
and profits and taxes delivered to the state by 3.6 billion 
yuan, earning 1.6 billion yuan in foreign exchange, and 
enabling the input-output ratio to reach 1: 5 40 
Thus, the implementation of the Spark Plan has gained 
some successes for the improvement of technology in some 
rural enterprises. However, this program has been far from 
adequate compared with the number and size of rural 
enterprises in all China. As noted above, most rural 
enterprises still lack sufficient technological personnel, 
and use out-dated facilities, often procured from state and 
collective enterprises that have upgraded their 
technological base. Although the reliance on second hand 
equipment is a cheap way of obtaining productive capacity in 
the short run, much of it is highly inefficient, and highly 
energy consumptive. Thus, although the Spark Plan marks an 
important step in the right direction, much work still 
remains to be done if the technology level in rural 
enterprises is to be improved. 
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8.3.2 Technological Personnel 
Since 1978, some enterprises faced bankruptcy and some 
went out of business. The most important reason for their 
failure was the lack of competent managers and technicians. 
For instance, Nanggong County in Hebei, Chuiyang township 
spent 110,000 yuan on a set of advanced shoe-making 
equipment. Yet none of the seven "technicians" it 
successively hired from outside at a high salary had 
mastered the entire spectrum of shoe technology and they 
were particularly inadequate when it came to design. The 
enterprise failed 4 months after it went into business. 41 
Professional technicians make up a small proportion of the 
workers in rural enterprises. In 1986,1,520,000 rural 
enterprises surveyed had only 630,000 professional 
technicians, an average of 0.4 technicians for one 
enterprise. For all the 43.91 million rural workers, 
technicians accounted for only 0.7 percent of the total. The 
42 percentage for State enterprises was 8.8 per cent. 
In order to improve the situation of lack of 
technological personnel in rural enterprises, a Chinese 
official document suggested that the following steps should 
be taken: First, the education department should include 
rural enterprises' requirements for personnel in the plan 
for developing vocational education and gradually establish 
professional schools for training staff members and staff. 
270 
Secondly, the state should assign some university and 
college graduates to rural enterprises. Thirdly, rural 
enterprises should be allowed to give proper titles to their 
technological personnel by referring to the criteria 
promulgated by the state in order to encourage the staff 
members and workers to become competent personnel through 
self-study. 43 
Meanwhile, the Chinese government has also accelerated, 
especially since 1985, the introduction and training of 
technological and management personnel for township and town 
enterprises. According to an investigation in 1985 involving 
23 provinces and municipalities, a total of 65,000 capable 
people were recruited by township and town enterprises and 
600,000 technological and management personnel were trained. 
A special characteristic of the work to cultivate talented 
personnel has been the operation of educational and training 
programs for staff and workers at various levels, through 
various channels, and in various forms. 
44 
The State also adopted a more liberal policy which has 
allowed technological personnel to work in rural enterprises 
in their spare time. In certain big cities such as Shanghai 
and Beijing, groups of scientific technological personnel 
travelled to suburbs from downtown either by bus or bicycle 
on Sunday to use their spare time to help rural enterprises 
develop new products, tackle technological problems, and 
train workers. This was very useful in solving the problems 
of technology in rural enterprise. 
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However, very f ew technological personnel in state 
enterprises can settle in rural areas and work in rural 
enterprises. The main reasons are as follows: first, some 
leaders of the State departments fear that once the 
scientific and technological personnel go to work in rural 
enterprise, they will become their rivals, and that the 
scientific and technological personnel going to work in 
rural enterprises and getting higher wages will affect the 
stability and ideology of the scientific and technological 
personnel who still work in their departments. 
Second, the personnel are afraid of losing their "iron 
rice bowls". In China, state employees receive a broad 
array of subsidies for basic consumption goods, services, 
and other benefits that are not provided to farmers. In 1978 
these included subsidies for grain, vegetable oils, and 
subsidiary foods, for housing, retirement, death, maternity, 
disability, injury, and some types of health benefits and 
labour insurance fees, etc. These subsidies in 1978 totaled 
528 yuan per year per employee or 82 percent of the average 
45 wage. If they go to rural enterprises to work, they will 
lose these subsidies. 
Third, there is an ideological and political reason why 
very few technological personnel work in rural enterprises. 
As Denis F. Simon's research has indicated, political cadres 
see themselves as being displaced by science and 
technological personnel. Party officials have felt insecure 
in granting these individuals more authority and 
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in ependence, especially since they threaten the party's own 
claims to be the main purveyor of truth and knowledge in 
society. 46 Technological personnel are worried about other 
people criticizing them by saying that their purpose in 
going down to work in the township and town enterprises is 
to "make big money". In some cases, these individuals have 
been accused of extortion and blackmail by jealous 
individuals who have not had such opportunities available to 
themselves. 47 
The State plans that by the year 2000 there would be 
200 million workers in rural enterprises. It would be very 
difficult for the enterprises to train this large number of 
workers by themselves. The official proposal is that 1 per 
cent of the tax money turned over to the State from rural 
enterprises, about 2 billion yuan, be used to train workers 
in rural enterprises. However, this is still not likely to 
be an adequate solution. 
8.3.3 Cooperation in Technology 
Before cooperation in technology is discussed, it is 
necessary to give a brief description of the system of 
China's science and technology. An unreformed Soviet system 
of science and technology structure, which operated in 
China until the late seventies, was unsuccessful in 
providing a sufficient, consistent link between the research 
and productive sectors. 
48 Moreover, sources of technology 
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are different for various parts of the industrial spectrum. 
Nation- and province- level enterprises receive their 
technological inputs mainly from national science and 
technology institutes and through imports. Lower-level 
enterprises are not completely cut off from these sources, 
but the bottom of the industrial pyramid derives its 
technological advancement mainly from a process of internal 
diffusion. Advanced science and technology are available 
mainly at higher levels. Intermediate science and technology 
are available for the middle levels, while the lower levels 
mainly get technological knowledge from a popular-based 
extension network. 49 Thus, rural enterprises could only 
obtained inputs of low technology. If rural enterprises want 
to obtain advanced technology, it is necessary for them to 
cooperate with state enterprises, research institutes and 
universities. 
Since 1978, technological cooperation has been 
encouraged by the Chinese government, as the following 
statement illustrates: 50 In the past two years, the commune 
and brigade enterprises in some localities have invited 
scientists and technicians from various scientific research 
departments, colleges and institutions of higher training, 
and designing departments to work as their advisers, assume 
the task of manufacturing new products on a trial basis, and 
apply the results from scientific research in production. 
This practice has helped the enterprises acquire many new 
techniques and turn out many new products. This has not only 
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quic ened the pace in turning science and technology into an 
actual productive force and closely linked scientific 
research with production, but has also solved the problem of 
weak technological forces in commune and brigade 
enterprises. Efforts must be made earnestly to sum up and 
propagate our experience in this respect. 51 
Cooperation efforts between research institutes or 
universities and rural enterprises and between state 
enterprises and rural enterprises have gone further. They 
take varied forms, take place at different levels and 
develop in different directions. 
Transfer of technology is a very common form of 
cooperation in technology. Both "vertical" and "horizontal" 
transfers of technology have taken place from foreign 
countries, research institutes and universities to rural 
enterprises or from state enterprises to rural enterprises. 
For example, a knitting mill in Jiangyin County, Jiangsu 
Province had less than 100 workers before 1981. After 
cooperating with the Jiangsu Import and Export Company of 
Knitting Products, and importing advanced foreign technology 
in 1981, by 1986 the mill produced 29.95 million yuan and 
earned $5.6 million foreign exchange. The scale of the mill 
increased to about 1,000 workers and 6 million yuan of fixed 
capital in 1987.52 This form of technology transfer is most 
suitable for those technologies that are not very 
sophisticated and can be easily adopted. Research institutes 
or universities are responsible for furnishing the 
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enterprise with the technology and solving the problems 
arising during production, but they do not take part in the 
management of the enterprise. The transfer of technology to 
previously non-industrialized areas is a very important part 
of the policies to promote the development of rural areas 
and thereby reduce poverty. Localities which have already 
started their industrialization will continue to be 
dependent on technology transfer in order to upgrade their 
industrial capability and move into the manufacture of more 
complicated products. 
In the process of the transfer of technology, big 
state enterprises in a number of places played a very 
important role in promoting technological cooperation with 
rural enterprises. Cooperation between urban state 
enterprises and rural enterprises takes place in two 
different forms. On the one hand, state enterprises send 
personnel and equipment to the places where new rural 
enterprises a re to be set up. On the other hand, 
technological personnel are trained in state enterprises. 
For example, in Changsha, Hunan, 49 urban enterprises 
cooperated with 108 rural factories to manufacture 267 
products, increasing the output value to 130m yuan in 1986. 
The rural enterprises acquired 1,995 technicians, 16.6m yuan 
and 385 machines through the cooperation, while offering 
land, labour and profit-sharing with their urban 
counterparts. 53 
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While helping rural enterprises to improve their 
technology and increase their incomes, urban enterprises 
have also expanded production and developed new and 
competitive products through co-operation. For example, 
Changlegang village in Changsha County used to grow only 
rice, sweet potatoes and hot peppers in the past while rich 
deposits of tin ore lay idle nearby. The village and a 
geological institute in Changsha set up a factory in July 
1986. With techniques and equipment provided by the 
institute, the villages produced 250 tons of finished ore 
worth 400,000 yuan. After recovery of investment, the 
village shared profits of 100,000 yuan. The 40 families in 
the village averaged an additional income of 1,300 yuan. 
When the provincial embroidery factory lacked female labour 
in 1985, it signed contracts with a nearby town. The 700 
rural women, processing supplied materials in their homes, 
helped the factory complete export tasks, while earning 
about 40 yuan per capita each month. 54 
There was also close cooperation between research 
institutes and universities and rural enterprises. Some 
research institutes and universities sent their experts to 
the enterprises to work as technological advisers according 
to the needs of specific enterprises, thus providing 
technological advice and services in relation to its 
production. In addition, research institutes and 
universities have trained students majoring in subjects 
requested by rural enterprises, and offer training classes 
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in business management for factory directors and managers. 
For example, Liaoning province had developed a project to 
spread advanced technology through a network involving three 
counties, 20 townships and 100 villages. The three-year 
programme was carried out on an experimental bases in 
Fuxing, Kazuo and Haicheng counties in 1982. The three 
counties trained more than 226,000 people through 1,100 
technology courses between 1983 and 1985.55 In 1985 some 
1,300 experts, technicians and various other types of 
professional personnel were invited to work in the three 
counties and 20 townships. They conducted surveys on local 
natural resources, helped in working out development plans 
and spread technology by training personnel. 56 The example 
from Liaoning Province shows that training programs are 
improving, and in a few cases, the technological expertise 
in rural enterprises has improved. However, on a national 
scale, the level of personnel and technology transfer 
remains relatively low, and is a key impediment to the long 
term development of an efficient and more productive rural 
enterprise sector. 
Some research institutes and universities also cooperate 
with rural enterprises to undertake joint research projects. 
Research institutes or universities provide technology while 
rural enterprises provide buildings, manpower, capital and 
other facilities. After the results of one project are put 
into production, other joint research projects can be 
planned and arranged according to the need of the 
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enterprises. As a result, the enterprises are able to 
develop new products at different times. For example, the 
three counties mentioned above established ties with over 
160 colleges, research units and industrial enterprises to 
absorb modern technology. The 20 townships achieved good 
economic results owing to the spread of 233 new technology 
items in 1985. By the end of October, they had produced a 
total industrial and agricultural output value of 553-29 
million yuan -- a 57.73 O-o increase over the same period of 
57 1984. Thus, it is a good way to promote the cooperation 
between rural enterprises and research institutes and 
universities. In so doing, on the one hand, research 
institutes and universities can gain funds by providing 
technology for rural enterprises. On the other hand, rural 
enterprises can improve technology by cooperating with 
research institutes and universities. 
Some rural enterprises in coastal areas have also 
started to cooperate with foreign businesses through equity 
and contractual joint-ventures and other arrangements with 
overseas Chinese and foreign businesses so that rural 
enterprises could buy advanced equipment, technologies, 
craftsmanship, and management skills. For example, Jiangkou 
town, Putia County, Fujian utilized funds invested by 
overseas Chinese to import advanced technologies and 
equipment, and through various joint operation arrangements, 
it has put its products on the world market. By 1987, there 
were 1,159 large and small enterprises in the township. 
58 
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In short, cooperation in technology between state 
enterprises and rural enterprises, between research 
institutes or universities and rural enterprises and between 
foreign businesses and rural enterprises has helped in 
promoting technological development of rural enterprises as 
well as improving production in rural enterprises. 
Nevertheless, the extent of technological collaboration on a 
national level remains relatively poor. The 'haves' are 
unwilling to provide advanced technology to the 'have-nots' 
instead preferring to maintain their advantage over 
potential competitors. The level of technology being 
transferred to rural enterprises is typically out-of-date 
productive capacity discarded by enterprises after they have 
upgraded their own facilities. The poor level of 
technological development in the countryside thus remains an 
important obstacle to future growth in this area, and to the 
establishment of a more efficient rural industrial sector. 
8.4 The Prospects for Technological Progress 
Since 1978, the Chinese government has emphasized the 
need to improve the technological level of rural 
enterprises. This policy and its implementation have had 
important implications for technological progress in rural 
enterprises. The Spark Plan has played a significant role in 
promoting relatively large-scale rural enterprises. The 
increase in the mobility of technological personnel between 
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research institutes and rural enterprises not only helps to 
exploit the potential of scarce technological and 
professional manpower, but also to an extent helps to solve 
the shortage of technological personnel in rural 
enterprises. Cooperation in technology has played a very 
important role in promoting the technological development of 
rural enterprises. 
Although the Chinese government has tried to promote 
technological progress since 1978, there is still a severe 
technological problem. At present, obsolete facilities, 
outdated techniques, and the shortage of qualified 
personnel, are the major obstacles to improve the quality of 
products, and reduce raw material consumption. Moreover, 
rural enterprises are facing new difficulties. Rural 
enterprises have gradually lost their privileges under the 
new situation brought on by reforms. The concessionary tax 
and credit policies originally enjoyed have been gradually 
cancelled. The advantage of lower paid labour has been 
greatly reduced. The means of production have seen great 
price rises. Therefore, if township enterprises are to 
achieve stability, they must rely on technological progress 
to increase competitiveness and adaptability. Therefore, 
technological progress in rural enterprises will be crucial 
in future. 
Achieving technological progress is thus an urgent 
task for rural enterprises. If rural enterprises want to 
make technological progress in future, the most important 
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tasks would be to solve the problems of technological 
personnel and finance. 
Qualified personnel are the key element in achieving 
technological progress. Rural enterprises have an insatiable 
need for well-trained personnel, and they are competing for 
all kinds of technological people with state-enterprises. In 
order to solve the shortage of qualified personnel, some 
factories send people to the universities, but few return to 
work for the plant. 
There is another major issue concerning the handling 
of the technological people who are helping the rural 
enterprises. Under present conditions, the short cut to 
finding the personnel to expedite advancements in the 
technology of rural enterprises is to recruit professionals 
and technological people to work after hours. 
Serious lack of financial resources in China is 
another important factor explaining low levels of 
technological capacity in rural enterprises. For rural 
enterprises, the sources of finance for innovation and 
production development are from retained profit, 
depreciation funds and the new product development funds 
derived from sales. However, the problems of exacting a 
large percentage of profit, collecting excessive charges, 
apportioning numbers expenses and allowing the town and 
township enterprises to retain little profit, and the 
problem that town and township enterprises lack reserve 
strength, not only generally exist but are also very 
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serious. According to a study of some township and town 
enterprises in Hebei Province in 198659, in the fist half 
of 1986, those enterprises realized after-tax profits of 
2.668 million yuan, 49 percent of which was exacted by the 
township (town) and village authorities. Only 18 percent of 
the prof it exacted by the township (town) and village 
authorities was returned to the enterprises. When the 
enterprises' after-tax profit was exacted by the township or 
village authorities, a lot of enterprises did not have the 
money to buy new equipment and had to borrow loans to buy 
raw materials and other essentials for their production. 
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In addition, the investigation showed that those enterprises 
paid a total of 1.047 million yuan to some departments in 
various charges and apportionments, which accounted for 23 
percent of their sales profits. 
61 The main reason is that 
the functions of government and enterprises have not 
separated, and local governments have to rely on rural 
enterprises as their main financial sources. 
The educational level of workers in rural enterprises 
is low. Most farmers were farm workers before they joined 
rural enterprises. Thus they lack broad and modernized 
industrial knowledge. Some enterprises believe that a one- 
time purchase of new facilities would solve a lifetime of 
problems. Some enterprises randomly pick a product without 
knowing the market conditions, and blindly produce goods 
without even considering improving technology as a means of 
enhancing their ability to compete. Others only eye 
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immediate profits and are unwilling to invest in new 
62 equipment. 
Therefore, if the level of technology in rural 
enterprises is to be significantly improved, both rural 
enterprises themselves and the Chinese government have much 
more to do. The measures for the promotion of technology in 
rural enterprises should include the following aspects: 
Chinese government should give preferential treatment in 
fiscal policy and grant rural enterprises more loans to 
improve outdated equipment and to train workers. Rural 
enterprises should attract more technological personnel 
from state enterprises, research institutes and 
universities, or persuade them to use their spare time to 
help them improve technology. The rate of depreciation for 
equipment should be increased so that rural enterprises can 
upgrade equipment more rapidly and devote efforts to 
assimilating suitable advance technology. 
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Chapter 9 Conclusion 
9.1 Positive Roles of Public policy changes for Rural 
Enterprises 
When the reformist leadership of Deng Xiaoping assumed 
power in December 1978, the CCP was facing a crisis of 
legitimacy. Although there were serious disagreements among 
the new leadership over the best way forward for China, a 
consensus developed among the party leadership that policy 
changes had to occur if the Party was to retain its position 
and the country was not to slide further behind its 
competitors in terms of economic development. As Carol 
Hamrin' wrote: "From the beginning, Deng Xiaoping viewed the 
economic reform program not only as a necessity for national 
well being, but also as a survival kit for the CCP. 11 It is 
therefore impossible to separate the economic and political 
imperatives behind policy changes towards rural enterprises 
after 1978 - the survival of the CCP was perceived as being 
dependent on the rapid development of the Chinese economy. 
This study has demonstrated that changes in public 
policy after 1978 did play positives roles in promoting the 
development of rural enterprises. These positive roles have 
been manifested in the following areas. First, and of 
crucial importance, the ideological base of policy has 
changed from one of restraining the development of 
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collective rural enterprises before 1978 to encouraging the 
development of rural enterprises after 1978. Perhaps the 
most dramatic change occured in the official attitude 
towards the private sector of rural enterprises. From being 
prohibited during the Maoist era, the private sector of 
rural enterprises was not only tolerated after 1978, but in 
the case of Wenzhou, has been actively encouraged and 
promoted as a positive model by some Chinese leaders. 
Without these fundamental changes of policy, neither 
political climate would have been conducive to the 
development of rural enterprises. 
Secondly, the extension of more decision-making powers 
to local governments allowed local governments considerable 
leeway in formulating policies to aid the development of 
rural enterprises. As a result, different development 
approaches have emerged in different areas depending on 
local regional economic and geographical conditions. As 
demonstrated in Chapter Three, development strategies in 
Wenzhou are fundamantally different from those adopted in 
Southern Jiangsu. As a result, it is not possible to talk in 
terms of a single development model for rural enterprises. 
There are large disparities in the scope and nature of 
developments across China as a whole. These disparities have 
not only been affected by local development strategies, but 
have also been influenced by the uneven development 
programme adopted in the 1980s. In combination, these policy 
changes have resulted in wide divergences in development, 
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not only between the three large regions (west, centre and 
coast) but also within regions. 
Thirdly, the expansion of market mechanisms as a means 
to regulate the economy has facilitated the development of 
rural enterprises. Freed from the constraints of 
bureaucratic management and allocation of resources, rural 
enterprises are able to buy more raw materials and get more 
funds in free markets. Without this development, the 
expansion of rural enterprises would have been strictly 
limited. 
But although the introduction of market mechanisms has 
undoubtedly facilitated the development of rural 
enterprises, the change from the old system has not been 
total. The hand of bureaucratic management is still very 
visible, particularly in the state-run sector. With many 
products in short supply on the domestic market, the 
government has frequently intervened to ensure the provision 
of adequate supplies to large-scale state run enterprises 
deemed to be essential components of the national economy. 
In these situations, rural enterprises become squeezed by 
the government's commitment to the state sector, and find 
it difficult to gain access to essential raw materials. In 
essence, when times are good, rural enterprises benefit from 
the development of the market, but when times get hard, they 
find themselves at the bottom of the government's pecking 
order for the allocation of resources. Like most sectors of 
the Chinese economy, rural enterprises have faced 
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difficulties due to the partial nature of reform. However on 
balance, we must conclude that even the partial introduction 
of the market is more conducive to the development of rural 
enterprises than no market at all. 
Fourthly, in order to solve the problem of huge 
numbers of rural surplus labourers in rural areas, the 
government has adopted the development of rural enterprises 
as the most important strategy in solving rural unemployment 
since 1978. The government has remained in tight control of 
peasants' rights to migrate to big cities, but it has 
adopted a more liberal policy to allow peasants to establish 
rural enterprises in small towns. This has provided a strong 
incentive for farmers to develop rural enterprises. 
Fifthly, the government has provided collective rural 
enterprises with preferential treatment in terms of bank 
credit and tax rates, although state loans towards rural 
enterprises have decreased since late 1988 and tax rates on 
rural enterprises have also gradually increased. Since 1978, 
the implementation of the agricultural output responsibility 
system and the reforms of agricultural prices have increased 
peasant incomes. This has enabled rural enterprises to raise 
funds from individuals and society in various ways. 
Therefore, government financial and tax policies have 
created more favourable financial conditions for developing 
rural enterprises, especially collective rural enterprises. 
Sixthly, the government has provided some policies to 
improve management in rural enterprises, especially in 
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township or village owned enterprises. The government has 
implemented the contractual responsibility system and a 
responsibility system for factory directors. The government 
also changed the payment system for labour and adopted a 
policy to promote the quality of production in rural 
enterprises. As a result, these policies have improved 
management in rural enterprises. 
Seventhly, since 1978 the technological strategy of 
the government has been changed from an emphasis on small- 
scale labour-intensive methods of production to the use of 
appropriate technology. The reform of the science and 
technology management system has given rural enterprises 
more opportunities to obtain advanced technology. The 
government has also taken some practical measures to promote 
technology in rural enterprises, including the 
implementation of the "Spark Plan" and the policy to allow 
technological personnel to work in rural enterprises in 
their spare time and the promotion of cooperation in 
technology between state enterprises and rural enterprises 
and between research institutes and universities and rural 
enterprises. These measures have also promoted technology in 
rural enterprises. 
9.2 Remaining Problems for Rural Enterprises 
The changes outlined above have combined to create an 
economic and political environment that has facilitated the 
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development of rural enterprises. But despite these 
advances, the change of public policy has been inadequate. 
on the long march to the situation where rural enterprises 
can play a full and valuable role in the Chinese economy, 
there is still a long way to go. 
Although private enterprises have acquired a legal 
status, private enterprises still face many difficulties and 
different forms of discrimination. Similarly, there is still 
considerable discrimination against rural enterprises 
(whether they are collective-run or private-run enterprises) 
particularly in the supply of raw materials and credits, 
compared with the policy towards state- run enterprises. 
Since 1978, the reform of the market has created a 
more favourable market environment for the development of 
rural enterprises. However, rural enterprises have not 
enjoyed the same competitive position as state-enterprise in 
many areas such as product transport, retailing and export, 
and the supply of key production elements. With the further 
reform of the economic system in the cities, the large and 
medium state enterprises have taken further steps to relax 
restrictions in order to invigorate their operations. At the 
same time, however, some privileges of state enterprises 
remain. In addition, with the increase in the level of wages 
and benefits for staff workers, the cost of labour in rural 
areas has increased. With the gradual opening of the market, 
the prices of energy and raw materials have continued to 
rise, so that rural enterprises have paid higher costs. With 
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the intensification of competition in the market, 
increasingly higher demands have also been made of rural 
enterprises in the technical standard and quality of their 
products. Thus, situations where rural enterprises enjoyed a 
position of superiority, normally or abnormally, have 
already, and I would argue prematurely, begun to fade away. 
In addition, the preferential treatments in credit and taxes 
formerly accorded rural enterprises have gradually been 
reduced. 
If the benefits of the introduction of market mechanisms 
have been tempered, so the devolution of powers to local 
authorities has been a double edged sword. The shortage of 
fiscal income in local communities and local government 
funds for welfare work and agricultural funds has led to the 
problem of local government exacting a large percentage of 
profit, and collecting excessive charges. Although the 
central government has implemented a policy of reducing the 
financial burden of rural enterprises, some problems such as 
exacting a large percentage of profits, collecting excessive 
charges, and allowing rural enterprises to retain only a 
small percentage of profits have remained. 
Government policies to promote technology in rural 
enterprises have also been inadequate. The shortage of 
technological personnel and finance and the low educational 
level of workers remain formidable obstacles for the future 
progress of technology in rural enterprises. 
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Moreover, some political and ideological questions 
have remained an obstacle restraining rural enterprises to 
make even greater progress. One complaint against rural 
enterprises has been that the development of rural 
enterprises affected agricultural production. For example, 
addressing the CCP's National Conference of Delegates in 
September 1985, Chen Yun asserted that: 
"Township and town enterprises should be developed, 
but the problem is that the call of 'no prosperity 
without engaging in industry, is heard much louder 
than that of 'no economic stability without 
agricultural development. ' Feeding and clothing a 
billion people constitutes one of China's major 
political as well as economic challenges, because 
grain shortages will lead to social disorder., We 
cannot afford to underestimate this matter.,, 2 
The adoption of the contract responsibility system 
unleashed the productive capabilities of the agricultural 
sector; agricultural income rose as a result of adjustment 
and decontrol of some agricultural product prices. However, 
agriculture in China remains backward, a fact borne out by 
the fluctuating agricultural production figures. 
The rapid development of rural enterprises has 
widened the discrepancy between the income of rural 
enterprises workers and peasants; hence, a problem involving 
agricultural production has arisen. According to a study 
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conducted in Southern Jiangsu Province, peasants are 
unwilling to stop planting grain, but they are also 
unwilling to plant too much. They do not want to stop 
planting because their past experience of hunger urges them 
not to abandon grain production. They do not want to plant 
too much because the economic results of land cultivation is 
about 30 percent lower than that of industrial work. 
3 This 
has caused considerable waste of farmland. In addition, 
large tracts of farmland have been occupied by flourishing 
rural enterprises. These two factors have contributed to a 
sharp decrease in farmland in recent years. Thus, the state 
should control the use of land, and rural enterprises should 
be concentrated in small towns so that the use of farmland 
could be more efficient. 
However, the problems of agriculture should not be 
blamed entirely on the development of rural enterprises. on 
the contrary, rural enterprises have supported the 
development of agriculture with a large amounts of funds. 
For example, in 1989, Zhejiang and Shanghai on average 
received 200 to 300 yuan per person per year in 
4 "supplementing agriculture" money. According to a survey 
conducted in coastal areas, each county needs more than 100 
million yuan ($18.5 million) to reach the goal of 
agricultural modernization. A substantial part of this large 
amount of investment has to be provided by rural industry. 
5 
This suggests that the view that rural enterprises had 
caused the agricultural decline is unjustified. 
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Another complaint against rural enterprises has been 
that rural enterprises have polluted the environment. A 
study was published in 1988 by environmentalists and 
ecologists from the Chinese scientific and other research 
institutions6, pointed out that the most flourishing rural 
industries were built without any consideration for the 
environment since 1978. In a report on environmental 
problems caused by China's small town and village 
industries, the scientists predicted that if rural 
enterprises continue to increase at a 25 to 30 percent 
growth rate, their industrial waste water will account for 
40 to 50 percent of country's total by the year 2,000. A 
test of the atmosphere in seven provinces where 12,000 rural 
enterprises are located showed that the content of toxicant 
elements in the air, such as benzene, silicon dust and 
asbestos, surpassed the standards set forth by the state 
public health authorities by several hundred or even one 
thousand times. 7 The waste water coming from rural 
industries accounted for only 10 percent of the country's 
total industrial waste water release, but in some highly- 
developed areas such as Southern Jiangsu province, 
industrial population in surrounding rural townships has 
been large-scale. Moreover, areas specializing in the 
production of sulphur, coke, bricks and tiles have had 
serious effect on the atmosphere, though large-scale air 
pollution has not been detected. 
8 
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Thus, environmental problems should be considered when 
rural enterprises are established. China's environmental 
protection policies should in future pay greater attention 
to rural ecological environment even though its priority may 
remain focused on urban areas. 
Private enterprises were only officially legalized in 
1988, and have traditionally been considered "capitalist 
ownership". As a result, political and ideological problems 
for private enterprises have been more severe. Some local 
party leaders have expressed concern that the existence 
and development of private enterprises might lead to private 
entrepreneurs becoming a distinct class infiltrating the 
state sector. This could result in the "restoration of 
capitalism", which would change the face of socialism and 
the nature of society in China. 9 
However, whether the economic reform policies will 
bring about fundamental changes in the political system will 
depend largely on whether the private sector of the economy 
can become strong enough to account for a significant part 
of China's gross national product. The output value of the 
private economy still only accounts for a very low 
percentage of the gross output value of Chinese industry. 
Nonetheless, the newly risen entrepreneurs with their 
increased wealth and social influence have brought demands 
for political influence and social standing. 
It was reported that more than 200,000 members of the 
Chinese Communist Party engaged in the private sector of 
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the economy in early 1989-10 Among the entrepreneurs in the 
survey of private rural enterprises, " 21.60-o were members of 
the Communist Party of China, 6.2% were members of the 
Communist Youth League of China, 8.20-o held positions in 
Village CCP Committees and Village Committees, 15 - 5*-. had 
relatives who worked in the government of the town 
(township) or county, or other public organizations. This 
data suggests that entrepreneurs have certain influence in 
rural areas. Potentially more damaging for the CCP in the 
long run, it also suggests that party membership, or links 
with party members, can ease the process of establishing and 
running private enterprises. The popular suspicion that 
private enterprises go hand in hand with corruption is 
unlikely to be eased by such a relationship. Thus, it could 
be said that the private economy is already playing a 
considerable role in Chinese politics. 
Furthermore, the working conditions for employees in 
enterprises owned by party members is not in accord with the 
party constitution, which calls for its members to make 
concerted efforts to eliminate exploitation in China. 12 It 
has been argued that if these members do not use all their 
income from exploitation for investment, the improvement of 
people's well-being and Party members dues, or if their 
enterprises are not transformed into collective enterprises, 
these members should be asked to quit the Party. 
13 Although 
these employment practices have been justified as a means 
to achieve common prosperity and the development of a 
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commodity economy, this does confuse the ideology of the 
members of the CCP. With the development of private 
enterprises in China, criticisms of the connection between 
party membership and private ownership of enterpises will 
continue to be expressed. 
As noted above, the main public complaint against 
private enterprises is in terms of corruption and illegal 
practices. As I have demonstrated in section 6.2 of Chapter 
Six, large numbers of rural enterprises have been guilty of 
tax evasion. In addition, the highly monopolized financial 
organizations have made it very hard for private enterprises 
to obtain loans, which sometimes are only available with 
"good personal connections". Thus private businesses have 
been forced to depend on favours and gifts in order to 
obtain raw materials, sell their goods and raise loans. It 
could therefore be argued that any corruption that arises is 
the fault of the partial nature of reform, which allows 
private enterprises to legally exist, but does not allow 
them to get what they physically need to exist. 
Nevertheless, in the eyes of much of the population, 
corruption is still being blamed on the existence of private 
enterprises, and not the economic system that they are 
forced to exist in. 
The development of private enterprises has widened 
disparities between the rich and the poor and between 
different regions. The result has been an increase in social 
tension. For example, in a survey of 100 private rural 
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enterprises, the average initial capital of each enterprise 
was 32,000 yuan. After three to four years, the average 
capital of each enterprise reached 144,000 yuan. 
14 
Furthermore, most private enterprises have operated in more 
developed rural areas along the coast. 15 By contrast, some 
areas hindered by poor geographical conditions, conservative 
views, and a low level of education, have not solved 
problems of poverty and backwardness. In addition, some 
entrepreneurs have articulated the fear that government 
officials may find ways to reorganize their businesses in 
the future. Thus, wealthy entrepreneurs in some areas have 
hit on the idea of making gifts of money, and providing 
other favours to cadres in the hopes of averting future 
problems. 16 
In the past, China condemned the capitalist theory. 
However, now it has admitted that a private economy in China 
can promote production, provide employment opportunities, 
and help in many other ways to meet people's needs. Thus, 
traditional Marxist-Leninist ideology has not guided 
present policy. Some theoreticians have tried to find new 
theories to explain the problem of the emergence of new 
economic and social forces. They have argued that China must 
comprehensively and correctly reassess modern capitalism - 
especially capitalism since World War II - and have called 
for the assimilation of the positive aspects and 
achievements of capita ism. 
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In the meanwhile, however, the development and existence 
of the private sector has brought it into competition with 
public ownership of the economic system. on the one hand, 
this competition could improve the administration and 
management of public ownership, as well as raising the 
quality of services within the state and collective systems. 
on the other hand, the very rapid development of private 
enterprises has caused state run businesses severe 
difficulties. Thus, the superiority of state ownership has 
been brought into doubt. 
For example, Wenzhou has a proportionately bigger 
private economy than anywhere else in China. In Wenzhou, 
state run businesses which have been managed over the past 
thirty years have been surpassed by private companies which 
have developed in a mere three to five years. Traditional 
management ideas and methods used by state run businesses 
have been decimated by furious competition and are left no 
choice but to undergo whole scale revision. Three economists 
at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences made the strongest 
case for a reform policy based on attacking state ownership 
and gave a plan for "privatising China". 
17 After the events 
of 4 June 1989, the plan of privatising China has officially 
been denied. 18 Although this proposal has, for the time 
being, been rejected by the Chinese government, it is 
possible that the proportion of public ownership will 
continue to fall in the future. 
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Private enterprises were among the hardest hit during 
the national austerity programme implemented between 1988 
and 1991. According to the State Administration of Industry 
and Commerce, more than 1 million self-employed people 
across the country went out of business in the first few 
months of 1989. Not only were many existing private 
businesses closing, but the number of new self-employed 
households registering was also declining. 19 The main reason 
behind the decrease was that of the state's rectification of 
private businesses. 20 
Another reason for the decline was the impact of the 
austerity programmes launched in September 1988. According 
to Wang Zhongming, director of the administration's 
Individual and Private Economy department, these programmes 
decreased the amount of bank loans, raw materials, fuel and 
other resources available to private businesses. For 
example, in Wenzhou, local banks did not allow individual 
businessmen to withdraw money, resulting in about 300,000 
businessmen and their partners reaching the verge of 
bankruptcy. 21 Other factors included poor management, 
indiscriminate fines and fees, extortion and fund shortages. 
In summary, although the legal status of private 
enterprises changed in the 1980s, much work remains to be 
done before they can compete in an equable manner in the 
Chinese economy. The crucial factor is the continued 
existence of a political and ideological environment that 
fosters suspicion (and even downright hostility) to the 
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private sector. Unless and until this environment changes, 
then private enterprises will not be able to operate to 
their full capacity, and the long term development of the 
Chinese economy will be subsequently hampered. 
9.3 Prospects for The Future Development of Rural 
Enterprises 
Although some political and ideological problems 
remain to be solved, it is reasonably certain that the 
Chinese government will continue to permit, and even 
encourage the development of rural enterprises. China's 
leaders are aware that farmers cannot rely on the limited 
arable land to improve their living standards. Moreover, 
agricultural modernization and the improvement of rural 
communication and transport services depends on the 
development of rural enterprises since the government cannot 
invest much money for agriculture when poorly run state 
owned industries, regarded as the backbone of the national 
economy, constantly need more money themselves. 
Moreover, China will have 520 million rural labourers 
by the end of this century, but agriculture can absorb only 
200 million farmers, and urban areas can accommodate no more 
than 20 million rural people. 
22 The rest will have to rely 
on rural enterprises. The alternative is to allow a large 
disaffected rural sector to develop - which, as the CCPIs 
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own rise to power proved, may not prove conducive to the 
party's desire to keep a grip on political power. 
The signs are that the Ccp is prepared to promote the 
development of rural enterprises as a strategy for absorbing 
surplus rural labour. In particular, the "Decision of the 
CCP Central Committee on Further Strengthening Agriculture 
and the Work in Rural Areas". adopted by the eighth plenary 
session of the 13th CCP Central Committee on 29th November 
1991, is worthy of attention. The Central Committee called 
for the development of secondary and tertiary industries, 
the stepping up of the development of small rural industrial 
districts and market towns, and the opening up of more 
avenues for rural labour force transfer. 23 In the light of 
this decision, it seems clear that the development of rural 
enterprises will be the single most important government 
strategy for utilising rural surplus labour. 
Even during the austerity programme of late 1988 to 
1991, new policies affecting rural enterprises were still 
formulated. In 1990, for example, the "Regulations for 
Collective rural enterprises in the PRCII was passed. The 
"Decision of the CCP Central Committee on Further 
Strengthening Agriculture and the Work in Rural Areas", 
adopted by the eighth plenary session of the 13th CCP 
Central Committee on 29th November 1991, also indicated that 
actively developing township and town enterprises is 
considered to be the way to develop the rural economy, and 
to increase peasants' income, and to speed up agricultural 
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modernization and national economic development. 
24 The 
decision further called for the giving of active support to 
township and town enterprises. 
The current government leaders' attitude towards rural 
enterprises is different from that epitomised by former 
premier and party secretary general Zhao Ziyang. They have 
emphasized the key function to be played by state-run large 
and medium-sized enterprises and adopted a policy that is 
more definitely inclined to allowing them to acquire 
capital, energy, and raw materials. However, rural 
enterprises have already grown bigger and stronger, making 
the clampdown in favour of state firms that much harder to 
impose and maintain. 
Irrespective of whether China's leaders like rural 
enterprises or not, most of them have expressed their 
support for rural enterprises. Deng Xiaoping highly praised 
these enterprises as a new force that has suddenly come to 
the fore because of rural reform. 25 Party secretary general 
Jiang Zemin has similarly stated that the role of township- 
town enterprises not only lies in having industry nourish 
both agricultural and sideline production, but also lies in 
close ties with urban large-scale industry and foreign 
trade, as well as close ties with agricultural and nonstaple 
food production. 
26 The current prime minister, Li Peng, not 
noted for his admiration of market forces also stated that: 
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" In my opinion, we should correctly assess the 
role that can be played by town and village 
enterprises in developing China's economy. 1127 
The government does not wish the development of private 
enterprises to threaten the predominance of state 
enterprises. However, at least with regard to the 
contribution of private enterprises towards the employment 
of surplus labour, the Chinese government is willing to 
tolerate the development of private enterprises. According 
to official statistics in 1989, private enterprises have 
employed some four million jobless people, including the 
disabled whom state enterprises are not willing to employ. 
If China's private enterprises can be allowed to develop 
smoothly, their output will make up 10 percent of the 
national gross value of industrial output and solve the 
problem of 40 millions jobless people. 
28 
At a press conference on 26 September 1989, the answers 
given by top party leaders confirmed that the Chinese 
government will permit the continued development of private 
enterprises. Yao Yilin said that China will continue to 
encourage their positive role in contributing to the 
national economy and people's livelihood, and will bring 
into full play their role as a necessary and beneficial 
supplement to the socialist economy. On the other hand, 
China will restrict their negative role by using appropriate 
industrial and taxation policies to restrict their 
30 'blindness'29 and strengthen administration and guidance. 
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Yao Yilin's comments are indicative of the dilemma 
facing China's leaders. On the one hand, the Chinese 
leadership has accepted that the development of private 
enterprises can be beneficial for the current Chinese 
economy in solving unemployment and improving people's 
livelihood. On the other hand, the leadership does not want 
private enterprise to compete seriously with state 
enterprises and affect the predominant status of public 
ownership in the Chinese national economy. But on balance, 
it is clear that the current Chinese leadership considers 
the urgent solution of serious economic problems more 
important than rigid adherence to Marxist dogmas. 
As demonstrated in section 2.1.2 of Chapter Two, 
important remarks made by Deng Xiaoping during a tour to the 
south of China, and also at the Fifth Session of the Seventh 
National People's Congress both called for further economic 
reform in early 1992. Some important policies have already 
been formulated to further encourage the development of 
rural enterprises. It therefore seems beyond any doubt that 
rural enterprises will continue to develop. 
The question is now to what extent this development 
will go. Some critics have warned against too rapid 
development of these enterprises, seeing them as a threat to 
state owned enterprises. 
31 When conservative leaders 
dominated the central government during the period of 
austerity, they intended to control the annual growth rate 
of rural enterprises to about 15 percent. 
32 However, on one 
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estimate, if rural enterprises grow at an average of 15 
percent a year during the 1990s, they will still increase to 
a production value of 3.8 trillion yuan ($704 billion) by 
the year 2000 and account for 48.3 percent of China's gross 
social output. 33 Even though they have been the main target 
of economic retrenchment since late 1988, rural enterprises 
in 1991 still increased at a rate of 18 percent. 
34 Such a 
dynamic situation suggest that rural enterprises are likely 
to grow at even higher rates. 
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Appendix 1. A Comparison of Employment in village-run and 
Township-run industries in 1987 Unit: jo, 000 persons 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Village Enterprises Township Enterprises 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Total 1735.21 1433.13 
Light Industry- 787.47 667.33 
Heavy Industry--- 947.74 765.80 
Branch of Industry 
Coal mining 
and dressing--- 65.29 75.75 
Ferrous metals 
mining and 
dressing---- 9.47 9.07 
Non-ferrous 
metals mining 
and dressing--- 6.98 10.07 
Building materials 
and other 
non-metal mineral 
products--- 93.21 52.72 
Salt mining--- 2.69 3.13 
Other mining 
and dressing --- 1.34 0.13 
Logging and 
transport of timber 
and bamboo--- 5.21 1.82 
Production and 
supply of 
running water--- 0.12 0.97 
Food manufacture--- 116.72 62.39 
Beverage manufacture -- - 20.17 26.11 
Tobacco processing --- 0.27 0.40 
Forage Processing --- 3.65 2.41 
Textiles --- 104.88 168.64 
Clothing --- 65.94 61.19 
Leather, f urs and 
manufactured goods --- 29.98 24.46 
Timber processing 
and bamboo, cane, 
palm fibre and 
straw products--- 29.30 20.38 
Furniture manufacture- 19-04 19.44 
Paper-making and 
manufactrued goods--- 42.45 32.45 
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Printing--- 18.58 11.69 
Manufacture of articles 
for culture, 
education and sports--- 13.20 14.60 
Manufacture of articles 
for arts and crafts--- 73.13 59.68 
Production and supply 
of power generation, 
Steam and hot water --- 2.99 10.31 
Petroleum processing --- 1.22 1.31 
Caking, gas and 
coal-related products-- 3.10 3.37 
Chemical industry--- 37.00 40.07 
Medical and pharmaceutic 
industry--- 2.02 4.32 
Chemical fibres 
industry--- 1.36 2.66 
Rubber manufactured 
goods--- 10.73 10.68 
Plastic manufactured 
goods--- 61.75 39.26 
Manufactured goods 
of building materials 
and other non-metal 
minerals--- 478.80 333.28 
Smelting and pressing 
of ferrous metals--- 13.92 14.97 
Smelting and pressing 
of non-ferrous metals-- 7.76 6.96 
Metal products--- 94.91 84.91 
Machine building 
industry--- 128.16 132.80 
Transportation 
equipment manufacture- 13.13 19.92 
Electric equipment 
and machinery- 28.91 39.57 
Electronic and 
telecommunications 
equipment--- 11.56 12.55 
Instruments, 
meters and other 
measuring equipment--- 4.06 5.32 
Other--- 112.31 13.35 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1988 (Chinese Edition) 
Compiled by the State Statistical Bureau, PRC. Chinese 
Statistical Press, August 1988, p. 288 
Note: These statistics are for the township and village 
levels. 
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Appendix 2. A Comparison of 
workers at the end of 1985 
sized Enterprises and Sample 
Large and Medium 
Sized Enterprises 
Technological Personnel per 1000 
between Sample Large and Medium 
Rural Industrial Enterprises 
Rural Industrial 
Enterprises 
Total 50.49 6.45 
Light Industry-- 30.57 5.63 
Using Farm Products 
As Raw Materials--- 22.99 5.16 
Using Non-farm Products 
As Raw Materials--- 48.97 6.60 
Heavy Industry --- 57.24 7.09 
Excavating --- 27.33 4.55 
Raw materials--- 53.74 9.11 
Processing--- 77.98 7.51 
Branch of Industry 
Coal mining 
and dressing--- 19.41 6.47 
Ferrous metals 
mining and 
dressing---- 34.70 1.65 
Non-ferrous 
metals mining 
and dressing--- 39.91 4.14 
Building materials 
and other 
non-metal mineral 
products--- 28.51 2.27 
Salt mining--- 18.95 4.11 
Logging and 
transport of timber 
and bamboo--- 33.64 1.06 
Production and 
supply of 
running water--- 39.49 2.42 
Food manufacture--- 23.04 6.64 
Beverage manufacture--- 31.27 10.19 
Tobacco processing --- 15.09 1.57 
Forage Processing --- 31.97 8.05 
Textiles --- 21.27 3.86 
Clothing --- 23.81 4.47 
Leather, f urs and 
manufactured goods --- 18.68 5.09 
Timber processing 
and bamboo, cane, 
palm fibre and 
straw products--- 29.08 4.25 
Furniture manufacture-- 21.53 4.83 
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Paper-making and 
manufactrued goods--- 30.01 5.83 
Printing--- 14.44 8.08 
Manufacture of articles 
for culture, 
education and sports--- 52.38 4.33 
Manufacture of articles 
for arts and crafts--- 14.22 4.84 
Production and supply 
of power generation, 
Steam and hot water --- 70.45 9.28 
Petroleum processing --- 78.08 12.68 
Caking, gas and 
coal-related products-- 42.79 3.22 
Chemical industry--- 59.56 10.66 
Medical and pharmaceuti 
industry--- 74.17 12.74 
Chemical fibres 
industry--- 57.92 7.22 
Rubber manufactured 
goods--- 40.29 7.17 
Plastic manufactured 
goods--- 41.22 5.07 
Manufactured goods 
of building materials 
and other non-metal 
minerals--- 34.09 5.12 
Smelting and pressing 
of ferous metals--- 45.57 10.22 
Smelting and pressing 
of non-ferous metals-- 43.93 7.87 
Metal products--- 47.10 8.47 
Machine building 
industry--- 72.06 11.65 
Transportation 
equipment manufacture-- 84.21 14.32 
Electric equipment 
and machinery--- 74.81 9.44 
Electronic and 
telecommunications 
equipment--- 124.10 11.99 
Instrruments, 
meters and other 
measuring equipment--- 122.19 11.61 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Source: 
Calculated from State Industry Survey Office, the State 
Council, The Survey Materials of -Tndustry in 1985 in the People's Republic of China, Chinese Statistical Press, 
Beijing, Vol. 1, April 1987 and Vol. 7, April 1988. 
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Appendix 3. A Comparison of original Value of Fixed Assets 
per worker engaged at the end of 1985 between Sample Large 
and Medium sized Enterprises and Sample Rural Industrial 
Enterprises 
Large and Medium 
Sized Enterprises 
Total 
Light Industry-- 
Using Farm Products 
As Raw Materials--- 
Using Non-farm Products 
As Raw Materials--- 
Heavy Industry --- 
Excavating --- 
Raw materials 
Processing--- 
Branch of Industry 
Coal mining 
and dressing--- 
Ferrous metals 
mining and 
dressing---- 
Non-ferrous 
metals mining 
and dressing--- 
Building materials 
and other 
non-metal mineral 
products--- 
Salt mining--- 
Logging and 
transport of timber 
and bamboo--- 
Production and 
supply of 
running water--- 
Food manufacture--- 
Beverage manufacture 
Tobacco processing --- 
Forage Processing --- 
Textiles --- 
Clothing --- 
Leather, furs and 
manufactured goods --- 
Timber processing 
and bamboo, cane, 
palm fibre and 
20623.18 
12666.15 
10847.51 
17077.57 
23320.84 
20269.97 
39726.10 
15508.51 
15016.26 
19860.66 
20712.98 
16049.15 
12118.11 
10037.43 
49866.86 
14126.60 
15541.83 
10620.01 
41047.86 
8584.34 
7886.61 
9888.63 
Rural Industrial 
Enterprises 
3099.05 
2661.46 
2669.96 
2643.57 
3440.97 
2002.39 
7340.85 
3108.98 
2384.62 
1270.39 
2387.20 
1497.92 
5058.19 
1473.67 
10214.58 
4136.92 
4669.26 
1778.91 
4437.57 
2723.24 
1148.99 
1213.87 
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straw products--- 11301.70 2531.68 
Furniture manufacture-- 9319.97 1939.00 
Paper-making and 
manufactrued goods--- 17482.64 4466.69 
Printing--- 14684.72 2517.68 
Manufacture of articles 
for culture, 
education and sports--- 15475.01 1967.82 
Manufacture of articles 
for arts and crafts--- 7190.19 886.31 
Production and supply 
of power generation, 
Steam and hot water --- 99422.54 24454.54 
Petroleum processing --- 51467.28 4862.43 
Caking, gas and 
coal-related products-- 25886.95 1865.24 
Chemical industry--- 27743.07 4522.44 
Medical and pharmaceuti 
industry--- 13960.78 4103.75 
Chemical fibres 
industry--- 42919.45 6294.65 
Rubber manufactured 
goods--- 11950.50 3039.65 
Plastic manufactured 
goods--- 18490.97 2832.23 
Manufactured goods 
of building materials 
and other non-metal 
minerals--- 16026.27 3105.73 
Smelting and pressing 
of ferous metals--- 26191.49 5120.79 
Smelting and pressing 
of non-ferous metals-- 28109.79 4075.30 
Metal products--- 11773.88 3206.35 
Machine building 
industry--- 14362.30 3788.83 
Transportation 
equipment manufacture-- 15453.89 3528.73 
Electric equipment 
and machinery--- 12159.13 2803.04 
Electronic and 
telecommunications 
equipment--- 14201.09 2527.41 
Instrruments, 
meters and other 
measuring equipment--- 12866.22 2522.69 
Note: 
Unit = yuan 
Source: 
As in appendix 
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A T, % Appendix 4. A Comparison of Net Value of output per worker 
(Average for Year) in 1985 between Sample Large and Medium 
Sized Enterprises and Sample Rural Industrial Enterprises 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Large and Medium 
Sized Enterprises 
Rural Industrial 
Enterprises 
Total 7044 2202 
Light Industry-- 8317 2121 
Using Farm Products 
As Raw Materials--- 8123 1995 
Using Non-farm Products 
As Raw Materials--- 8772 2381 
Heavy Industry --- 6621 2262 
Excavating --- 4766 1990 
Raw materials --- 11502 2754 
Processing--- 4897 2252 
Branch of Industry 
Coal mining 
and dressing--- 1877 1999 
Ferrous metals 
mining and 
dressing---- 3736 1953 
Non-ferrous 
metals mining 
and dressing--- 2937 2529 
Building materials 
and other 
non-metal mineral 
products--- 2319 1855 
Salt mining--- 7541 3034 
Logging and 
transport of timber 
and bamboo--- 3034 4164 
Production and 
supply of 
running water--- 5386 2624 
Food manufacture--- 5285 1652 
Beverage manufacture--- 9746 2691 
Tobacco processing --- 66499 2066 
Forage Processing --- 12704 2070 
Textiles --- 5113 2383 
Clothing --- 4538 1699 
Leather, furs and 
manufactured goods --- 4253 1711 
Timber processing 
and bamboo, cane, 
palm fibre and 
straw products--- 3684 1760 
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Furniture manufacture-- 4102 1749 
Paper-making and 
manufactrued goods--- 6791 1955 
Printing--- 6002 1977 
Manufacture of articles 
for culture, 
education and sports--- 11893 1876 
Manufacture of articles 
for arts and crafts--- 3639 1470 
Production and supply 
of power generation, 
Steam and hot water --- 20292 2136 
Petroleum processing --- 44698 4934 
Caking, gas and 
coal-related products-- 4672 1763 
Chemical industry--- 8387 3031 
Medical and pharmaceuti 
industry--- 7700 3526 
Chemical fibres 
industry--- 12697 4244 
Rubber manufactured 
goods--- 12627 3053 
Plastic manufactured 
goods--- 7573 2272 
Manufactured goods 
of building materials 
and other non-metal 
minerals--- 5118 1720 
Smelting and pressing 
of ferous metals--- 7492 3795 
Smelting and pressing 
of non-ferous metals-- 6624 4215 
Metal products--- 5365 2394 
Machine building 
industry--- 4321 3036 
Transportation 
equipment manufacture-- 5081 3509 
Electric equipment 
and machinery--- 7684 3980 
Electronic and 
telecommunications 
equipment--- 6981 3663 
Instrruments, 
meters and other 
measuring equipment--- 4183 2981 
Note: 
Unit = yuan 
Source: 
As in appendix 
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, 
Ar% 
, ppendix 5. The Investment of Fixed Assets in Sample Rural 
Industrial Enterprises 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
(1) (2) 
1981-1985 1949-1985 (1)/(2)0-o 
Total 25,016,211 38,127,720 65.61 
Light Industry-- 10,168,962 14,312,067 71.05 
Using Farm Products 
As Raw Materials--- 7,195,302 9,668,413 74.42 
Using Non-farm Products 
As Raw Materials --- 2,973,660 4,643,654 64.03 
Heavy Industry --- 14,847,249 23,815,653 62.34 
Excavating --- 1,968,099 2,944,157 66.85 
Raw materials --- 4,386,892 6,654,856 65.92 
Processing--- 8,492,258 14,216,640 59.73 
Branch of Industry 
Coal mining 
and dressing--- 1,264,552 1,852,779 68.25 
Ferrous metals 
mining and 
dressing---- 61,664 84,359 73.09 
Non-ferrous 
metals mining 
and dressing--- 128,768 188,207 68.42 
Building materials 
and other 
non-metal mineral 
products--- 500,298 801,532 62.42 
Salt mining--- 65,782 143,015 45.99 
Logging and 
transport of timber 
and bamboo--- 12,188 15,930 76.51 
Production and 
supply of 
running water--- 68,120 78,059 87.21 
Food manufacture--- 1,540,599 2,259,147 68.19 
Beverage manufacture--- 717,483 915,704 78.35 
Tobacco processing --- 1,850 3,377 54.78 
Forage Processing --- 51,765 60,746 85.22 
Textiles --- 2,744,820 3,392,958 80.89 
Clothing --- 593,644 708,523 83.79 
Leather, furs and 
manufactured goods --- 184,848 235,632 78.45 
Timber processing 
and bamboo, cane, 
palm fibre and 
straw products--- 273,717 435,304 62.88 
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Furniture manufacture-- 234,792 374,419 62.71 
Paper-making and 
manufactrued goods--- 700,663 1,100,103 63.69 
Printing--- 189,357 250,042 75.73 
Manufacture of articles 
for culture, 
education and sports--- 122,783 154,286 79.58 
Manufacture of articles 
for arts and crafts--- 271,591 351,642 77.24 
Production and supply 
of power generation, 
Steam and hot water --- 1,310,134 2,481,910 52.79 
Petroleum processing --- 28,637 38,464 74.45 
Caking, gas and 
coal-related products-- 36,493 49,908 73.12 
Chemical industry--- 931,736 1,376,430 67.69 
Medical and pharmaceuti 
industry--- 88,605 125,835 70.41 
Chemical fibres 
industry--- 113,639 119,232 95.31 
Rubber manufactured 
goods--- 162,944 241,244 67.54 
Plastic manufactured 
goods--- 760,808 986,789 77.09 
Manufactured goods 
of building materials 
and other non-metal 
minerals--- 6,227,642 9,365,128 66.49 
Smelting and pressing 
of ferous metals--- 468,606 577,522 81.14 
Smelting and pressing 
of non-ferous metals-- 148,789 185,578 80.18 
Metal products--- 1,276,290 2,463,615 51.81 
Machine building 
industry--- 2,224,937 4,519,122 49.23 
Transportation 
equipment manufacture-- 432,930 693,334 62.44 
Electric equipment 
and machinery--- 645,989 929,252 69.52 
Electronic and 
telecommunications 
equipment--- 167,841 205,681 81.60 
Instrruments, 
meters and other 
measuring equipment --- 
------------------------ 
88,294 
-------------- 
130,989 
-------------- 
67.41 
-------- 
Note: Unit = 1,000 yuan 
Source: State Industry Survey Office, the State Council, The 
Survey Materials of Industry in 1985 in the People's 
Republic of China, Chinese Statistical Press, Beijing, 
Vol. 7, April 1988, pp. 150-151. 
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Appendix 6. The Size and Acquisition date of Installed 
Equipment by Original Value at the End of 1985 in Sample 
Rural Industrial Enterprises by Branch of Industry 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
No. of Total 
Enterprises Equipment 80's 70's 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Total 170,364 16,089,648 9,830,946 5,594,215 
Light Industry 85,849 
--Using Farm 
Products As 
Raw Materials--- 60,350 
--Using Non-farm 
Products As 
Raw Materials--- 25,499 
Heavy Industry 84,515 
Excavating 14,268 
Raw materials 15,088 
Processing 55,159 
Branch of Industry 
Coal mining 
and dressing--- 6 
Ferrous metals 
mining and 
dressing---- 
Non-ferrous 
metals mining 
and dressing--- 
Building materials 
and other 
non-metal mineral 
products--- 
Salt mining--- 
Logging and 
transport of timber 
and bamboo--- 
Production and 
supply of 
running water--- 
Food manufacture--- 
Beverage manufacture--- 
Tobacco processing --- 
Forage Processing --- 
Textiles --- 
Clothing --- 
Leather, furs and 
manufactured goods --- 
Timber processing 
and bamboo, cane, 
5,814,586 3,929,367 1,590,605 
3,959,368 2,793,383 
1,855,218 1,135,984 
10,275,062 
910,622 
2,777,057 
6,587,383 
, 218 488,740 
677 33,070 
775 77,291 
6,386 308,473 
384 12,533 
199 2,703 
455 7,127 
18,849 736,412 
7,779 277,835 
23 795 
975 22,743 
7,768 1,706,936 
6,698 277,562 
2,297 72,720 
5,901,579 
587,371 
1,565,030 
3,749,178 
322,907 
21,326 
49,836 
191,307 
5,695 
1,822 
5,262 
505,184 
211,931 
383 
17,851 
1,299,158 
213,339 
55,821 
955,779 
634,826 
4,003,610 
294,531 
1,120,166 
2,588,913 
152,906 
10,398 
25,375 
104,862 
6,194 
819 
1,647 
198,736 
62,015 
370 
4,515 
282,566 
57,080 
14,882 
323 
palm fibre and 
straw products--- 5,171 
Furniture manufacture-- 5,105 
Paper-making and 
manufactrued goods--- 3,557 
Printing--- 2,158 
Manufacture of articles 
for culture, 
education and sports--- 1,016 
Manufacture of articles 
for arts and crafts--- 3,568 
Production and supply 
of power generation, 
Steam and hot water --- 6,517 
Petroleum processing --- 160 
Caking, gas and 
coal-related products -- - 724 
Chemical industry--- 4,955 
Medical and pharmaceuti cal 
industry--- 363 
Chemical fibres 
industry--- 103 
Rubber manufactured 
goods--- 996 
Plastic manufactured 
goods--- 4,641 
Manufactured goods 
of building materials 
and other non-metal 
minerals--- 32,378 
Smelting and pressing 
of ferous metals--- 881 
Smelting and pressing 
of non-ferous metals-- - 534 
Metal products--- 13,484 
Machine building 
industry--- 15,786 
Transportation 
equipment manufacture -- - 2,354 
Electric equipment 
and machinery--- 3,489 
Electronic and 
telecommunications 
equipment--- 702 
Instrruments, 
meters and other 
measuring equipment--- 599 
151,749 88,536 55,941 
106,535 57,348 42,946 
540,087 288,909 230,525 
123,441 86,127 29,101 
67,431 46,176 19,284 
66,747 47,345 17,215 
1,019,889 383,285 588,267 
13,061 7,564 5,347 
15,707 11,360 4,122 
481,235 312,482 158,880 
37,222 27,968 8,441 
71,727 60,165 10,058 
104,351 65,734 32,765 
518,631 385,564 115,503 
4,488,811 2,867,137 1,518,231 
293,039 209,027 70,762 
86,349 65,095 18,757 
984,915 468,654 459,032 
1,970,647 865,464 985,126 
271,836 140,289 118,729 
405,635 265,595 125,605 
113,337 93,196 18,620 
49,857 30,779 16,707 
Note: Unit = 1,000 yuan 
Source: State Industry Survey Office, the State Council, The 
Survey Materials of Industry in 1985 in the People's 
Republic of China, Chinese Statistical Press, Beijing, 
Vol. 7, April 1988, pp-150-151. 
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AA 
V. % 
, ppendix 6 (continued) 
The Size and Acquisition date of Installed Equipment by 
Original Value at the End of 1985 in Sample Rural 
Industrial Enterprises by Branch of Industry 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
601's 50's before 1949 
--- ------------------------- 
Total 
--------- 
479,767 
--------- 
130,601 
--------- 
54,118 
Light Industry 182,432 64,543 47,639 
Using Farm Products 
As Raw Materials--- 116,320 49,529 44,357 
Using Non-farm Products 
As Raw Materials--- 66,112 15,014 3,282 
Heavy Industry 297,335 66,058 6,479 
Excavating 22,540 5,511 669 
Raw materials 73,953 16,217 1,691 
Processing 200,842 44,330 4,119 
Branch of Industry 
Coal mining 
and dressing--- 10,878 1,832 217 
Ferrous metals 
mining and 
dressing---- 1,215 131 
Non-ferrous 
metals mining 
and dressing--- 1,570 420 90 
Building materials 
and other 
non-metal mineral 
products--- 8,822 3,120 362 
Salt mining--- 485 159 
Logging and 
transport of timber 
and bamboo--- 54 8 
Production and 
supply of 
running water--- 159 59 
Food manufacture--- 26,440 5,388 664 
Beverage manufacture--- 3,010 741 138 
Tobacco processing--- 30 6 6 
Forage Processing --- 261 116 
Textiles --- 511010 33,354 40,848 
Clothing --- 5j367 1,528 248 
Leather, furs and 
manufactured goods --- 1,730 247 40 
Timber processing 
and bamboo, cane, 
palm fibre and 
straw products--- 5,955 1,171 146 
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Furniture manufacture-- 5,203 919 119 
Paper-making and 
manufactrued goods--- 14,871 4,640 1,142 
Printing--- 5,286 2,007 920 
Manufacture of articles 
for culture, 
education and sports--- 1,437 456 78 
Manufacture of articles 
for arts and crafts--- 1,632 403 152 
Production and supply 
of power generation, 
Steam and hot water --- 42,689 5,535 113 
Petroleum processing --- 39 
Caking, gas and 
coal-related products-- 175 so 
Chemical industry--- 7,466 2,089 318 
Medical and pharmaceuti 
industry--- 796 7 10 
Chemical fibres 
industry--- 1,214 166 124 
Rubber manufactured 
goods--- 3,645 1,846 361 
Plastic manufactured 
goods--- 11,987 4,280 1,297 
Manufactured goods 
of building materials 
and other non-metal 
minerals--- 83,789 18,341 1,313 
Smelting and pressing 
of ferous metals--- 8,372 4,009 869 
Smelting and pressing 
of non-ferous metals-- 2,120 367 10 
Metal products--- 47,575 8,989 665 
Machine building 
industry--- 96,452 21,408 2,196 
Transportation 
equipment manufacture-- 10,326 2,270 222 
Electric equipment 
and machinery--- 11,419 2,804 212 
Electronic and 
telecommunications 
equipment--- 1,308 200 13 
Instrruments, 
meters and other 
measuring equipment --- 
-------------------------- 
1,975 
-------- 
330 
----------- 
66 
--------------- 
Note: Unit = 1,000 yuan 
Source: As above. 
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Appendix 7. The Size and Acquisition date of Installed 
Equipment by Original Value at the End of 1985 in Sample 
Rural Industrial Enterprises by Branch of Industry (% share 
per period) 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
80's 70's before 70's 
-------------------------- 
Total 
--------- 
61.10 
--------- 
34.77 
------------- 
4.13 
Light Industry 67.58 27.36 5.07 
Using Farm Products 
As Raw Materials--- 70.55 24.14 5.31 
Using Non-farm Products 
As Raw Materials--- 61.23 34.22 4.55 
Heavy Industry 57.44 38.96 3.60 
Excavating 64.50 32.34 3.15 
Raw materials 56.36 40.34 3.31 
Processing 56.91 39.30 3.78 
Branch of Industry 
Coal mining 
and dressing--- 66.7 31.29 2.64 
Ferrous metals 
mining and 
dressing---- 64.49 31.44 4.07 
Non-ferrous 
metals mining 
and dressing--- 64.48 32.83 2.69 
Building materials 
and other 
non-metal mineral 
products--- 62.02 33.99 3.99 
Salt mining--- 45.44 49.42 5.14 
Logging and 
transport of timber 
and bamboo--- 67.41 30.30 2.29 
Production and 
supply of 
running water--- 73.83 23.11 3.06 
Food manufacture--- 68.60 26.99 4.41 
Beverage manufacture --- 76.28 22.32 1.40 
Tobacco processing --- 48.18 46.54 5.28 
Forage Processing --- 78.49 19.85 1.66 
Textiles --- 76.11 16.55 7.34 
Clothing --- 76.86 20.56 2.57 
Leather, furs and 
manufactured goods --- 76.76 20.46 2.77 
Timber processing 
and bamboo, cane, 
palm fibre and 
straw products--- 58.34 36.86 4.79 
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Furniture manufacture-- 53.83 40.31 5.86 
Paper-making and 
manufactrued goods--- 53.49 42.68 3.82 
Printing--- 69.77 23.57 6.65 
Manufacture of articles 
for culture, 
education and sports--- 68.48 28.60 2.92 
Manufacture of articles 
for arts and crafts--- 70.93 25.79 3.28 
Production and supply 
of power generation, 
Steam and hot water --- 37.58 57.68 4.74 
Petroleum processing --- 57.91 40.94 1.15 
Caking, gas and 
coal-related products-- 72.32 26.24 1.43 
Chemical industry--- 64.93 33.02 2.05 
Medical and pharmaceuti 
industry--- 75.14 22.68 2.18 
Chemical fibres 
industry--- 83.88 14.02 2.10 
Rubber manufactured 
goods--- 62.99 31.40 5.61 
Plastic manufactured 
goods--- 74.34 22.27 3.39 
Manufactured goods 
of building materials 
and other non-metal 
minerals--- 63.87 33.82 2.30 
Smelting and pressing 
of ferous metals--- 71.33 24.15 4.52 
Smelting and pressing 
of non-ferous metals-- 75.39 21.72 2.89 
Metal products--- 47.58 46.61 5.81 
Machine building 
industry--- 43.92 49.99 6.09 
Transportation 
equipment manufacture-- 51.61 43.68 4.72 
Electric equipment 
and machinery--- 65.48 30.97 3.56 
Electronic and 
telecommunications 
equipment --- 82.23 16.43 1.34 
Instrruments, 
meters and other 
measuring equipment --- 
-------------------------- 
61.73 
---------- 
33.51 
--------- 
4.76 
---------- 
Note: Unit = 01 
-- 
Source: As above. 
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